Boardroom · Executive simulation

Corvell Furniture: three years to restore the margin

A family furniture maker whose profit margin has slipped from ten per cent to almost nothing must decide what to fix first, what to spend and what to risk.

Fictional company Source: Simulated data 7 roles 9 stages 3 years of decisions

The board's mandate

The board has given the executive team three years, 2027 to 2029, and up to £2.50m a year to spend on marketing, new machinery, a people programme and international expansion. Prices and overheads are the team's to set. The board's targets are a profit margin of at least 5% in 2029, and no year ending with the overdraft above the bank's limit of £2.50m. Whatever is not spent stays in the bank. The family will take no dividend until the margin recovers.

The question for the executive team How should Corvell restore its profitability by 2029 without exhausting the bank's patience, the workforce's goodwill or the brand it has built?

The brief

Corvell Furniture makes dining tables, chairs, sideboards and beds in oak and walnut in a converted mill at Wexley Bridge. Every piece is made to order by 160 makers, finishers and fitters, and sold through two showrooms, the company's website and about forty independent furniture shops. Ruth Corvell's grandfather founded the business in 1972. It has never moved and has never made a loss, though 2026 came close.

Until recently it was comfortably profitable. In 2023 Corvell delivered 23,682 pieces and earned £19.81m, a profit margin of 10.1% and a return on capital employed of 23.2%. In 2026 it delivered 20,780 pieces for £18.26m; the profit margin was 1.0% and the return on capital employed 2.1%.

Nothing dramatic happened. Timber, finishes and fittings cost more every year, and the price list rose more slowly. Importers of cheaper solid-wood furniture held or trimmed their prices. To protect profit the marketing budget was cut every year, from £760k in 2023 to £420k in 2026, and pay was frozen in 2025 and 2026. A second showroom opened in 2025 on a ten-year lease. Experienced makers began to leave: 25 left in 2026, against 10 in 2023.

In November 2026 the board asked its executive team for a three-year plan. You join that team in one of seven roles. The decisions are the team's; your role decides what you watch most closely and what you will answer for.

The seven roles' briefings

Chief executive (CEO)

You answer to the board for all of it. In 2023 Corvell earned a profit margin of 10.1%; in 2026 it earned 1.0%, and the return on the capital the owners have tied up in it fell from 23.2% to 2.1%. The family wants the business kept whole and in Wexley Bridge; the fund wants the margin back quickly; the bank wants a plan that does not live on its overdraft.

Your job is the balance. Every executive will argue for their own function; you are the one who has to say what comes first, what can wait, and what the plan will cost the people who carry it out.

Judged on

  • A profit margin of at least 5% in 2029
  • No year ending over the overdraft limit
  • Brand strength of at least 60 in 2029
  • Morale of at least 55 in 2029

Chief financial officer (CFO)

You look first at what the numbers say and when the cash moves. Operating profit fell from £2m in 2023 to £186k in 2026, the gross profit margin from 58.1% to 53.6%, and return on capital employed from 23.2% to 2.1%. Liquidity is not yet the problem: net cash was £1.54m at the end of 2026, the current ratio 3.77, and the overdraft unused.

That comfort will not last if the plan spends the whole budget and the returns come late. Each year's spending is paid for now; most of it earns next year or after. Your task is to make sure the plan is affordable on the way, not only at the end.

Judged on

  • Return on capital employed of at least 12% in 2029
  • Net cash never below zero at a year end
  • Profit for the year, added over the three years, of at least zero

Chief marketing officer (CMO)

You see the customers Corvell has lost. Market share fell from 2.3% to 1.9% while the market grew, because Corvell's prices rose against rivals that held or trimmed theirs: on an index of its price against competitors' (competitors = 100), Corvell went from 110 to 118. Marketing was cut from £760k to £420k, and the brand, at 62, has only begun to show it.

You also know what the finance team can forget: a brand fades when it is not maintained, and marketing takes a year to show its full effect.

Judged on

  • Market share of at least 2% in 2029
  • Brand strength of at least 65 in 2029
  • Revenue up by at least £2m on 2026

Chief operating officer (COO)

You run the workshop. It can make about 22,735 pieces a year in normal hours and 26,145 with overtime; it delivered 20,780 in 2026. That looks like room to grow, but there is less of it than there was: in 2023, normal hours could make 26,171. Experienced makers have left (25 in 2026), new starters are slower, and the share of pieces returned or remade rose from 2.6% to 3.9%.

Whoever wins the argument upstairs, you will have to make the plan. If marketing works, can you make the pieces? If the efficiency programme bites, who will check the finish?

Judged on

  • Service quality of at least 75 in 2029
  • No more than 5,000 hours of overtime in any year
  • No more than 3% of pieces returned or remade in 2029

Chief human resources officer (CHRO)

You see what the last three years did to the people who make the product. Pay was frozen in 2025 and 2026. Morale in the staff survey fell from 64 to 50, and labour turnover rose from 6.3% to 15.6%: 25 people left in 2026, many of them experienced makers who went to better-paid work down the valley.

The union wants a pay rise; the fund wants costs cut; the makers who stayed want to know whether the company has a future. A plan that ignores them will be carried out by people who no longer believe in it.

Judged on

  • Morale of at least 60 in 2029
  • Labour turnover of no more than 10% in 2029
  • Morale never below 50 at a year end

Strategy director

You look beyond the next year. Corvell has been losing share at home for three years while the market grew by 5.6%, and its return on capital employed has fallen from 23.2% to 2.1%. A distributor has offered to sell the range in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, and rivals compete on price at home.

Your question is where Corvell will earn its return in 2030 and after: in the same market, defended better, or in new ones? A plan that only repairs the past may leave the company with nowhere to grow.

Judged on

  • Revenue up by at least £3m on 2026
  • Return on capital employed of at least 10% in 2029
  • At least 10% of revenue earned abroad in 2029

Management consultant

The board has hired you for an independent view. You have no function to defend, and you will be judged on whether the plan works for the whole business: the margin, the workshop, the people and the bank.

Your first reading of the figures: revenue fell by 7.8% between 2023 and 2026, but operating profit fell from £2m to £186k. The company has cash (£1.54m) and time, but not unlimited amounts of either, and each executive sees a different part of the problem. Your value is in seeing how the parts connect.

Judged on

  • A profit margin of at least 4% in 2029
  • Service quality of at least 72 in 2029
  • Morale of at least 58 in 2029
  • No year ending over the overdraft limit

Choose your role

The decisions are the executive team's. Your role sets the measures you watch most closely, what each stage asks you to look for first, and the goals you are judged on at the end. The roles' goals pull in different directions: no plan meets every goal of every role.

Your role

This is the casebook of the simulation: every stage with its evidence and questions, the answers in the disclosures, and a worked example that plays the three years with the engine's figures. With JavaScript you choose a role, answer each stage, set your own plan for each year and compare it with every strategy.

Stage 1 of 9

Examine the financial information

Read the statements and the ratios for 2023 to 2026. Where has the profit gone, and is this a problem of profit, of cash, or both?

Exhibit 1

Statement of profit or loss, 2023 to 2026

Source: Simulated data
Statement of profit or loss, £000
£0002023202420252026
Sales revenue19,80719,28918,63418,263
Cost of sales8,2918,3638,3408,478
of which materials, delivery and other inputs8,0838,1718,1328,161
of which returns and remakes207193207317
Gross profit11,51710,92610,2949,785
Expenses9,5169,4249,6149,599
of which wages, overtime and recruitment4,8764,9544,9844,999
of which overheads3,2003,2003,5003,560
of which marketing760620500420
of which the people programme80503020
of which depreciation600600600600
Profit before interest and tax2,0011,502680186
Interest130130130130
Profit before tax1,8711,37255056
Tax46834313814
Profit for the year1,4031,02941342
Dividends1,0008004000
Retained profit4032291342
In pounds sterling, thousands; figures in brackets are negative. Cost of sales is the materials, delivery and other inputs bought for each piece, with returns and remakes; the makers' wages are expenses.
Exhibit 2

Statement of financial position

Source: Simulated data
Statement of financial position, £000
£000End of 2022End of 2023End of 2024End of 2025End of 2026
Non-current assets (net book value)6,0006,0006,0006,0006,000
Current assets
Cash8001,1841,4381,4881,545
Debtors1,0781,0851,0571,0211,001
Stock1,3141,3631,3751,3711,394
Total current assets3,1923,6323,8703,8803,939
Total assets9,1929,6329,8709,8809,939
Current liabilities
Bank overdraft00000
Trade creditors9851,0221,0311,0281,045
Total current liabilities9851,0221,0311,0281,045
Non-current liabilities: loans2,0002,0002,0002,0002,000
Net assets6,2076,6106,8396,8526,894
Equity
Share capital1,0001,0001,0001,0001,000
Retained earnings5,2075,6105,8395,8525,894
Total equity6,2076,6106,8396,8526,894
In pounds sterling, thousands. Net assets equal total equity in every column; the tests check it.
Exhibit 3

Cash flow, 2023 to 2026

Source: Simulated data
Cash flow, £000
£0002023202420252026
Profit for the year1,4031,02941342
Add back depreciation600600600600
Change in debtors(7)283620
Change in stock(49)(12)4(23)
Change in creditors379(3)17
Cash flow from operating activities1,9841,6541,050657
Upkeep of the plant(600)(600)(600)(600)
Cash flow from investing activities(600)(600)(600)(600)
Dividends paid(1,000)(800)(400)0
Cash flow from financing activities(1,000)(800)(400)0
Net cash flow3842545057
Opening net cash (cash less overdraft)8001,1841,4381,488
Closing net cash1,1841,4381,4881,545
Starting from profit and adjusting for depreciation and working capital (the indirect method). Upkeep is what was spent keeping the mill's machinery in repair.
Exhibit 4Source: Simulated data
The figures behind the lines
Revenue, operating profit, profit margin and net cash by year
Measure2023202420252026
Sales revenue£19.81m£19.29m£18.63m£18.26m
Profit before interest and tax£2m£1.50m£680k£186k
Profit margin10.1%7.8%3.7%1.0%
Net cash (cash less overdraft)£1.18m£1.44m£1.49m£1.54m

Question 1Using the statement of profit or loss, calculate Corvell's profit margin for 2026, as a percentage to one decimal place.

Answer and working for question 1

The answer: 1.0% (anything within 0.15 percentage points of it counts as right)

Profit margin = (profit before interest and tax ÷ sales revenue) × 100 = (£186k ÷ £18.26m) × 100 = 1.0%. In 2023 it was 10.1%: of every pound of sales, Corvell now keeps about a penny from its trading, where it used to keep ten pence.

Question 2Which statement best explains how Corvell's profit fell between 2023 and 2026?
Answer and explanation for question 2
  • Not thisRevenue collapsed while costs stayed the same.Revenue fell by 7.8% over three years: a decline, not a collapse. And costs did not stay the same: cost of sales for each piece rose by 16.5%, and overheads by 11.3%.
  • The answerEach piece cost more to make while prices rose less, fewer pieces were sold, and the costs that do not change with output rose.Right. Materials for each piece rose by 18.0% while the average price rose by 5.1%, so the gross profit margin fell from 58.1% to 53.6%. Pieces delivered fell by 12.3%, and overheads rose by 11.3%. Each effect on its own was modest; together they took operating profit from £2m to £186k.
  • Not thisInterest on new borrowing turned an operating profit into a loss.There was no new borrowing. Interest was £130k in 2026, the same as in 2023, because the loan did not change and the overdraft was not used.
  • Not thisHeavy investment in new machinery raised depreciation.Corvell bought no new machinery in these years. Depreciation was £600k in 2023 and £600k in 2026.
Exhibit 5

Ratios, 2023 to 2026

Source: Simulated data

This exhibit opens once you have checked both answers above, so that you work the margin out first.

Ratios, 2023 to 2026
Ratio2023202420252026
Gross profit marginGross profit margin = (gross profit ÷ sales revenue) × 10058.1%56.6%55.2%53.6%
Profit marginProfit margin = (profit before interest and tax ÷ sales revenue) × 10010.1%7.8%3.7%1.0%
Return on capital employedROCE = (profit before interest and tax ÷ capital employed) × 10023.2%17.0%7.7%2.1%
Current ratioCurrent ratio = current assets ÷ current liabilities3.553.753.773.77
Acid test (quick) ratioAcid test (quick) ratio = (current assets − stock) ÷ current liabilities2.222.422.442.44
Stock turnover (days) HLStock turnover (number of days) = (average stock ÷ cost of sales) × 365, here on closing stock60 days60 days60 days60 days
Debtor days HLDebtor days = (debtors ÷ total sales revenue) × 36520 days20 days20 days20 days
Creditor days HLCreditor days = (creditors ÷ cost of sales) × 36545 days45 days45 days45 days
Gearing ratio HLGearing ratio = (non-current liabilities ÷ capital employed) × 10023.2%22.6%22.6%22.5%

HL The efficiency ratios and gearing are HL only, and are hidden while you are viewing SL content.

The guide's formulas (pp. 64 to 65). Stock days use closing stock.
HL Stock days, debtor days, creditor days and the gearing ratio are HL only (3.6). Both questions here can be answered from the statements and the profitability and liquidity ratios.

In the IB course: 3.4 Final accounts, 3.5 Profitability and liquidity ratio analysis, 3.6 Efficiency ratio analysisHL, 3.7 Cash flow

Stage 2 of 9

Identify the causes of the decline

Eleven pieces of evidence from the board pack. Choose the ones that explain the fall in profitability, and leave out what the evidence does not support. Then see what each choice tells you.

Which of these explain the fall in Corvell's profitability? Choose at least 2.
  • Cause or not? Materials cost more; prices rose less

    A cause

    A cause. Each piece's gross profit shrank as costs outran prices: the gross profit margin fell from 58.1% to 53.6%. The margin on what is sold is the first place to look.

  • Cause or not? Rivals held or cut their prices

    A cause

    A cause. The marketing team's price tests put the price elasticity of demand at about 2.0: each 1% that Corvell's price rises against its rivals' costs about 2.0% of orders. Its market share fell from 2.3% to 1.9% in a market that grew.

  • Cause or not? Marketing was cut every year

    A cause

    A cause, and one that has not finished. Half of a year's marketing reaches the brand the following year, so cuts show late: the brand has only begun to fall. To hold it where it is, Corvell would need to spend about £699k a year.

  • Cause or not? Pay frozen; makers leaving

    A cause

    A cause. Each leaver costs recruitment and a year in which the new maker produces about half as much, and disengaged makers make more mistakes. Pieces delivered per worker fell from 148 to 130; the quality problems follow from it.

  • Cause or not? Overheads rose while sales fell

    A cause

    A cause. A cost that does not change with output weighs more as sales fall. The new showroom has not brought the sales to pay for itself, which also makes it the obvious first target of an efficiency programme.

  • Cause or not? More pieces coming back

    Partly a cause

    Partly. The cost of remaking pieces is real and has grown, but it is a symptom: quality fell because experienced makers left and those who stayed were less engaged. Fixing returns without fixing morale treats the symptom. It matters later too: this year's poor reviews cost next year's brand.

  • Cause or not? The market is shrinking

    Not a cause

    Not supported. The market grew by 5.6% over the three years; it was Corvell's share of it that fell. The problem is Corvell's position in the market, not the market.

  • Cause or not? Interest on borrowing

    Not a cause

    Not a cause. Interest was the same in every year, because the loan did not change and the overdraft was not used. It is small beside the fall in operating profit, from £2m to £186k.

  • Cause or not? Heavy investment raised depreciation

    Not a cause

    Not supported. Corvell bought no new machinery in these years, and depreciation was £600k in 2023 too. The showroom is leased, not owned, so its cost sits in overheads, where the evidence points.

  • Cause or not? Dividends drained the company

    Not a cause

    Not a cause of the fall in profit. Dividends are paid out of profit once it is made: they reduce cash and retained earnings, not the profit margin. Here cash is not the problem: net cash was £1.54m at the end of 2026.

  • Cause or not? The exchange rate hurt sales abroad

    Not a cause

    Not a cause: Corvell does not yet sell abroad. The exchange rate will matter if it starts to, which is one of the strategies open to it.

HL Labour turnover (2.4) and quality management (5.3) are HL only, but the evidence about them can be read at SL.

In the IB course: 3.3 Costs and revenues, 3.5 Profitability and liquidity ratio analysis, 4.5 The seven Ps of the marketing mix, 2.4 Motivation and demotivation, 5.3 Lean production and quality managementHL

Stage 3 of 9

Analyse the market

Look at the market Corvell sells into and the one it could enter. Which customers is it losing, and to whom? What would a change of price do?

Exhibit 6

The home market and Corvell's place in it

Source: Simulated data
The home market by year
Measure2023202420252026
Home market (pieces)1.02m1.03m1.05m1.07m
Pieces delivered at home (pieces)23,68222,61021,41420,780
Market share at home2.3%2.2%2.0%1.9%
Average price per piece£836£853£870£879
Competitors’ average price£760£752£745£745
Price against competitors (competitors = 100)110113117118
Marketing spend£760k£620k£500k£420k
Brand strength (out of 100)65656462
The market is the premium solid-wood furniture market at home, in pieces. Brand strength is from the annual customer survey.
Exhibit 7

Competitors in 2026

Source: Simulated data
MakerPositionAverage priceMarket share
Tessaro Living Imported solid-wood furniture sold online and in out-of-town stores; a narrower range, delivered in days. £611 7.5%
Valdane Home A department store chain's own brand, made abroad in pine and oak veneer. £655 9.0%
Brennick and Hale A British maker of premium furniture with eight stores of its own. £834 3.4%
Corvell FurnitureMade to order in oak and walnut at Wexley Bridge.£8791.9%
Other makersMany small workshops and importers.n/a78.2%
Every competitor is fictional. Prices are averages across comparable pieces.
Exhibit 8

The offer from abroad

Source: Simulated data

A distributor has offered to sell Corvell's range in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. Setting up (certification, a catalogue in three languages, training the distributor's staff and a stand at a trade fair) would cost about £300k, and sales would start the year after. With enough spent on building the market, it could take about 6,000 pieces a year at today's prices. The distributor would buy at about £809 a piece at the planning rate of €1.15 to the pound, paying in euros after 75 days. Freight, duty and insurance would cost £85 a piece, and about 4% of pieces arrive damaged and are replaced.

Question 1The marketing team's price tests suggest that a 5% price rise would cost about 9.3% of orders. At 2026 costs, what would a 5% rise do to revenue and to gross profit?
Answer and explanation for question 1
  • Not thisBoth would rise, because each piece would earn more.Each piece would earn more, but there would be fewer of them: revenue would change by −⁠4.8% and gross profit by −⁠0.8%.
  • The answerRevenue would fall, and gross profit would barely change: on its own a price rise would not restore the margin, though it would free capacity.Right. With elasticity of about 2.0, orders fall faster than the price rises: revenue changes by −⁠4.8% and gross profit by −⁠0.8%. Prices should follow costs, but they cannot carry the recovery alone.
  • Not thisRevenue would fall by the full 5%, and gross profit by more.The price rise offsets part of the lost volume: revenue changes by −⁠4.8%, and gross profit by −⁠0.8%, because each piece not made also saves its materials.
  • Not thisNothing would change, because premium customers do not notice price.Corvell's customers did notice: as its price rose against its rivals', its market share fell from 2.3% to 1.9%.
Question 2What would the distributor's offer add to Corvell, and what would it risk?
Answer and explanation for question 2
  • The answerDemand that does not depend on the home market, at a lower margin on each piece, after a year of set-up costs, with earnings that fall when the pound strengthens.Right. At the planning rate each export would leave about £299 after its inputs, freight and damage, against £471 at home; a pound 5% stronger would cut the price received to £770. The set-up is paid a year before the first sale.
  • Not thisExtra profit from the first year, because the distributor does the selling.Nothing is sold abroad until the set-up is complete, a year after it begins, and the market then takes further spending to build.
  • Not thisNo currency risk, because Corvell would quote its prices in pounds.The distributor would pay in euros at a price set at the planning rate. If the pound strengthens, each euro buys fewer pounds: at a rate 5% stronger, each piece would earn £770 instead of £809.
  • Not thisHigher margins than at home, because customers abroad pay more.The distributor takes its margin, and freight and damage add cost: each export would leave about £299, against £471 at home.
HL The importance of market share (4.1), price elasticity of demand (4.5) and international marketing (4.6) are HL only. The questions can be answered from the figures given.

In the IB course: 4.1 Introduction to marketing, 4.5 The seven Ps of the marketing mix, 4.6 International marketingHL, 1.5 Growth and evolution

Stage 4 of 9

Review operational capacity

How much can the workshop make, what limits it, and what happens to cost and quality when it is pushed?

Exhibit 9

The workshop, 2023 to 2026

Source: Simulated data
The workshop by year
Measure2023202420252026
Plant capacity (pieces)28,00028,00028,00028,000
Capacity in normal hours (pieces)26,17125,15623,97322,735
Productive capacity, with overtime (pieces)28,00028,00027,56926,145
Pieces delivered (pieces)23,68222,61021,41420,780
Load on normal hours90.5%89.9%89.3%91.4%
Capacity utilization rate84.6%80.7%77.7%79.5%
Overtime hours (hours)0000
Labour productivity (pieces per worker)148141134130
Pieces returned or remade2.6%2.4%2.6%3.9%
Service quality (out of 100)77787771
Capacity in normal hours is what the workforce can make at its current skill and morale, or the plant's limit if that is lower; productive capacity adds the overtime allowed, up to 15% more hours. Utilization is output as a share of productive capacity; load is output as a share of normal-hours capacity.

Question 1How many more pieces could the workshop have made in 2026 in normal hours, without overtime?

Answer and working for question 1

The answer: 1,955 pieces (anything within 60 pieces of it counts as right)

Capacity in normal hours, 22,735 pieces, less pieces delivered, 20,780, leaves about 1,955 pieces. In 2023 normal hours could make 26,171: the room has shrunk as experienced makers left.

Question 2Suppose orders rose by 12% in 2027 and nothing else changed. What would happen in the workshop?
Answer and explanation for question 2
  • Not thisAll of it would be made in normal hours.Orders 12% higher would be about 23,273 pieces, more than the 22,735 that normal hours can make.
  • The answerSome pieces would need overtime at a premium, and with the workshop running above its normal capacity, service quality would slip.Right. About 538 pieces would be made in overtime, and the workshop would run at 102.4% of its normal capacity, well above the point at which faults and late deliveries rise.
  • Not thisThe machines would be the limit, so orders would be lost.The plant could make 28,000 pieces. The limit is people's hours, and overtime can stretch them for a while.
  • Not thisNothing, because utilization was only 79.5%.Utilization here is measured against capacity with overtime. Against normal hours the workshop was already close to full, so extra orders would come at overtime rates.
HL Capacity utilization, productivity (5.6) and quality management (5.3) are HL only. The questions here use only the capacity figures in the exhibit.

In the IB course: 5.1 Introduction to operations management, 5.3 Lean production and quality managementHL, 5.6 Production planningHL

Stage 5 of 9

Consider employees and other stakeholders

Who is affected by each way out, who can stop it, and what have the last three years done to the people who make the product?

Exhibit 10

The workforce, 2023 to 2026

Source: Simulated data
The workforce by year
Measure2023202420252026
Production workforce (people)160160160160
Leavers (people)10162225
Labour turnover6.3%10.0%13.8%15.6%
Morale (out of 100)64585350
Skill index (opening = 1.00)1.001.011.010.99
Labour productivity (pieces per worker)148141134130
Morale is from the annual staff survey. Every leaver was replaced; a new starter makes about half as much as an experienced maker in the first year.
Exhibit 11

The stakeholders and what they say

Source: Simulated data
  • The Corvell family

    High power

    Owns 70% of the shares. A business that stays independent, stays in Wexley Bridge and keeps its name for craft.

    “Three generations of my family have made furniture here. I will not be the one who sells it or moves it.” Ruth Corvell, chair

  • The investment fund

    High power

    Owns 30% of the shares and has a seat on the board. A return on its investment, and a company whose stake it could one day sell.

    “The margin has gone from ten per cent to one in three years. We want it back, and soon. Cost is the quickest lever.”

  • The workforce and its union

    Medium power

    Jobs, pay that keeps up with the town, and a say in how the work changes.

    “Two years without a rise, and the best makers go to the kitchen firms down the valley. If you want quality, pay the people who make it.” Sam Hollis, union convenor

  • The bank

    Medium power

    Its loan of £2m repaid as agreed, and the overdraft kept inside its limit of £2.50m.

    “Corvell has banked with us for decades. A plan that borrows to grow is a conversation; a plan that borrows to stand still is not.”

  • Customers and the independent shops

    Medium power

    Furniture that lasts twenty years, delivered on the promised date; for the shops, a brand that sells.

    “The finish used to be perfect and the delivery date was the delivery date. Our table came three weeks late.” A customer review, 2026

  • Timber suppliers

    Low power

    Steady orders, paid on time.

    “Oak is dearer everywhere. We could hold prices for a year if Corvell committed to the volumes.”

  • The town of Wexley Bridge

    Low power

    Its largest private employer staying, and staying well.

    “Corvell is the reason the high street still has a café and a hardware shop.” A town councillor

Every person and organization here is fictional.
Question 1The fund proposes a 12% cut in overheads in 2027. Whose interests conflict most sharply, and why?
Answer and explanation for question 1
  • The answerThe fund, which wants profit back quickly, and the workforce, whose morale is already low: a deep cut would lift the first year's profit but risk more leavers and poorer quality.Right. Both have real power over the plan: the fund on the board, the workforce in the quality of every piece. With morale at 50, a cut beyond the obvious slack would land on people already looking for the door.
  • Not thisThe bank and the customers, because customers pay the bank.Neither has much at stake in an overheads cut. The bank cares about the overdraft; customers care about the finish and the delivery date.
  • Not thisNobody's, because everyone gains when costs fall.The saving goes to profit at once, but the cost falls on the people whose jobs or workload change, and, later, on customers if quality slips.
  • Not thisThe family and the town, because the family plans to move production abroad.Nothing in the evidence suggests a move. The family's stated aim is the opposite: to keep the business in Wexley Bridge.
Question 2Which response to low morale fits the evidence best?
Answer and explanation for question 2
  • Not thisA one-off bonus for everyone this year.It would help for a year. But the makers who leave are going to better-paid work and better prospects; a one-off payment changes neither.
  • The answerA programme of training and development, with pay that rewards new skills.Right. Pay that has fallen behind the town is a hygiene factor in Herzberg's terms: it causes dissatisfaction until it is put right. Training and a path to better work are motivators. The evidence shows both problems.
  • Not thisCut overtime to reduce stress.The workshop did not work overtime in 2026. Overtime is not why morale fell.
  • Not thisDo nothing; morale recovers by itself.Morale does drift back towards its usual level, but only part of the way each year, and meanwhile turnover keeps draining skill from the workshop.
HL Labour turnover (2.4) and industrial and employee relations (2.7) are HL only. At HL, labour turnover in 2026 was 25 leavers ÷ 160 staff × 100 = 15.6%; every leaver was replaced, so the average number of staff was 160.

In the IB course: 1.4 Stakeholders, 2.1 Introduction to human resource management, 2.4 Motivation and demotivation, 2.7 Industrial/employee relationsHL

Stage 6 of 9

Select a strategic alternative

Four ways forward. Each fits some of the evidence and ignores some of it. Choose the one you will lead with: your plan for 2027 starts from it, and you can change any lever.

Which strategy will you lead with?
  1. Fix what the evidence says is broken: pass rising costs on in modest price rises, rebuild the brand, stop the drain of experienced makers, and trim the overheads that grew while sales fell.

    What it would take

    • Prices up each year, a little more than competitors' prices.
    • Marketing back above the level that holds the brand where it is.
    • A people programme of training and retention pay.
    • A small efficiency programme aimed at the new showroom and other slack.

    The risks

    It is slow. The first year is likely to be worse before the brand and the workforce recover, and the board will have to hold its nerve.

    Its plan, year by year: Restore the core
    The plan for Restore the core
    Lever202720282029
    Price change+4%+3%+3%
    Efficiency programme5% of overheadsNoneNone
    Marketing£1.10m£1.10m£1m
    Capacity investmentNoneNoneNone
    People programme£200k£200k£200k
    International expansionNoneNoneNone
    Budget spent (of £2.50m a year)£1.30m£1.30m£1.20m
    How well it fits the evidence: Restore the core

    A strong fit with the evidence

    A strong fit. It treats each cause the evidence supports (the squeezed margin, the brand, morale and the overheads) and none that it does not. Its weakness is time: marketing and training pay back over years, not months.

  2. Restore the margin quickly by cutting costs: a deep efficiency programme, a lean marketing budget, no new spending, and firm price rises.

    What it would take

    • A deep efficiency programme in the first year.
    • Marketing cut below the level that holds the brand.
    • No people programme, no machinery and no expansion.
    • Firm price rises every year.

    The risks

    It treats overheads as the whole problem. Cuts beyond the slack thin out support and inspection, morale falls further from an already low level, and the brand keeps fading.

    Its plan, year by year: Cut back to profit
    The plan for Cut back to profit
    Lever202720282029
    Price change+4%+3%+3%
    Efficiency programme12% of overheadsNoneNone
    Marketing£300k£300k£300k
    Capacity investmentNoneNoneNone
    People programmeNoneNoneNone
    International expansionNoneNoneNone
    Budget spent (of £2.50m a year)£300k£300k£300k
    How well it fits the evidence: Cut back to profit

    A weak fit with the evidence

    A weak fit. It addresses one cause, the overheads, and deepens two others, the brand and morale. It will lift the first year's profit, which is why it appeals to the fund, but the evidence says the decline runs through the brand and the workforce.

  3. Win back the customers lost to cheaper rivals: cut prices, spend heavily on marketing, and invest in machinery to make the extra pieces.

    What it would take

    • Price cuts in the first two years.
    • Heavy marketing in every year.
    • New machinery in the first two years.
    • A small people programme.

    The risks

    Demand responds at once but machinery takes a year to arrive. With a price elasticity of about 2.0, the extra pieces each earn less, and the plan spends the whole budget.

    Its plan, year by year: Win volume
    The plan for Win volume
    Lever202720282029
    Price change−4%−1%No change
    Efficiency programmeNoneNoneNone
    Marketing£1.50m£1.40m£1.20m
    Capacity investment£900k£600kNone
    People programme£100k£100k£100k
    International expansionNoneNoneNone
    Budget spent (of £2.50m a year)£2.50m£2.10m£1.30m
    How well it fits the evidence: Win volume

    A conditional fit

    Conditional. It answers the lost market share and the fading brand, but not the squeezed margin: with costs still rising, lower prices mean a thinner margin on every piece. It works only if the workshop can make the extra pieces without overtime, yet the machinery arrives a year after the demand.

  4. Grow where the price war is not: accept the distributor's offer, build sales in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, and add machinery for the export volume, while keeping the home business steady.

    What it would take

    • Set-up abroad in the first year, then spending to build the market in every year.
    • New machinery in the first two years for the extra volume.
    • Marketing a little above the level that holds the brand, and a modest people programme.
    • Prices up a little each year.

    The risks

    Two years of costs before exports pay; earnings that shrink when the pound strengthens; damage and delay on the way; and the home market's problems only half fixed.

    Its plan, year by year: Go international
    The plan for Go international
    Lever202720282029
    Price change+3%+2%+2%
    Efficiency programmeNoneNoneNone
    Marketing£800k£800k£800k
    Capacity investment£600k£400kNone
    People programme£150k£150k£150k
    International expansion£900k£700k£500k
    Budget spent (of £2.50m a year)£2.45m£2.05m£1.45m
    How well it fits the evidence: Go international

    A conditional fit

    Conditional. It adds demand that does not depend on the home market, but it leaves the home causes, the brand and the margin, half treated. It also carries risks the home business does not: the exchange rate, freight, and a distributor who pays after 75 days.

In the IB course: 1.3 Business objectives, 1.5 Growth and evolution, 4.6 International marketingHL, 3.8 Investment appraisal

Stage 7 of 9

Allocate resources

Set the plan for 2027: the price, any efficiency programme, and how much of the year's budget goes to marketing, machinery, people and international expansion.

The six levers

LeverRangeIn 2026What it does
Price change −10% to +10% +1% Per cent on last year’s prices, from −10 to +10. Demand responds through the price elasticity of demand.
Efficiency programme None to 15% of overheads None Per cent of overheads cut this year, from 0 to 15. The saving lasts; so does the strain on quality and morale.
Marketing None to £2m £420k This year’s whole marketing spend. Half of its effect on the brand arrives this year and half next year.
Capacity investment None to £2.50m None Machinery that adds plant capacity and cuts the hours each piece needs. Paid now; in use next year.
People programme None to £1m £20k Training, development and retention pay. Morale responds this year; productivity next year.
International expansion None to £1.50m None Entering the export market: set-up first, then building sales. Exports start the year after set-up.

Marketing, capacity, people and international share the year's budget of £2.50m: 4 levers, one pot. Whatever is not spent stays in the bank.

In the worked example: Restore the core

The worked example follows the first strategy, Restore the core, as a team might have played it: its plan for each year, and the engine's results. With JavaScript you can play your own plan, year by year, and compare it with this one and with the other strategies.

The worked example's plan: Restore the core
Lever202720282029
Price change+4%+3%+3%
Efficiency programme5% of overheadsNoneNone
Marketing£1.10m£1.10m£1m
Capacity investmentNoneNoneNone
People programme£200k£200k£200k
International expansionNoneNoneNone
Budget spent (of £2.50m a year)£1.30m£1.30m£1.20m

In the IB course: 3.9 BudgetsHL, 3.8 Investment appraisal, 3.2 Sources of finance

Stage 8 of 9

Implement, year by year

Each year runs as soon as you commit it. Read what happened and why, then adjust the plan for the next year. Some of what you decide arrives a year later.

The worked example, year by year

2027: what happened

The plan Prices up 4%. An efficiency programme cutting overheads by 5%. Marketing: £1.10m. No new machinery. People programme: £200k. No spending abroad.

Customers and the brand
Home orders
20,018 −⁠761 Down, worse
Market share
1.8% −⁠0.1 pts Down, worse
Brand
61 −⁠1 Down, worse
Price
£914 +⁠£35 Up
  • The brand moved from 61.7 to 60.9: +3.4 from last year's marketing arriving, +5.9 from this year's, −9.3 as it faded, and −0.9 from last year's service quality in reviews.
  • Home orders were 20,018 pieces (−⁠3.7% on 2026). Against the opening position the market was 10.9% larger, the price against competitors multiplied orders by 0.79 and the brand by 0.95.
  • The average price was £914, 21.5% above competitors' £752. Market share at home: 1.8%.
The workshop
Delivered
20,018 −⁠761 Down, worse
Load
88.6% −⁠2.8 pts Down
Service quality
69 −⁠2 Down, worse
Returns
4.5% +⁠0.6 pts Up, worse
  • In normal hours the workforce could make 22,588 pieces and the plant 28,000; with overtime the most was 25,976. Every order was met.
  • Output ran at 88.6% of normal-hours capacity: no overtime was needed.
  • Service quality was 69.0 (78 at best; −0.3 from running the workshop hard, −6.9 from low morale at the start of the year, −1.8 from skill), and 4.5% of pieces came back or were remade.
People
Morale
54 +⁠3 Up, better
Labour turnover
13.8% −⁠1.9 pts Down, better
Skill
0.96 −⁠0.04 Down, worse
Overtime
0 No change
  • Morale moved from 50.1 to 53.6: +3.4 recovering towards its usual level, +2.5 from the people programme, −2.5 from the efficiency programme.
  • Labour turnover was 13.8%: 22 people left and were replaced, each new starter making about half as much in the first year.
  • The skill index is 0.96 (1.00 at the opening position): it rises with training paid for the year before, which arrived this year, and falls when experienced makers leave.
Money
Revenue
£18.30m +⁠£35k Up, better
Operating profit
−⁠£474k −⁠£660k Down, worse
Profit margin
−2.6% −⁠3.6 pts Down, worse
Net cash
£944k −⁠£601k Down, worse
  • Revenue £18.30m, gross profit margin 54.3%, profit before interest and tax −⁠£474k (a profit margin of −2.6%), profit for the year −⁠£604k.
  • Cash from trading was −⁠£1.0k; £600k went on the plant (upkeep alone). Net cash ended the year at £944k, with the overdraft unused.
  • Return on capital employed: −5.7%.
The accounts for 2027
Statement of profit or loss, 2026 and 2027, £000
£00020262027
Sales revenue18,26318,298
Cost of sales8,4788,357
of which materials, delivery and other inputs8,1617,998
of which returns and remakes317360
Gross profit9,7859,940
Expenses9,59910,414
of which wages, overtime and recruitment4,9995,106
of which overheads3,5603,382
of which the efficiency programme’s one-off costs027
of which marketing4201,100
of which the people programme20200
of which depreciation600600
Profit before interest and tax186(474)
Interest130130
Profit before tax56(604)
Tax140
Profit for the year42(604)
Retained profit42(604)
Cash flow, 2027, £000
£0002027
Profit for the year(604)
Add back depreciation600
Change in debtors(2)
Change in stock20
Change in creditors(15)
Cash flow from operating activities(1)
Upkeep of the plant(600)
Cash flow from investing activities(600)
Cash flow from financing activities0
Net cash flow(601)
Opening net cash (cash less overdraft)1,545
Closing net cash944
Statement of financial position, end of 2026 and end of 2027, £000
£000End of 2026End of 2027
Non-current assets (net book value)6,0006,000
Current assets
Cash1,545944
Debtors1,0011,003
Stock1,3941,374
Total current assets3,9393,320
Total assets9,9399,320
Current liabilities
Bank overdraft00
Trade creditors1,0451,030
Total current liabilities1,0451,030
Non-current liabilities: loans2,0002,000
Net assets6,8946,290
Equity
Share capital1,0001,000
Retained earnings5,8945,290
Total equity6,8946,290

2028: what happened

The plan Prices up 3%. No efficiency programme. Marketing: £1.10m. No new machinery. People programme: £200k. No spending abroad.

Customers and the brand
Home orders
20,811 +⁠793 Up, better
Market share
1.8% No change
Brand
62 +⁠1 Up, better
Price
£941 +⁠£27 Up
  • The brand moved from 60.9 to 62.1: +5.9 from last year's marketing arriving, +5.9 from this year's, −9.1 as it faded, and −1.5 from last year's service quality in reviews.
  • Home orders were 20,811 pieces (+⁠4.0% on 2027). Against the opening position the market was 15.4% larger, the price against competitors multiplied orders by 0.77 and the brand by 0.97.
  • The average price was £941, 22.7% above competitors' £767. Market share at home: 1.8%.
The workshop
Delivered
20,811 +⁠793 Up, better
Load
87.8% −⁠0.8 pts Down
Service quality
72 +⁠3 Up, better
Returns
3.8% −⁠0.7 pts Down, better
  • In normal hours the workforce could make 23,696 pieces and the plant 28,000; with overtime the most was 27,250. Every order was met.
  • Output ran at 87.8% of normal-hours capacity: no overtime was needed.
  • Service quality was 71.7 (78 at best; −4.5 from low morale at the start of the year, −1.8 from skill), and 3.8% of pieces came back or were remade.
People
Morale
58 +⁠5 Up, better
Labour turnover
10.0% −⁠3.8 pts Down, better
Skill
0.95 No change
Overtime
0 No change
  • Morale moved from 53.6 to 58.4: +2.2 recovering towards its usual level, +2.5 from the people programme.
  • Labour turnover was 10.0%: 16 people left and were replaced, each new starter making about half as much in the first year.
  • The skill index is 0.95 (1.00 at the opening position): it rises with training paid for the year before, which arrived this year, and falls when experienced makers leave.
Money
Revenue
£19.59m +⁠£1.30m Up, better
Operating profit
£180k +⁠£655k Up, better
Profit margin
0.9% +⁠3.5 pts Up, better
Net cash
£887k −⁠£57k Down, worse
  • Revenue £19.59m, gross profit margin 54.4%, profit before interest and tax £180k (a profit margin of 0.9%), profit for the year £38k.
  • Cash from trading was £543k; £600k went on the plant (upkeep alone). Net cash ended the year at £887k, with the overdraft unused.
  • Return on capital employed: 2.2%.
The accounts for 2028
Statement of profit or loss, 2027 and 2028, £000
£00020272028
Sales revenue18,29819,593
Cost of sales8,3578,930
of which materials, delivery and other inputs7,9988,601
of which returns and remakes360329
Gross profit9,94010,663
Expenses10,41410,483
of which wages, overtime and recruitment5,1065,201
of which overheads3,3823,382
of which the efficiency programme’s one-off costs270
of which marketing1,1001,100
of which the people programme200200
of which depreciation600600
Profit before interest and tax(474)180
Interest130130
Profit before tax(604)50
Tax013
Profit for the year(604)38
Retained profit(604)38
Cash flow, 2028, £000
£0002028
Profit for the year38
Add back depreciation600
Change in debtors(71)
Change in stock(94)
Change in creditors71
Cash flow from operating activities543
Upkeep of the plant(600)
Cash flow from investing activities(600)
Cash flow from financing activities0
Net cash flow(57)
Opening net cash (cash less overdraft)944
Closing net cash887
Statement of financial position, end of 2027 and end of 2028, £000
£000End of 2027End of 2028
Non-current assets (net book value)6,0006,000
Current assets
Cash944887
Debtors1,0031,074
Stock1,3741,468
Total current assets3,3203,428
Total assets9,3209,428
Current liabilities
Bank overdraft00
Trade creditors1,0301,101
Total current liabilities1,0301,101
Non-current liabilities: loans2,0002,000
Net assets6,2906,328
Equity
Share capital1,0001,000
Retained earnings5,2905,328
Total equity6,2906,328

2029: what happened

The plan Prices up 3%. No efficiency programme. Marketing: £1m. No new machinery. People programme: £200k. No spending abroad.

Customers and the brand
Home orders
21,695 +⁠884 Up, better
Market share
1.8% No change
Brand
64 +⁠1 Up, better
Price
£970 +⁠£28 Up
  • The brand moved from 62.1 to 63.6: +5.9 from last year's marketing arriving, +5.6 from this year's, −9.3 as it faded, and −0.8 from last year's service quality in reviews.
  • Home orders were 21,695 pieces (+⁠4.2% on 2028). Against the opening position the market was 20.0% larger, the price against competitors multiplied orders by 0.76 and the brand by 0.99.
  • The average price was £970, 23.9% above competitors' £783. Market share at home: 1.8%.
The workshop
Delivered
21,695 +⁠884 Up, better
Load
87.3% −⁠0.5 pts Down
Service quality
76 +⁠4 Up, better
Returns
2.8% −⁠1.0 pts Down, better
  • In normal hours the workforce could make 24,858 pieces and the plant 28,000; with overtime the most was 28,000. Every order was met.
  • Output ran at 87.3% of normal-hours capacity: no overtime was needed.
  • Service quality was 75.8 (78 at best; −1.1 from low morale at the start of the year, −1.1 from skill), and 2.8% of pieces came back or were remade.
People
Morale
62 +⁠3 Up, better
Labour turnover
8.1% −⁠1.9 pts Down, better
Skill
0.97 +⁠0.02 Up, better
Overtime
0 No change
  • Morale moved from 58.4 to 61.5: +0.6 recovering towards its usual level, +2.5 from the people programme.
  • Labour turnover was 8.1%: 13 people left and were replaced, each new starter making about half as much in the first year.
  • The skill index is 0.97 (1.00 at the opening position): it rises with training paid for the year before, which arrived this year, and falls when experienced makers leave.
Money
Revenue
£21.04m +⁠£1.45m Up, better
Operating profit
£1.17m +⁠£985k Up, better
Profit margin
5.5% +⁠4.6 pts Up, better
Net cash
£1.57m +⁠£679k Up, better
  • Revenue £21.04m, gross profit margin 55.4%, profit before interest and tax £1.17m (a profit margin of 5.5%), profit for the year £776k.
  • Cash from trading was £1.28m; £600k went on the plant (upkeep alone). Net cash ended the year at £1.57m, with the overdraft unused.
  • Return on capital employed: 12.8%.
The accounts for 2029
Statement of profit or loss, 2028 and 2029, £000
£00020282029
Sales revenue19,59321,038
Cost of sales8,9309,378
of which materials, delivery and other inputs8,6019,122
of which returns and remakes329256
Gross profit10,66311,661
Expenses10,48310,496
of which wages, overtime and recruitment5,2015,314
of which overheads3,3823,382
of which marketing1,1001,000
of which the people programme200200
of which depreciation600600
Profit before interest and tax1801,165
Interest130130
Profit before tax501,035
Tax13259
Profit for the year38776
Retained profit38776
Cash flow, 2029, £000
£0002029
Profit for the year776
Add back depreciation600
Change in debtors(79)
Change in stock(74)
Change in creditors55
Cash flow from operating activities1,279
Upkeep of the plant(600)
Cash flow from investing activities(600)
Cash flow from financing activities0
Net cash flow679
Opening net cash (cash less overdraft)887
Closing net cash1,566
Statement of financial position, end of 2028 and end of 2029, £000
£000End of 2028End of 2029
Non-current assets (net book value)6,0006,000
Current assets
Cash8871,566
Debtors1,0741,153
Stock1,4681,542
Total current assets3,4284,260
Total assets9,42810,260
Current liabilities
Bank overdraft00
Trade creditors1,1011,156
Total current liabilities1,1011,156
Non-current liabilities: loans2,0002,000
Net assets6,3287,104
Equity
Share capital1,0001,000
Retained earnings5,3286,104
Total equity6,3287,104

The dashboard at the end of the worked example

  • Revenue

    £21.04m

    Change from 2028: +⁠£1.45m Up, better

    Sales revenue, 2023 to 2029Sales revenue was £19.81m in 2023 and rose to £21.04m in 2029. It ranged from £18.26m to £21.04m.
  • Operating profit

    £1.17m

    Change from 2028: +⁠£985k Up, better

    Profit before interest and tax, 2023 to 2029Profit before interest and tax was £2m in 2023 and fell to £1.17m in 2029. It ranged from −⁠£474k to £2m.
  • Profit margin

    5.5%

    Change from 2028: +⁠4.6 pts Up, better

    Profit margin, 2023 to 2029Profit margin was 10.1% in 2023 and fell to 5.5% in 2029. It ranged from −2.6% to 10.1%.
  • ROCE

    12.8%

    Change from 2028: +⁠10.6 pts Up, better

    Return on capital employed, 2023 to 2029Return on capital employed was 23.2% in 2023 and fell to 12.8% in 2029. It ranged from −5.7% to 23.2%.
  • Net cash

    £1.57m

    Change from 2028: +⁠£679k Up, better

    Net cash (cash less overdraft), 2023 to 2029Net cash (cash less overdraft) was £1.18m in 2023 and rose to £1.57m in 2029. It ranged from £887k to £1.57m.
  • Market share

    1.8%

    Change from 2028: No change

    Market share at home, 2023 to 2029Market share at home was 2.3% in 2023 and fell to 1.8% in 2029. It ranged from 1.8% to 2.3%.
  • Brand

    64out of 100

    Change from 2028: +⁠1 Up, better

    Brand strength, 2023 to 2029Brand strength was 65 in 2023 and fell to 64 in 2029. It ranged from 61 to 65.
  • Service quality

    76out of 100

    Change from 2028: +⁠4 Up, better

    Service quality, 2023 to 2029Service quality was 77 in 2023 and fell to 76 in 2029. It ranged from 69 to 78.
  • Utilization

    77.5%

    Change from 2028: +⁠1.1 pts Up

    Capacity utilization rate, 2023 to 2029Capacity utilization rate was 84.6% in 2023 and fell to 77.5% in 2029. It ranged from 76.4% to 84.6%.
  • Morale

    62out of 100

    Change from 2028: +⁠3 Up, better

    Morale, 2023 to 2029Morale was 64 in 2023 and fell to 62 in 2029. It ranged from 50 to 64.

In the IB course: 3.7 Cash flow, 5.6 Production planningHL, 4.5 The seven Ps of the marketing mix

Stage 9 of 9

Evaluate the consequences

Three years on: what did the plan achieve, what did it cost, and who paid for it?

The worked example, 2026 against 2029

The worked example: 2026 against 2029
Measure20262029Change
Sales revenue£18.26m£21.04m+⁠£2.78m, up, better
Profit before interest and tax£186k£1.17m+⁠£979k, up, better
Profit margin1.0%5.5%+⁠4.5 pts, up, better
Return on capital employed2.1%12.8%+⁠10.7 pts, up, better
Net cash (cash less overdraft)£1.54m£1.57m+⁠£21k, up, better
Market share at home1.9%1.8%−⁠0.1 pts, down, worse
Brand strength6264+⁠2, up, better
Service quality7176+⁠4, up, better
Morale5062+⁠11, up, better
Labour turnover15.6%8.1%−⁠7.5 pts, down, better

How each role's goals came out

Chief executive (CEO): 4 of 4 goals met
  • Met A profit margin of at least 5% in 2029 5.5%
  • Met No year ending over the overdraft limit Never over the limit
  • Met Brand strength of at least 60 in 2029 64
  • Met Morale of at least 55 in 2029 62
Chief financial officer (CFO): 3 of 3 goals met
  • Met Return on capital employed of at least 12% in 2029 12.8%
  • Met Net cash never below zero at a year end £887k
  • Met Profit for the year, added over the three years, of at least zero £210k
Chief marketing officer (CMO): 1 of 3 goals met
  • Missed Market share of at least 2% in 2029 1.8%
  • Missed Brand strength of at least 65 in 2029 64
  • Met Revenue up by at least £2m on 2026 +⁠£2.78m
Chief operating officer (COO): 3 of 3 goals met
  • Met Service quality of at least 75 in 2029 76
  • Met No more than 5,000 hours of overtime in any year 0
  • Met No more than 3% of pieces returned or remade in 2029 2.8%
Chief human resources officer (CHRO): 3 of 3 goals met
  • Met Morale of at least 60 in 2029 62
  • Met Labour turnover of no more than 10% in 2029 8.1%
  • Met Morale never below 50 at a year end 54
Strategy director: 1 of 3 goals met
  • Missed Revenue up by at least £3m on 2026 +⁠£2.78m
  • Met Return on capital employed of at least 10% in 2029 12.8%
  • Missed At least 10% of revenue earned abroad in 2029 0.0%
Management consultant: 4 of 4 goals met
  • Met A profit margin of at least 4% in 2029 5.5%
  • Met Service quality of at least 72 in 2029 76
  • Met Morale of at least 58 in 2029 62
  • Met No year ending over the overdraft limit Never over the limit

Question 1From your final year's statements, calculate your return on capital employed for that year, as a percentage to one decimal place.

Answer and working for question 1

The answer: 12.8% (anything within 0.30 percentage points of it counts as right)

ROCE = (profit before interest and tax ÷ capital employed) × 100, where capital employed = non-current liabilities + equity. Here: £1.17m ÷ (£2m + £7.10m) × 100 = 12.8%.

  1. What worked, and the evidence for it. Name the levers that did most, with the figures that show it.
  2. What it cost, and who bore the cost. Think of cash, the first year's profit, and the people inside and outside the business.
  3. What you would change, and why. One decision you would make differently, and what you expect it would have done.

In the IB course: 3.5 Profitability and liquidity ratio analysis, 1.4 Stakeholders, 1.3 Business objectives

After the plan

The debrief

The debrief opens when the evaluation is done, so that the comparisons do not steer your plan.

Corvell's decline had several causes that fed each other: costs outran prices, the brand was starved, and a workforce whose pay was frozen lost its best makers and some of its care. No single lever fixes all of them, and every lever has a delay or a side effect. The plans that did best treated the causes in proportion, accepted a weaker first year, and did not push the workshop beyond what its people could make.

The worked example against the other strategies

Each plan is played from the same start by the same engine.

Every strategy compared
PlanProfit after tax, 2027 to 2029Operating profit, 2027Operating profit, 2028Operating profit, 2029Lowest net cashRevenue, 2029Profit margin, 2029ROCE, 2029Market share, 2029Brand, 2029Service quality, 2029Morale, 2029
Restore the core£210k−⁠£474k£180k£1.17m£887k£21.04m5.5%12.8%1.8%647662
Cut back to profit−⁠£1.84m£113k−⁠£508k−⁠£1.05m−⁠£81k£15.41m−6.8%−14.9%1.3%466355
Win volume−⁠£3.18m−⁠£1.15m−⁠£871k−⁠£464k−⁠£3.40m Over the limit£24.18m−1.9%−8.1%2.4%636152
Go international−⁠£1.23m−⁠£1.28m−⁠£198k£1.02m−⁠£1.70m£23.29m4.4%13.3%1.8%607462
Carry on as in 2026−⁠£1.37m−⁠£143k−⁠£400k−⁠£437k£94k£18.99m−2.3%−5.8%1.8%526958
Profit after tax added over 2027 to 2029, by planRestore the core: £210k; Cut back to profit: −⁠£1.84m; Win volume: −⁠£3.18m; Go international: −⁠£1.23m; Carry on as in 2026: −⁠£1.37m. Highest: Restore the core. Lowest: Win volume. Yours is marked.−⁠£4m−⁠£3m−⁠£2m−⁠£1m£0£1mRestore the core£210kCut back to profit−⁠£1.84mWin volume−⁠£3.18mGo international−⁠£1.23mCarry on as in 2026−⁠£1.37m
Profit after tax over the three years; the worked example is marked. The figures are in the table above.

The worked example, lever by lever

Each row runs the worked example again with one lever kept at its 2026 level in every year, and shows what that lever added. The levers work on each other, so the rows need not add up.

What each lever of the worked example did
LeverOperating profit, 2027Operating profit, 2029Profit after tax, all yearsNet cash, 2029Brand, 2029Service quality, 2029Morale, 2029
Price change+⁠£28k+⁠£659k+⁠£720k+⁠£873k+2.2+7.4+1.6
Efficiency programme+⁠£130k+⁠£24k+⁠£244k+⁠£257k−0.6−1.8−1.1
Marketing−⁠£286k+⁠£1.35m+⁠£1.30m+⁠£1.05m+11.0No changeNo change
People programme−⁠£152k+⁠£325k+⁠£90k+⁠£61k+1.6+9.0+4.5

The exchange rate as a risk

Go international: profit after tax over the plan was −⁠£1.23m. Had the pound been 8% stronger than it was in every year, it would have been −⁠£1.54m (−⁠£311k); 8% weaker, −⁠£865k (+⁠£366k).

The trade-offs

Short-term margin against long-term demand

An efficiency programme lifts profit at once. Beyond the slack every organization carries, it removes the people and checks that keep quality up: morale falls, makers leave, faults rise, and the reviews that follow cost demand a year later. The first year's figures reward a deep cut; the third year's punish it.

Demand against capacity

Marketing and lower prices raise orders at once, but the workshop's capacity does not move until machinery arrives a year later or skills improve. Orders beyond normal hours are made in overtime at a premium, by tired makers who make more mistakes; beyond overtime they are lost. Growth needs capacity first, or at least at the same time.

Price against volume

With a price elasticity of demand of about 2.0, a 1% price rise costs about 2.0% of orders. At Corvell's margins that leaves gross profit roughly where it was: prices should follow costs, but price alone cannot restore the margin, and a price cut gives margin away on every piece.

Profit against cash

Machinery and expansion are paid for before they earn, and export customers pay more slowly. A plan can be profitable by 2029 and still have spent the bank's patience on the way: the lowest point of net cash matters as much as the end.

People against payback

A people programme costs money this year and pays back next year and after, through lower turnover, better skills and fewer faults. Within three years it barely pays for itself in profit; its value is in the workshop the plan leaves behind.

What each strategy teaches

Restore the core

The worked example. Its first year was its worst, an operating profit of −⁠£474k, because marketing and training were paid for at once and paid back later. By 2029 the profit margin was 5.5% and return on capital employed 12.8%, with morale at 62 and service quality at 76. Its weak point is growth: market share ended at 1.8%, below 2026's, because every price rise cost orders.

Cut back to profit

The quickest result: the best first year of any of the four plans, an operating profit of £113k. Then the cost of the cuts arrived. The brand fell to 46 and service quality to 63, and by 2029 operating profit was −⁠£1.05m. Short-term margin was bought with long-term demand.

Win volume

The biggest business: revenue of £24.18m and the highest market share of the four plans, 2.4%. It was also the least profitable. Demand arrived before the machinery, so the workshop ran on overtime (9,712 hours in 2027), service quality fell to 61, and net cash ended at −⁠£3.40m, beyond the bank's limit.

Go international

Growth with a delay and a currency. Exports earned £2.89m in 2029, 12.4% of revenue, and operating profit reached £1.02m, but only after a first year in which operating profit was −⁠£1.28m, with net cash as low as −⁠£1.70m. The pound's rise in 2028 cut what every export earned.

In the IB course

HL Some of the theory below is HL only, and is hidden while you are viewing SL content.

Profitability and liquidity

Corvell's profit margin and return on capital employed fell for three years while its current ratio stayed high: a profitability problem can sit behind healthy liquidity. Strategies to improve the profitability ratios work on price, on costs or on the capital employed, and each lever in this simulation is one of these.

3.5 Profitability and liquidity ratio analysis 3.4 Final accounts

Fixed costs, variable costs and contribution

Materials and delivery vary with output; wages and overheads are fixed in the short run. When fewer pieces are sold, the fixed costs are spread over fewer of them, which is why a modest fall in sales did so much damage to profit, and why extra sales are worth so much while there is spare capacity.

3.3 Costs and revenues 5.5 Break-even analysis

Pricing and price elasticity of demand HL

Price elasticity of demand measures how far quantity demanded responds to a change in price. Above 1, a price rise lowers revenue; whether it lowers profit depends on the margin on each unit lost. Corvell's own price tests put it at about 2.0, so its price decisions are trade-offs, not free money.

4.5 The seven Ps of the marketing mix

Motivation, rewards and training

In Herzberg's terms, pay that falls behind the local market is a hygiene factor: it causes dissatisfaction, and here departures, until it is put right. Training and development work as motivators. The people programme combines the two, and its effect on productivity arrives a year after the money is spent.

2.4 Motivation and demotivation

Capacity, productivity and quality HL

Capacity utilization compares output with productive capacity. Running close to full leaves no slack for mistakes: overtime costs a premium and strains morale, and faults rise. Labour productivity fell at Corvell as experienced makers left, which shrank capacity even though the plant could make more.

5.6 Production planning 5.3 Lean production and quality management

Investment, profit and cash flow

An investment is paid for in cash when it is made, but reaches the statement of profit or loss only as depreciation over its life, and earns only once it is in use. That is why a plan with machinery can show a profit and a shrinking bank balance in the same year.

3.7 Cash flow 3.8 Investment appraisal

Entering international markets HL

Entering a market abroad brings opportunities (demand that does not depend on the home economy, room to grow) and threats: set-up costs, a distributor's margin, longer payment terms, damage in transit and exchange rate risk. A stronger home currency cuts what each export earns in home currency.

4.6 International marketing 1.6 Multinational companies (MNCs)

Stakeholders and their conflicts

The family, the fund, the workforce, the bank and the customers want different things from the same plan, and have different power to get them. A plan that ignores a stakeholder with high power, or one whose goodwill the product depends on, is unlikely to be carried out as written.

1.4 Stakeholders

Beyond the IB course

Source: Enrichment Ideas from management research that the IB course does not require, for undergraduate, MBA and professional readers and for curious IB students.

Decisions whose results arrive late

John Sterman (1989) asked people to manage a simulated distribution system with time delays between their decisions and the results. They performed poorly, and his analysis found them insensitive to the feedback from their own earlier decisions. Corvell has the same structure: marketing, training and machinery pay back a year or more after they are paid for, and a manager who judges them on the first year will cut them.

John D. Sterman (1989), Modeling Managerial Behavior: Misperceptions of Feedback in a Dynamic Decision Making Experiment, Management Science, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 321 to 339

Anchoring on last year's figures

Tversky and Kahneman (1974) described anchoring: estimates that start from a given value tend to stay close to it. A budget that starts from last year's figures, or from the figures a strategy suggests, tends to stay near them. Ask what each lever is for before asking how much it had last year.

Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1974), Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Science, vol. 185, no. 4157, pp. 1124 to 1131

Escalating commitment

Staw (1976) found that people who had made a decision that went badly tended to commit more resources to it. A turnaround that disappoints in its first year, as most good ones do, tests this both ways: whether to persist with an investment that has not yet paid back, or to keep feeding one that never will. The test is the evidence about what comes next, not the money already spent.

Barry M. Staw (1976), Knee-deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 27 to 44

A balanced set of measures

Kaplan and Norton (1992) argued that financial measures alone report the past, and proposed a balanced scorecard: financial, customer, internal business, and innovation and learning measures, read together. The seven roles here each watch a different part of such a scorecard; the debrief asks you to read all of it.

Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton (1992), The Balanced Scorecard: Measures That Drive Performance, Harvard Business Review

Good enough, chosen with limited time

Herbert Simon (1955) modelled rational choice by people of limited computational ability, who look for an option that meets their aspirations rather than compute every possibility. With six levers and three years, no one can try every plan; the board's targets act as aspirations, and a plan that meets them is a reasonable place to stop searching.

Herbert A. Simon (1955), A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 69, no. 1, pp. 99 to 118

Misconceptions this tests

  • The claim Cutting costs always improves profit.

    The correction

    Only the first few per cent, the slack. Beyond that, cuts reach what earns the revenue: quality, the brand and the people. The plan that cut deepest had the best first year and the worst third.

  • The claim If demand rises, profit rises.

    The correction

    Only while there is capacity to meet it at normal cost. Beyond normal hours each piece is made in overtime, with more faults; beyond capacity the orders are lost.

  • The claim A price cut wins customers, so it raises profit.

    The correction

    With elasticity above 1 a price cut raises revenue if the workshop can make the pieces, but every piece earns less. At Corvell's margins gross profit falls, and the extra volume can overload the workshop.

  • The claim Profit and cash are the same thing.

    The correction

    Machinery, dividends and slow-paying customers move cash without moving the profit margin in the same way. A plan can be profitable and still run short of cash.

  • The claim An investment that loses money in its first year has failed.

    The correction

    Marketing, training, machinery and expansion are paid for now and pay back later. Judge each on the years it was meant to change.

Practice

Source: Original practice question The platform's own questions, written for this simulation; they are not IB questions. The questions in the stages above are the platform's own too.

HL One or more questions are HL only, and are hidden while you are viewing SL content.

  1. Using the statements of profit or loss, calculate the change in Corvell's gross profit margin between 2023 and 2026. [2 marks] Calculate
  2. Explain two reasons why Corvell's profit margin fell much further than its revenue between 2023 and 2026. [4 marks] Explain
  3. Evaluate a deep efficiency programme as a way to restore Corvell's profitability. [10 marks] Evaluate
  4. Discuss whether Corvell should accept the distributor's offer to sell its range in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. [10 marks] Discuss HL
  5. Recommend how Corvell should divide its budget for 2027 between marketing, machinery, people and international expansion. [10 marks] Recommend

Key terms

How the figures were made

Corvell Furniture, its people, its competitors and its distributor are fictional, and every figure is simulated, including the exchange rates. The executive engine (src/lib/executive/engine.ts) works each year from the opening position, the year's levers and its conditions, in the order its file sets out, and every statement, ratio and figure in the text is its output. The coefficients (how strongly price moves orders, how fast the brand fades, how much overtime strains morale) are teaching assumptions, chosen so that the history tells a plausible story and the trade-offs can be seen. They are not estimates for any real business. The unit tests check the engine against figures worked by hand, check the accounting identities in every year of a large grid of plans, and check every claim this debrief makes about the four strategies.

How the executive simulation's model works: every link and lag