Jensen and Meckling (1976)
Agency theory
When managers own little of the firm they run, they bear only part of the cost of their decisions, so their interests diverge from owners'. Agency costs are the sum of monitoring costs, bonding costs and the residual loss that remains.
How to use it
For any governance arrangement, ask which divergence of interest it addresses and at what cost. For a pay plan: does it reward what owners value, over the horizon they care about, without paying for luck?
Where it fails
It assumes self-interest and treats the shareholder as the only principal. It explains why monitoring is needed better than how much is enough, and it can justify incentive pay that itself creates new distortions.
Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4). Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2).