No. 09 The Boardroom Briefings Capital allocation

How should a company balance shareholder returns with long-term investment?

Velmar Components weighs a buyback against a factory for electric cars

A German maker of car parts has €480m of net cash and an investor demanding it back. Its future depends on electric vehicles; its profits still depend on petrol and diesel.

Source: Simulated data Fictional company Updated 16 November 2026
Company
Velmar Components AG, Stuttgart, Germany
Industry
Automobile
Decision
Capital allocation
Functions
Finance and accounts, Strategy and management
Key concepts
Change, Sustainability
Editions
Student, then Analysis
Choose an edition

You are reading the Student edition. The recommendation is withheld.

This briefing has two editions. The Student edition comes first: the case and the questions. The Analysis edition follows it, closed, so that you can decide before you read the recommendation.

The Student edition

The case and the questions, with the recommendation withheld · about 7 minutes to read

Section 01: Executive summary

The decision in brief. In this edition the summary stops short of a recommendation.

The situation

Velmar makes exhaust systems and fuel pumps for petrol and diesel cars, and a growing line of cooling systems for the batteries of electric cars. It earned a net profit of €231.0m in 2025 and holds €480m more in cash than it owes. An activist investor wants €400m returned to shareholders; management wants to build a €650m plant for electric vehicle parts.

The decision

How to divide the company's cash between its owners and its future: return it through a buyback and higher dividends, invest it all in the new plant, build the plant in stages while returning a little, or borrow to do both.

What is at stake

Most of Velmar's revenue comes from products that its largest customers plan to stop needing. The decision tests whether the board can serve today's shareholders without starving the business that will have to pay tomorrow's dividends.

Section 02: Business background

Velmar Components was founded in Stuttgart in 1952 and listed on the stock exchange in 1998. It supplies five car makers in Europe, employs 9,400 people in four countries and earned revenue of €3,850m in 2025, with an EBIT margin of 9.0% (Exhibit 2). It has paid 40% of its net profit as dividends for a decade, and ended 2025 with €780m of cash and €300m of borrowing (Exhibit 3).

Its products are changing under it. Exhaust systems and fuel pumps, which electric cars do not need, still brought 82.0% of revenue in 2025, but that revenue fell slightly between 2023 and 2025, while revenue from battery cooling systems rose by 59.7% (Exhibit 1). Three of Velmar's five largest customers have said they will stop developing new petrol and diesel engines within the decade.

In 2026 Granite Lake Capital, an activist fund, bought 6.0% of the shares and wrote to the board. It wants €400m returned through a share buyback, the dividend raised to 60% of profit, and no new plant, arguing that Velmar's last electric vehicle project ran over budget. The chief executive, Katrin Albers, has proposed a €650m plant for battery cooling systems. The supervisory board, half of whose members represent employees, must decide.

Company
Velmar Components AG
Business
Car parts for vehicle makers
Based in
Stuttgart, Germany
Size
9,400 employees and revenue of €3,850m in 2025
Ownership
Publicly held company listed on the stock exchange; Granite Lake Capital, an activist investor, owns 6.0% of the shares
Figures in
EUR, in millions (€m)
Status
A fictional company. Every figure is simulated for teaching and checked for consistency.

Section 03: Strategic context

The industry and the forces on the decision, in general terms. The only figures in this briefing are the company's own.

A company that makes more cash than it can invest well can return it to its owners, through dividends or by buying back its own shares. A buyback reduces the number of shares, so each remaining share has a larger claim on profits, and earnings per share rise even if profit does not. Neither form of return creates value by itself: value comes from the profits the business goes on to earn.

Car parts suppliers face the shift to electric vehicles from two sides. Their old products will be needed less, though for years yet, while new products need large investment before the orders that will use them are certain. Suppliers that invest too early can be left with plants their customers do not fill; those that invest too late can lose the next generation of contracts to rivals.

Shareholders differ. Some hold shares for income and want dividends; some want the price to rise; activist investors buy stakes to press for changes they believe will lift the price, often within a few years. Employees, customers and the communities around the plants have a long-term stake that a short-term shareholder may not share.

Section 04: Relevant evidence

The company's own evidence (simulated), established research (cited, and stated only as its central idea) and how the market works.

  • The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data

    Profits that rise, a market that shrinks

    Revenue rose from €3,620m in 2023 to €3,850m in 2025 and the EBIT margin from 8.0% to 9.0% (Exhibit 2). But revenue from combustion products fell by 0.9% over the same years, and their share of revenue fell from 88.0% to 82.0% (Exhibit 1). Today's profits come from the products with the least future.

    See Exhibit 2, Exhibit 1

  • The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data

    Cash the company has not needed

    Free cash flow reached €210m in 2025, and net cash stands at €480m (Exhibits 2 and 3). At a share price of €62.00 the company is valued at €3,100m, 13.4 times its earnings per share of €4.62.

    See Exhibit 2, Exhibit 3

  • The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data

    A plant that pays only if the contract comes

    The finance team's forecasts for the new plant depend on a contract to supply cooling systems for a major car maker's next electric platform, which the team puts at a 60% chance (Exhibit 4). With the contract the plant is worth €291.9m at 8%; without it, it loses €120.3m (Exhibit A1).

    See Exhibit 4

  • Established research Cited research

    Managers tend to smooth dividends

    A classic study of dividend decisions found that managers aim at a long-run share of profit to pay out, raise dividends only when they expect to sustain the increase, and are very reluctant to cut them.

    Source: John Lintner (1956), Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained Earnings, and Taxes

  • Established research Cited research

    In theory, the form of the payout does not matter; the investment does

    Under idealized conditions, with no taxes or costs of trading and with investors fully informed, how a firm divides its earnings between dividends and retained profit does not change its value: what matters is the investment it makes. Real markets depart from those conditions, which is why payout decisions still send signals.

    Source: Merton H. Miller and Franco Modigliani (1961), Dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of shares

The exhibits

Exhibit 1

Revenue by product line, 2023 and 2025 (€m)

Source: Simulated data
Product line 2023 Share in 2023 (%) 2025 Share in 2025 (%) Change (%)
Exhaust systems and fuel pumps (petrol and diesel)3,18688.03,15782.0−0.9
Battery cooling systems (electric vehicles)43412.069318.059.7
All products3,620100.03,850100.06.4
Source Velmar's segment reporting (simulated).

Section 05: Financial information

Exhibit 2 gives three years of results: revenue, EBIT, net profit, dividends, retained profit and free cash flow. Exhibit 3 gives the balance sheet figures and the share figures for 2025, and Exhibit 1 the revenue from each product line. Exhibit 4 gives the forecast cash flows of the new plant over ten years, with and without the contract it depends on. Velmar appraises investments at 8%.

Exhibit 2

Velmar's results, 2023 to 2025 (€m)

Source: Simulated data
Year Revenue EBIT EBIT margin (%) Net profit Dividends Retained profit Free cash flow
20233,620289.68.0195.578.2117.3160
20243,740317.98.5214.085.6128.4185
20253,850346.59.0231.092.4138.6210

EBIT is earnings before interest and tax. Free cash flow is the cash from operations left after the investment needed to keep the existing business running.

Source Velmar's annual reports (simulated).
Exhibit 3

Velmar's balance sheet and shares at the end of 2025

Source: Simulated data
Item 2025
Cash (€m)780
Borrowings, due after more than a year (€m)300
Net cash (€m)480
Equity (€m)2,140
Shares in issue (millions)50
Share price (€)62
Earnings per share (€)4.62
Dividend per share (€)1.85
Gearing ratio (%)12.3

Earnings per share and the dividend per share are measures beyond the IB course; the gearing ratio is on the guide's formula sheet (HL).

Source Velmar's annual report and the stock exchange price on 30 December 2025 (simulated).
Exhibit 4

Forecast cash flows of the new plant (€m)

Source: Simulated data
Case Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Each year, years 5 to 10
B. Build it all now: the contract is won−250−250−90110160190
B. Build it all now: the contract is not won−250−250−905080100
C. Build in stages: the contract is won−150−150−290110160190
C. Build in stages: the contract is not won−150−15030406070

Building it all costs €650m over three years: €250m, €250m and €150m, less €60m of cash from early sales in year 2. Building in stages spends €300m on a first phase and the other €350m in year 2 only if the contract is won; without it, the first phase runs as a smaller plant. The finance team puts the chance of winning the contract at 60%, with the decision due by the end of 2027.

Source Finance team's forecasts for the supervisory board (simulated).

Section 06: Stakeholder implications

Who has a stake in the decision, how much they care and how much they can affect it, what they want, and what the decision would mean for them.

  • Granite Lake Capital

    Stakeholder
    Internal
    Interest
    High
    Power
    Medium
    What they want
    €400m back through a buyback, a 60% payout and no new plant, so that the share price rises within a few years.
    What the decision means for them
    Option A gives it what it wants; option C gives it part. With 6.0% of the shares it cannot decide alone, but it can persuade other investors and make the board's life difficult.
  • Long-term institutional shareholders

    Stakeholder
    Internal
    Interest
    High
    Power
    High
    What they want
    A company still earning profits in twenty years, and a steady dividend meanwhile.
    What the decision means for them
    They hold most of the shares and will decide whether the activist wins support. A clear plan with stages they can judge is more likely to keep them than either extreme.
  • Employees and their representatives

    Stakeholder
    Internal
    Interest
    High
    Power
    High
    What they want
    Jobs that survive the end of petrol and diesel engines.
    What the decision means for them
    Half of the supervisory board represents them. Option A protects today's returns with no plan for the jobs that depend on combustion products; options B and C build the work that could replace them.
  • Katrin Albers and the management board

    Stakeholder
    Internal
    Interest
    High
    Power
    High
    What they want
    The plant, and the credibility to deliver it after an earlier project ran over budget.
    What the decision means for them
    Option B is their proposal. Building in stages asks them to win the contract before spending most of the money, which tests their forecasts in the open.
  • Car makers

    Stakeholder
    External
    Interest
    Medium
    Power
    High
    What they want
    Suppliers that can deliver the parts for their next electric platforms on time.
    What the decision means for them
    A supplier that pays out its cash and builds nothing will not win the next generation of contracts.
  • Lenders

    Stakeholder
    External
    Interest
    Medium
    Power
    Medium
    What they want
    A borrower whose debt stays easily covered by its profits.
    What the decision means for them
    Option D would take borrowing from €300m to €700m just as the company starts its largest investment.

Section 07: The strategic options

The courses of action open to the board. Each is set out on its own terms; the Analysis edition judges them.

  1. Option A: Return the cash

    Buy back €400m of shares in 2026, raise the dividend to 60% of profit, and keep investment in electric vehicle parts to what the existing plants need.

    What it needs
    The supervisory board's agreement, and a decision not to build the new plant.
    What it could gain
    The activist satisfied, earnings per share up from €4.62 to €5.11, and no risk of an overrun.
    What could go wrong
    A company that shrinks with its combustion products; the next generation of contracts lost; employees left without a future plan.

    Evidence: Exhibit 3, Exhibit 1

  2. Option B: Invest it all in the plant

    Commit the full €650m to the new plant now, keep the dividend at 40% of profit, and make no buyback.

    What it needs
    €650m over three years from cash and profits, and confidence in winning the contract.
    What it could gain
    The largest plant, ready soonest, worth €291.9m if the contract is won.
    What could go wrong
    A loss of €120.3m if it is not; an angry activist; and €650m committed before the main uncertainty is resolved.

    Evidence: Exhibit 4

  3. Option C: Build in stages, and return a little

    Commit €300m to a first phase now and the other €350m only if the contract is signed by the end of 2027. Keep the dividend at 40% of profit and buy back €100m of shares.

    What it needs
    A plant designed to be built in two phases, and the discipline to stop after the first if the contract is lost.
    What it could gain
    Most of the plant's value if the contract comes, a much smaller loss if it does not, and some cash returned now.
    What could go wrong
    A slower start than option B, which a rival could exploit; a smaller buyback than the activist wants.

    Evidence: Exhibit 4

  4. Option D: Borrow to do both

    Issue €400m of bonds to fund the buyback the activist wants, and build the whole plant from cash and profits.

    What it needs
    Lenders willing to lend at about 5%, and a board comfortable with more debt.
    What it could gain
    Shareholders and management both get what they asked for.
    What could go wrong
    Borrowing rises from €300m to €700m and gearing from 12.3% to 28.7%, while the plant's success is uncertain; €20m a year of interest; little room left if the business turns down.

    Evidence: Exhibit 3, Exhibit 4

Section 08: Evaluation criteria

How the board has said it will judge the options, and how much each criterion counts. The weights add up to 100.

Criterion How it is judged Weight
Long-term value The expected net present value of the investment, and the company's position for the next generation of contracts. 30%
Returns to shareholders now Cash returned through dividends and buybacks, and the effect on earnings per share. 20%
Financial risk The money at risk if the contract is lost, and the company's borrowing. 20%
Employees and strategy Whether the option builds work to replace the jobs that depend on combustion products. 15%
Flexibility How much the option lets the board decide later, when it knows more. 15%

Section 09: Discussion questions

Answer them before you open the Analysis edition, which has notes on each.

Source: Original practice question
Show content for

Showing everything. HL-only material is marked HL.

In the style of the IB course

The platform's own questions, written for this briefing; they are not IB examination questions. The marks are each question's own allocation.

  1. Using Exhibit 2, calculate Velmar's retained profit in 2025, and the dividends it would pay if it raised the payout to 60% of net profit.

    Calculate AO4 3.4 Final accounts

    [4 marks]

  2. Using Exhibit 3, calculate Velmar's gearing ratio at the end of 2025, and what it would be under option D.

    Calculate AO4 3.6 Efficiency ratio analysis HL

    [4 marks]

  3. Explain why protecting shareholder value and investing for the long term may conflict at Velmar.

    Explain AO2 1.3 Business objectives

    [4 marks]

  4. Discuss how the board should balance the demands of Granite Lake Capital with those of Velmar's other stakeholders.

    Discuss AO3 1.4 Stakeholders

    [10 marks]

  5. Recommend how Velmar should use its cash, with reference to the net present value of the plant.

    Recommend AO3 3.8 Investment appraisal; 1.3 Business objectives HL

    [10 marks]

HL-only questions are hidden in the SL view. Choose HL above to see them.

For seminars, beyond the course

Source: Enrichment

For undergraduate, MBA and professional readers. These questions go beyond the IB course and are labelled as enrichment.

  1. Does a share buyback create value? When is it the best use of a company's cash?
  2. Are activist investors a discipline on managers or a source of short-termism? What does this case suggest?
  3. Why is building in stages worth more than building all at once, even though the plant is the same?
The Analysis edition The worked discussion: the evidence, the assumptions, every option judged and the recommendation. Open it when you have decided. About 6 minutes to read.

The Analysis edition

The worked discussion and the recommendation · about 6 minutes to read

Source: Arjun Agrawal frameworkThe Business Brief's analysis

From here, the page gives the platform's reading of the case: its interpretation of the evidence, its judgement and its recommendation. It adds no new facts, and the same evidence can support other conclusions if they are argued well.

Section A1: Executive summary

Recommended Option C: Build in stages, and return a little

Build the plant in stages and return a little cash now (option C). Staging the €650m keeps most of the plant's value if the contract is won, €313.0m, and turns the loss if it is not into a small gain, €50.5m, for an expected NPV of €208.0m against €127.0m for building it all at once. It answers the activist's fair point, that an earlier project overran, by making management win the contract before spending most of the money, and it returns €100m without starving the business that will have to pay future dividends.

Section A2: What the evidence shows

The exhibits worked through. Every figure here is recomputed from the exhibits on every build.

  • Velmar's profits come from products with a shrinking future: combustion products are 82.0% of revenue, and revenue from them fell by 0.9% between 2023 and 2025 while battery cooling systems grew by 59.7% (Exhibit 1).
  • The plant has a positive expected value either way it is built, but staging is worth more: an expected NPV of €208.0m against €127.0m, and €50.5m rather than −€120.3m if the contract is lost (Exhibit A1).
  • The buyback flatters a measure rather than the business: earnings per share would rise from €4.62 to €5.11 under option A, but net profit would fall by €8.4m of lost interest, and nothing would replace the combustion business (Exhibit A2).
  • The company can afford to stage the plant and keep paying dividends. Net cash is €480m and free cash flow was €210m in 2025 (Exhibits 2 and 3).
Exhibit A1

The plant's net present value at 8% over ten years (€m)

Source: Simulated data
How it is built Contract won Contract not won Expected
B. All at once291.9−120.3127.0
C. In stages313.050.5208.0

The expected NPV weights each case by the finance team's 60% chance of winning the contract. The NPVs use the guide's discount factors at 8% for years 1 to 10.

Source The Business Brief's analysis of Exhibit 4 (simulated data).
Exhibit A2

Each option's effect on earnings per share and gearing

Source: Simulated data
Option Shares bought back (millions) Shares left (millions) Earnings per share (€) Gearing ratio (%)
As in 20250.0050.004.6212.3
A. Buy back €400m6.4543.555.1114.7
C. Buy back €100m1.6148.394.7312.8
D. Borrow €400m for the buyback6.4543.554.9828.7

Each buyback is at €62.00 a share and reduces equity by its cost. Spending cash loses the 3% it earns, and borrowing costs 5%, both after 30% tax; the figures use 2025's net profit and leave out the plant's own effects. Earnings per share is a measure beyond the IB course.

Source The Business Brief's analysis of Exhibits 2 and 3 (simulated data).

Section A3: The assumptions

What the analysis takes as given, and how a manager would test it before relying on it.

  • The chance of winning the contract is 60%.

    How to test it It is the finance team's judgement. At what chance would building it all at once (B) be better than staging? Ask the car maker for its timetable and its shortlist.

  • The plant can be built in two phases at the same total cost.

    How to test it Ask the engineers what a two-phase design costs extra, and include it in the staged forecast.

  • A rival will not win the contract because Velmar waited.

    How to test it The first phase must be large enough to show the car maker that Velmar can deliver.

  • Combustion revenue will decline slowly.

    How to test it If customers move faster, the case for investing grows and the cash available to invest shrinks; model a faster decline.

Section A4: The trade-offs

What the board gives up to get what it wants. No option avoids all of them.

Cash now, or a business later

Every euro returned now is a euro not invested in the products Velmar's future depends on. The question is not whether to reward shareholders, but which shareholders, and over what time.

Commitment, or the option to wait

Building it all at once wins the race to be ready; building in stages buys the right to stop. Here the contract decision is close enough, by the end of 2027, that waiting costs little.

Debt, or discipline

Borrowing to do both avoids choosing, at the cost of more than doubling the company's debt as it starts its largest project. A board that cannot choose between its stakeholders should not hide the choice in its balance sheet.

Section A5: The alternatives, judged

Every option judged against the evidence, then scored against the board's criteria.

  1. Option A: Return the cash

    Weakly supported by the evidence

    Weakly supported. It lifts earnings per share for a few years by giving up the investment the company needs to survive the decline of its main products, and it ignores a positive expected NPV.

  2. Option B: Invest it all in the plant

    Defensible if its conditions hold

    Defensible if the contract were close to certain. At a 60% chance it commits €650m before the main uncertainty is resolved, and loses €120.3m if the contract goes elsewhere.

  3. Option C: Build in stages, and return a little

    Best supported by the evidence

    The best supported. It has the highest expected NPV, the smallest loss in the bad case, returns some cash, and gives the supervisory board a clear point, the contract decision, at which to commit the rest.

  4. Option D: Borrow to do both

    Weakly supported by the evidence

    Weakly supported. It gives everyone what they asked for by raising gearing from 12.3% to 28.7% just as the company takes its largest risk.

The options scored against the board's criteria

Each option is scored from 1 (poor) to 5 (strong) on each criterion. The weighted score is the sum of each weight times its score, divided by 100. The scores are the analysis's judgement; a scoring matrix organizes judgement, it does not replace it.

Criterion Weight Option A Option B Option C Option D
Long-term value 30% 1353
Returns to shareholders now 20% 5234
Financial risk 20% 4341
Employees and strategy 15% 1544
Flexibility 15% 3251
Weighted score 100% 2.70 2.95 4.25 (the highest) 2.65

Section A6: The recommended course of action

Option C: Build in stages, and return a little

Approve the first phase of the plant, €300m, now, with the second phase, €350m, to be committed only when the car maker's contract is signed, and a firm decision by the end of 2027. Keep the dividend at 40% of profit, buy back €100m of shares, and publish the plan's stages and measures so that every shareholder can hold the board to them.

Why

  • Staging has the highest expected NPV, €208.0m, and avoids a loss if the contract goes elsewhere.
  • It answers the activist's concern about overruns by tying most of the spending to a contract won.
  • It keeps the dividend steady, which shareholders value and managers are rightly reluctant to cut.
  • It builds the products that will replace the combustion business, which protects employees and the company's future alike.

On these conditions

If the contract is lost, the second phase should not be built, and the board should return more of the cash it would have spent. If the car maker wants a supplier ready sooner than staging allows, the case for building it all at once (option B) returns.

Section A7: Implementation

What happens, in what order, and who answers for it.

  1. Months 1 to 3 Approve the first phase and the €100m buyback; publish the plan, its stages and its measures; meet the main institutional shareholders and Granite Lake Capital. Management board and supervisory board
  2. Months 3 to 18 Build the first phase on a design that allows the second; bid for the car maker's contract. Chief executive and head of operations
  3. By the end of 2027 If the contract is won, commit the second phase; if not, run the first phase as a smaller plant and review the payout. Supervisory board
  4. Every year Report the plant's progress against its budget and the measures below alongside the dividend decision. Chief financial officer

Section A8: Evaluation: how to tell if it is working

The evaluation criteria, applied after the decision: what to measure, what counts as working, and when to look.

Measure Target Reviewed
The plant's budget The first phase built within its €300m, with no overrun. Every quarter
The contract A decision by the end of 2027, with the second phase committed only if it is won. At the decision
Battery cooling revenue Rising from 18.0% of revenue towards a third within five years. Every year
Shareholder returns A dividend of 40% of net profit each year, plus the €100m buyback. Every year

Section A9: Limitations

What the analysis cannot see, and what would change its recommendation.

The limits of the analysis

  • The plant's cash flows are forecasts ten years ahead, and the 60% chance of the contract is a judgement.
  • The analysis treats the 8% discount rate as given; a higher rate, reflecting the plant's risk, would lower every NPV.
  • Earnings per share after a buyback depends on the share price paid, which is assumed to stay at €62.00.

What would change the recommendation

  • If the car maker offered the contract only to a supplier able to build at full scale at once, option B would be the better choice.
  • If the contract were lost, much of the cash should go back to shareholders, as the activist asks.
  • If the shares fell far below the value of the business, a larger buyback would become a better use of cash than it now is.

Section A10: Notes on the discussion questions

What a strong answer to each discussion question does. Guidance, not a markscheme.

Source: Assessment explanation
  1. Question 1 [4 marks]

    Retained profit = net profit − dividends = 231.0 − 92.4 = €138.6m. At a 60% payout, dividends would be 231.0 × 60 ÷ 100 = €138.6m, leaving €92.4m retained: the two figures swap. Two marks for each.

  2. Question 2 [4 marks]HL

    Now: 300 ÷ (300 + 2,140) × 100 = 12.3%. Under D, borrowing rises to €700m and the buyback cuts equity by €400m to €1,740m: 700 ÷ (700 + 1,740) × 100 = 28.7%. Two marks for each.

  3. Question 3 [4 marks]

    Cash spent on the plant cannot be returned now, and the plant pays only years later and only if the contract comes; but a company that does not invest loses the products its future profits, and so its shareholders' value, depend on. Strong answers show that the conflict is between shareholders with different time horizons.

  4. Question 4 [10 marks]

    Good answers set out each group's interest and power (the activist's 6.0%, the institutions' majority, the employees' seats on the supervisory board, the car makers' contracts), consider how far their aims really conflict, and reach a judgement on how to weigh them.

  5. Question 5 [10 marks]HL

    Strong answers compare the expected NPVs (B €127.0m, C €208.0m) and the outcomes without the contract (B −€120.3m, C €50.5m), weigh the returns the activist wants and the company's future, and make a recommendation with conditions.

  6. Seminar question 1 Enrichment

    A buyback raises earnings per share by reducing the shares, but creates value only if the shares are cheap or the company has no better use for the money. Good answers apply this to a company with €480m of net cash and a positive NPV investment available.

  7. Seminar question 2 Enrichment

    Activists can force managers to justify holding cash, as Jensen's argument about free cash flow suggests; they can also push for returns that hollow out a company in transition. The overrun on Velmar's last project gives the activist a fair point; the plant's positive expected NPV gives management one.

  8. Seminar question 3 Enrichment

    Staging keeps the right to stop after the first phase if the contract is lost, which cuts the loss in the bad case from −€120.3m to a gain of €50.5m. The ability to wait for information has a value, which managers call a real option.

Notes on HL-only questions are hidden in the SL view.

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