No. 09 The Boardroom Briefings Capital allocation
How should a company balance shareholder returns with long-term investment?
Velmar Components weighs a buyback against a factory for electric cars
A German maker of car parts has €480m of net cash and an investor demanding it back. Its future depends on electric vehicles; its profits still depend on petrol and diesel.
- Company
- Velmar Components AG, Stuttgart, Germany
- Industry
- Automobile
- Decision
- Capital allocation
- Functions
- Finance and accounts, Strategy and management
- Key concepts
- Change, Sustainability
- Editions
- Student, then Analysis
You are reading the Student edition. The recommendation is withheld.
This briefing has two editions. The Student edition comes first: the case and the questions. The Analysis edition follows it, closed, so that you can decide before you read the recommendation.
The edition switch could not start. Both editions are on the page: the Analysis edition follows the Student edition.
The Student edition
Section 01: Executive summary
The decision in brief. In this edition the summary stops short of a recommendation.
The situation
Velmar makes exhaust systems and fuel pumps for petrol and diesel cars, and a growing line of cooling systems for the batteries of electric cars. It earned a net profit of €231.0m in 2025 and holds €480m more in cash than it owes. An activist investor wants €400m returned to shareholders; management wants to build a €650m plant for electric vehicle parts.
The decision
How to divide the company's cash between its owners and its future: return it through a buyback and higher dividends, invest it all in the new plant, build the plant in stages while returning a little, or borrow to do both.
What is at stake
Most of Velmar's revenue comes from products that its largest customers plan to stop needing. The decision tests whether the board can serve today's shareholders without starving the business that will have to pay tomorrow's dividends.
Section 02: Business background
Velmar Components was founded in Stuttgart in 1952 and listed on the stock exchange in 1998. It supplies five car makers in Europe, employs 9,400 people in four countries and earned revenue of €3,850m in 2025, with an EBIT margin of 9.0% (Exhibit 2). It has paid 40% of its net profit as dividends for a decade, and ended 2025 with €780m of cash and €300m of borrowing (Exhibit 3).
Its products are changing under it. Exhaust systems and fuel pumps, which electric cars do not need, still brought 82.0% of revenue in 2025, but that revenue fell slightly between 2023 and 2025, while revenue from battery cooling systems rose by 59.7% (Exhibit 1). Three of Velmar's five largest customers have said they will stop developing new petrol and diesel engines within the decade.
In 2026 Granite Lake Capital, an activist fund, bought 6.0% of the shares and wrote to the board. It wants €400m returned through a share buyback, the dividend raised to 60% of profit, and no new plant, arguing that Velmar's last electric vehicle project ran over budget. The chief executive, Katrin Albers, has proposed a €650m plant for battery cooling systems. The supervisory board, half of whose members represent employees, must decide.
- Company
- Velmar Components AG
- Business
- Car parts for vehicle makers
- Based in
- Stuttgart, Germany
- Size
- 9,400 employees and revenue of €3,850m in 2025
- Ownership
- Publicly held company listed on the stock exchange; Granite Lake Capital, an activist investor, owns 6.0% of the shares
- Figures in
- EUR, in millions (€m)
- Status
- A fictional company. Every figure is simulated for teaching and checked for consistency.
Section 03: Strategic context
The industry and the forces on the decision, in general terms. The only figures in this briefing are the company's own.
A company that makes more cash than it can invest well can return it to its owners, through dividends or by buying back its own shares. A buyback reduces the number of shares, so each remaining share has a larger claim on profits, and earnings per share rise even if profit does not. Neither form of return creates value by itself: value comes from the profits the business goes on to earn.
Car parts suppliers face the shift to electric vehicles from two sides. Their old products will be needed less, though for years yet, while new products need large investment before the orders that will use them are certain. Suppliers that invest too early can be left with plants their customers do not fill; those that invest too late can lose the next generation of contracts to rivals.
Shareholders differ. Some hold shares for income and want dividends; some want the price to rise; activist investors buy stakes to press for changes they believe will lift the price, often within a few years. Employees, customers and the communities around the plants have a long-term stake that a short-term shareholder may not share.
Section 04: Relevant evidence
The company's own evidence (simulated), established research (cited, and stated only as its central idea) and how the market works.
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The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data
Profits that rise, a market that shrinks
Revenue rose from €3,620m in 2023 to €3,850m in 2025 and the EBIT margin from 8.0% to 9.0% (Exhibit 2). But revenue from combustion products fell by 0.9% over the same years, and their share of revenue fell from 88.0% to 82.0% (Exhibit 1). Today's profits come from the products with the least future.
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The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data
Cash the company has not needed
Free cash flow reached €210m in 2025, and net cash stands at €480m (Exhibits 2 and 3). At a share price of €62.00 the company is valued at €3,100m, 13.4 times its earnings per share of €4.62.
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The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data
A plant that pays only if the contract comes
The finance team's forecasts for the new plant depend on a contract to supply cooling systems for a major car maker's next electric platform, which the team puts at a 60% chance (Exhibit 4). With the contract the plant is worth €291.9m at 8%; without it, it loses €120.3m (Exhibit A1).
See Exhibit 4
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Established research Cited research
Managers tend to smooth dividends
A classic study of dividend decisions found that managers aim at a long-run share of profit to pay out, raise dividends only when they expect to sustain the increase, and are very reluctant to cut them.
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Established research Cited research
In theory, the form of the payout does not matter; the investment does
Under idealized conditions, with no taxes or costs of trading and with investors fully informed, how a firm divides its earnings between dividends and retained profit does not change its value: what matters is the investment it makes. Real markets depart from those conditions, which is why payout decisions still send signals.
Source: Merton H. Miller and Franco Modigliani (1961), Dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of shares
The exhibits
Revenue by product line, 2023 and 2025 (€m)
Source: Simulated data| Product line | 2023 | Share in 2023 (%) | 2025 | Share in 2025 (%) | Change (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Exhaust systems and fuel pumps (petrol and diesel) | 3,186 | 88.0 | 3,157 | 82.0 | −0.9 |
| Battery cooling systems (electric vehicles) | 434 | 12.0 | 693 | 18.0 | 59.7 |
| All products | 3,620 | 100.0 | 3,850 | 100.0 | 6.4 |
Section 05: Financial information
Exhibit 2 gives three years of results: revenue, EBIT, net profit, dividends, retained profit and free cash flow. Exhibit 3 gives the balance sheet figures and the share figures for 2025, and Exhibit 1 the revenue from each product line. Exhibit 4 gives the forecast cash flows of the new plant over ten years, with and without the contract it depends on. Velmar appraises investments at 8%.
Velmar's results, 2023 to 2025 (€m)
Source: Simulated data| Year | Revenue | EBIT | EBIT margin (%) | Net profit | Dividends | Retained profit | Free cash flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 3,620 | 289.6 | 8.0 | 195.5 | 78.2 | 117.3 | 160 |
| 2024 | 3,740 | 317.9 | 8.5 | 214.0 | 85.6 | 128.4 | 185 |
| 2025 | 3,850 | 346.5 | 9.0 | 231.0 | 92.4 | 138.6 | 210 |
EBIT is earnings before interest and tax. Free cash flow is the cash from operations left after the investment needed to keep the existing business running.
Velmar's balance sheet and shares at the end of 2025
Source: Simulated data| Item | 2025 |
|---|---|
| Cash (€m) | 780 |
| Borrowings, due after more than a year (€m) | 300 |
| Net cash (€m) | 480 |
| Equity (€m) | 2,140 |
| Shares in issue (millions) | 50 |
| Share price (€) | 62 |
| Earnings per share (€) | 4.62 |
| Dividend per share (€) | 1.85 |
| Gearing ratio (%) | 12.3 |
Earnings per share and the dividend per share are measures beyond the IB course; the gearing ratio is on the guide's formula sheet (HL).
Forecast cash flows of the new plant (€m)
Source: Simulated data| Case | Year 0 | Year 1 | Year 2 | Year 3 | Year 4 | Each year, years 5 to 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| B. Build it all now: the contract is won | −250 | −250 | −90 | 110 | 160 | 190 |
| B. Build it all now: the contract is not won | −250 | −250 | −90 | 50 | 80 | 100 |
| C. Build in stages: the contract is won | −150 | −150 | −290 | 110 | 160 | 190 |
| C. Build in stages: the contract is not won | −150 | −150 | 30 | 40 | 60 | 70 |
Building it all costs €650m over three years: €250m, €250m and €150m, less €60m of cash from early sales in year 2. Building in stages spends €300m on a first phase and the other €350m in year 2 only if the contract is won; without it, the first phase runs as a smaller plant. The finance team puts the chance of winning the contract at 60%, with the decision due by the end of 2027.
Section 06: Stakeholder implications
Who has a stake in the decision, how much they care and how much they can affect it, what they want, and what the decision would mean for them.
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Granite Lake Capital
- What they want
- €400m back through a buyback, a 60% payout and no new plant, so that the share price rises within a few years.
- What the decision means for them
- Option A gives it what it wants; option C gives it part. With 6.0% of the shares it cannot decide alone, but it can persuade other investors and make the board's life difficult.
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Long-term institutional shareholders
- What they want
- A company still earning profits in twenty years, and a steady dividend meanwhile.
- What the decision means for them
- They hold most of the shares and will decide whether the activist wins support. A clear plan with stages they can judge is more likely to keep them than either extreme.
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Employees and their representatives
- What they want
- Jobs that survive the end of petrol and diesel engines.
- What the decision means for them
- Half of the supervisory board represents them. Option A protects today's returns with no plan for the jobs that depend on combustion products; options B and C build the work that could replace them.
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Katrin Albers and the management board
- What they want
- The plant, and the credibility to deliver it after an earlier project ran over budget.
- What the decision means for them
- Option B is their proposal. Building in stages asks them to win the contract before spending most of the money, which tests their forecasts in the open.
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Car makers
- What they want
- Suppliers that can deliver the parts for their next electric platforms on time.
- What the decision means for them
- A supplier that pays out its cash and builds nothing will not win the next generation of contracts.
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Lenders
- What they want
- A borrower whose debt stays easily covered by its profits.
- What the decision means for them
- Option D would take borrowing from €300m to €700m just as the company starts its largest investment.
Section 07: The strategic options
The courses of action open to the board. Each is set out on its own terms; the Analysis edition judges them.
Section 08: Evaluation criteria
How the board has said it will judge the options, and how much each criterion counts. The weights add up to 100.
| Criterion | How it is judged | Weight |
|---|---|---|
| Long-term value | The expected net present value of the investment, and the company's position for the next generation of contracts. | 30% |
| Returns to shareholders now | Cash returned through dividends and buybacks, and the effect on earnings per share. | 20% |
| Financial risk | The money at risk if the contract is lost, and the company's borrowing. | 20% |
| Employees and strategy | Whether the option builds work to replace the jobs that depend on combustion products. | 15% |
| Flexibility | How much the option lets the board decide later, when it knows more. | 15% |
Section 09: Discussion questions
Answer them before you open the Analysis edition, which has notes on each.
In the style of the IB course
The platform's own questions, written for this briefing; they are not IB examination questions. The marks are each question's own allocation.
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Using Exhibit 2, calculate Velmar's retained profit in 2025, and the dividends it would pay if it raised the payout to 60% of net profit.
[4 marks]
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Using Exhibit 3, calculate Velmar's gearing ratio at the end of 2025, and what it would be under option D.
[4 marks]
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Explain why protecting shareholder value and investing for the long term may conflict at Velmar.
[4 marks]
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Discuss how the board should balance the demands of Granite Lake Capital with those of Velmar's other stakeholders.
[10 marks]
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Recommend how Velmar should use its cash, with reference to the net present value of the plant.
[10 marks]
HL-only questions are hidden in the SL view. Choose HL above to see them.
For seminars, beyond the course
For undergraduate, MBA and professional readers. These questions go beyond the IB course and are labelled as enrichment.
- Does a share buyback create value? When is it the best use of a company's cash?
- Are activist investors a discipline on managers or a source of short-termism? What does this case suggest?
- Why is building in stages worth more than building all at once, even though the plant is the same?
The Analysis edition The worked discussion: the evidence, the assumptions, every option judged and the recommendation. Open it when you have decided. About 6 minutes to read.
The Analysis edition
From here, the page gives the platform's reading of the case: its interpretation of the evidence, its judgement and its recommendation. It adds no new facts, and the same evidence can support other conclusions if they are argued well.
Section A1: Executive summary
Recommended Option C: Build in stages, and return a little
Build the plant in stages and return a little cash now (option C). Staging the €650m keeps most of the plant's value if the contract is won, €313.0m, and turns the loss if it is not into a small gain, €50.5m, for an expected NPV of €208.0m against €127.0m for building it all at once. It answers the activist's fair point, that an earlier project overran, by making management win the contract before spending most of the money, and it returns €100m without starving the business that will have to pay future dividends.
Section A2: What the evidence shows
The exhibits worked through. Every figure here is recomputed from the exhibits on every build.
- Velmar's profits come from products with a shrinking future: combustion products are 82.0% of revenue, and revenue from them fell by 0.9% between 2023 and 2025 while battery cooling systems grew by 59.7% (Exhibit 1).
- The plant has a positive expected value either way it is built, but staging is worth more: an expected NPV of €208.0m against €127.0m, and €50.5m rather than −€120.3m if the contract is lost (Exhibit A1).
- The buyback flatters a measure rather than the business: earnings per share would rise from €4.62 to €5.11 under option A, but net profit would fall by €8.4m of lost interest, and nothing would replace the combustion business (Exhibit A2).
- The company can afford to stage the plant and keep paying dividends. Net cash is €480m and free cash flow was €210m in 2025 (Exhibits 2 and 3).
The plant's net present value at 8% over ten years (€m)
Source: Simulated data| How it is built | Contract won | Contract not won | Expected |
|---|---|---|---|
| B. All at once | 291.9 | −120.3 | 127.0 |
| C. In stages | 313.0 | 50.5 | 208.0 |
The expected NPV weights each case by the finance team's 60% chance of winning the contract. The NPVs use the guide's discount factors at 8% for years 1 to 10.
Each option's effect on earnings per share and gearing
Source: Simulated data| Option | Shares bought back (millions) | Shares left (millions) | Earnings per share (€) | Gearing ratio (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| As in 2025 | 0.00 | 50.00 | 4.62 | 12.3 |
| A. Buy back €400m | 6.45 | 43.55 | 5.11 | 14.7 |
| C. Buy back €100m | 1.61 | 48.39 | 4.73 | 12.8 |
| D. Borrow €400m for the buyback | 6.45 | 43.55 | 4.98 | 28.7 |
Each buyback is at €62.00 a share and reduces equity by its cost. Spending cash loses the 3% it earns, and borrowing costs 5%, both after 30% tax; the figures use 2025's net profit and leave out the plant's own effects. Earnings per share is a measure beyond the IB course.
Section A3: The assumptions
What the analysis takes as given, and how a manager would test it before relying on it.
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The chance of winning the contract is 60%.
How to test it It is the finance team's judgement. At what chance would building it all at once (B) be better than staging? Ask the car maker for its timetable and its shortlist.
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The plant can be built in two phases at the same total cost.
How to test it Ask the engineers what a two-phase design costs extra, and include it in the staged forecast.
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A rival will not win the contract because Velmar waited.
How to test it The first phase must be large enough to show the car maker that Velmar can deliver.
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Combustion revenue will decline slowly.
How to test it If customers move faster, the case for investing grows and the cash available to invest shrinks; model a faster decline.
Section A4: The trade-offs
What the board gives up to get what it wants. No option avoids all of them.
Cash now, or a business later
Every euro returned now is a euro not invested in the products Velmar's future depends on. The question is not whether to reward shareholders, but which shareholders, and over what time.
Commitment, or the option to wait
Building it all at once wins the race to be ready; building in stages buys the right to stop. Here the contract decision is close enough, by the end of 2027, that waiting costs little.
Debt, or discipline
Borrowing to do both avoids choosing, at the cost of more than doubling the company's debt as it starts its largest project. A board that cannot choose between its stakeholders should not hide the choice in its balance sheet.
Section A5: The alternatives, judged
Every option judged against the evidence, then scored against the board's criteria.
The options scored against the board's criteria
Each option is scored from 1 (poor) to 5 (strong) on each criterion. The weighted score is the sum of each weight times its score, divided by 100. The scores are the analysis's judgement; a scoring matrix organizes judgement, it does not replace it.
| Criterion | Weight | Option A | Option B | Option C | Option D |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Long-term value | 30% | 1 | 3 | 5 | 3 |
| Returns to shareholders now | 20% | 5 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Financial risk | 20% | 4 | 3 | 4 | 1 |
| Employees and strategy | 15% | 1 | 5 | 4 | 4 |
| Flexibility | 15% | 3 | 2 | 5 | 1 |
| Weighted score | 100% | 2.70 | 2.95 | 4.25 (the highest) | 2.65 |
Section A6: The recommended course of action
Option C: Build in stages, and return a little
Approve the first phase of the plant, €300m, now, with the second phase, €350m, to be committed only when the car maker's contract is signed, and a firm decision by the end of 2027. Keep the dividend at 40% of profit, buy back €100m of shares, and publish the plan's stages and measures so that every shareholder can hold the board to them.
Why
- Staging has the highest expected NPV, €208.0m, and avoids a loss if the contract goes elsewhere.
- It answers the activist's concern about overruns by tying most of the spending to a contract won.
- It keeps the dividend steady, which shareholders value and managers are rightly reluctant to cut.
- It builds the products that will replace the combustion business, which protects employees and the company's future alike.
On these conditions
If the contract is lost, the second phase should not be built, and the board should return more of the cash it would have spent. If the car maker wants a supplier ready sooner than staging allows, the case for building it all at once (option B) returns.
Section A7: Implementation
What happens, in what order, and who answers for it.
- Months 1 to 3 Approve the first phase and the €100m buyback; publish the plan, its stages and its measures; meet the main institutional shareholders and Granite Lake Capital. Management board and supervisory board
- Months 3 to 18 Build the first phase on a design that allows the second; bid for the car maker's contract. Chief executive and head of operations
- By the end of 2027 If the contract is won, commit the second phase; if not, run the first phase as a smaller plant and review the payout. Supervisory board
- Every year Report the plant's progress against its budget and the measures below alongside the dividend decision. Chief financial officer
Section A8: Evaluation: how to tell if it is working
The evaluation criteria, applied after the decision: what to measure, what counts as working, and when to look.
| Measure | Target | Reviewed |
|---|---|---|
| The plant's budget | The first phase built within its €300m, with no overrun. | Every quarter |
| The contract | A decision by the end of 2027, with the second phase committed only if it is won. | At the decision |
| Battery cooling revenue | Rising from 18.0% of revenue towards a third within five years. | Every year |
| Shareholder returns | A dividend of 40% of net profit each year, plus the €100m buyback. | Every year |
Section A9: Limitations
What the analysis cannot see, and what would change its recommendation.
The limits of the analysis
- The plant's cash flows are forecasts ten years ahead, and the 60% chance of the contract is a judgement.
- The analysis treats the 8% discount rate as given; a higher rate, reflecting the plant's risk, would lower every NPV.
- Earnings per share after a buyback depends on the share price paid, which is assumed to stay at €62.00.
What would change the recommendation
- If the car maker offered the contract only to a supplier able to build at full scale at once, option B would be the better choice.
- If the contract were lost, much of the cash should go back to shareholders, as the activist asks.
- If the shares fell far below the value of the business, a larger buyback would become a better use of cash than it now is.
Section A10: Notes on the discussion questions
What a strong answer to each discussion question does. Guidance, not a markscheme.
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Question 1 [4 marks]
Retained profit = net profit − dividends = 231.0 − 92.4 = €138.6m. At a 60% payout, dividends would be 231.0 × 60 ÷ 100 = €138.6m, leaving €92.4m retained: the two figures swap. Two marks for each.
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Question 2 [4 marks]HL
Now: 300 ÷ (300 + 2,140) × 100 = 12.3%. Under D, borrowing rises to €700m and the buyback cuts equity by €400m to €1,740m: 700 ÷ (700 + 1,740) × 100 = 28.7%. Two marks for each.
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Question 3 [4 marks]
Cash spent on the plant cannot be returned now, and the plant pays only years later and only if the contract comes; but a company that does not invest loses the products its future profits, and so its shareholders' value, depend on. Strong answers show that the conflict is between shareholders with different time horizons.
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Question 4 [10 marks]
Good answers set out each group's interest and power (the activist's 6.0%, the institutions' majority, the employees' seats on the supervisory board, the car makers' contracts), consider how far their aims really conflict, and reach a judgement on how to weigh them.
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Question 5 [10 marks]HL
Strong answers compare the expected NPVs (B €127.0m, C €208.0m) and the outcomes without the contract (B −€120.3m, C €50.5m), weigh the returns the activist wants and the company's future, and make a recommendation with conditions.
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Seminar question 1 Enrichment
A buyback raises earnings per share by reducing the shares, but creates value only if the shares are cheap or the company has no better use for the money. Good answers apply this to a company with €480m of net cash and a positive NPV investment available.
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Seminar question 2 Enrichment
Activists can force managers to justify holding cash, as Jensen's argument about free cash flow suggests; they can also push for returns that hollow out a company in transition. The overrun on Velmar's last project gives the activist a fair point; the plant's positive expected NPV gives management one.
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Seminar question 3 Enrichment
Staging keeps the right to stop after the first phase if the contract is lost, which cuts the loss in the bad case from −€120.3m to a gain of €50.5m. The ability to wait for information has a value, which managers call a real option.
Notes on HL-only questions are hidden in the SL view.
The course and beyond
Where this briefing meets the IB course, and, kept apart and labelled, the ideas it draws on from beyond it.
Subtopics
- 1.3 Business objectives Protecting shareholder value as an objective, and the conflict between short-term and long-term objectives.
- 1.4 Stakeholders Conflict between an activist shareholder, long-term shareholders, employees and customers.
- 1.2 Types of business entities A publicly held company, owned by shareholders who can buy and sell its shares.
- 3.2 Sources of finance Retained profit as an internal source of finance, and loan capital (bonds) under option D.
- 3.4 Final accounts Dividends and retained profit in the statement of profit or loss.
- 3.6 Efficiency ratio analysis HL The gearing ratio, and how borrowing to fund a buyback raises it.
- 3.8 Investment appraisal Net present value at 8% in two cases, and the expected value across them (HL).
- 5.8 Research and development HL Investment in research and development for the products that will replace the old ones.
Frameworks in the course
- The Boston Consulting Group matrix IB toolkit Combustion products are cash cows in a declining market; battery cooling systems are a question mark that the cash cows can fund.
- Decision trees IB toolkit Weigh building all at once against building in stages, with the 60% chance of the contract on the branches.
Course terms
Ideas beyond the course
- Payout policy Finance research offers two ideas that frame the board's choice. Dividends tend to be smoothed, so a raised dividend is a promise managers are reluctant to break; and in a world without frictions the split between paying out and retaining would not matter, only the investment would. Real markets have frictions, so the payout signals what the board believes about the future. Source: John Lintner (1956), Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained Earnings, and Taxes; Merton H. Miller and Franco Modigliani (1961), Dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of shares
- Free cash flow and the discipline of debt Jensen argued that managers of firms with cash beyond their good investments may spend it on growth that does not pay, and that paying cash out, or committing to debt, disciplines them. The activist's case rests on this argument; the plant's positive expected NPV is the answer to it. Source: Michael C. Jensen (1986), Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
Frameworks beyond the course
- Mendelow's matrix Enrichment Map the activist, the institutions, the employees and the car makers by their power and interest.
- The balanced scorecard Enrichment Hold the board to more than earnings per share, measuring the plant, the customers and the people as well.
Go further: Advanced Management
- Risk, return, the cost of capital and capital structure Beyond the IB course Advanced financial management: the module behind this decision, with real organizations, models and a decision exercise.
- Capital budgeting and investment decisions Beyond the IB course Advanced financial management: the module behind this decision, with real organizations, models and a decision exercise.
- Governance and accountability Beyond the IB course Leadership and organizational behaviour: the module behind this decision, with real organizations, models and a decision exercise.
- Corporate strategy and restructuring Beyond the IB course Advanced strategy: the module behind this decision, with real organizations, models and a decision exercise.
Work it through
The platform's tools that apply the briefing's ideas to its figures, or to your own.
- Financial Laboratory Net present value (NPV) Rework the plant's NPVs at 8% and at other rates (HL).
- Financial Laboratory Gearing ratio Rework the gearing ratio under each option (HL).
- Strategy Studio BCG portfolio matrix Place Velmar's product lines in a portfolio.
- Strategy Studio Decision tree builder Build the tree for building all at once against building in stages.
Sources and method
- Method How the Boardroom Briefings and their figures were made, Arjun Agrawal | The Business Brief (2026). The platform’s own method.
- Research Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained Earnings, and Taxes, John Lintner, American Economic Review (1956). Cited as a reference; not opened for this release.
- Research Dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of shares, Merton H. Miller and Franco Modigliani, Journal of Business 34(4) (1961). Cited as a reference; not opened for this release.
- Research Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers, Michael C. Jensen, American Economic Review 76(2) (1986). Cited as a reference; not opened for this release.
Arjun Agrawal | The Business Brief, https://the-business-brief-dun.vercel.app/boardroom-briefings/shareholder-returns-or-investment/. Original teaching material, not an IB publication. The organizations in the teaching cases are fictional unless a case says otherwise.