Leadership and organizational behaviour · Module 5

Governance and accountability

Who holds the people who run a company to account, by what means, and why do the arrangements so often fail when they are most needed?

Beyond the IB course UndergraduateMBAProfessional About 18 minutes · 2,995 words · checked 16 November 2026

From the IB course to this module

The IB course introduces companies owned by shareholders (1.2), objectives and corporate social responsibility (1.3) and the conflicting interests of stakeholders (1.4), but it does not examine how the people who run companies are held to account. This module covers the theories of corporate governance, how boards work, shareholder voice and control, executive pay and regimes of personal accountability.

Section 01: Conceptual foundation

In the Cadbury Committee's (1992) phrase, corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. The problem it addresses was named by Berle and Means (1932): in large companies ownership is spread among many shareholders while control sits with professional managers, whose interests may differ from the owners'. Jensen and Meckling (1976) called the resulting losses agency costs: the cost of monitoring managers, the cost managers incur to reassure owners, and the residual loss from decisions that still diverge from owners' interests.

Accountability has two parts: an obligation to explain one's decisions to someone entitled to ask, and consequences that depend on the answer. Governance mechanisms supply both. Internal ones include the board and its committees, audit and internal control, and the design of executive pay. External ones include shareholders, who can use voice by voting and engaging or exit by selling (Hirschman, 1970), as well as lenders, auditors, the market for corporate control, regulators and the press.

Which problem dominates depends on ownership. Where shareholdings are dispersed, as in many British and American listed companies, the main conflict is between managers and shareholders. Yet in most countries large firms typically have a controlling owner, often a family or the state (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999), and the main conflict is between the controller and minority shareholders.

Section 02: Advanced explanation

Agency, stewardship and stakeholders

Agency theory dominates finance and law. It assumes managers will pursue their own interests when unchecked and prescribes monitoring by independent boards, pay that aligns managers with shareholders, and an active market for corporate control. Fama and Jensen (1983) added that well-governed organizations separate decision management, proposing and implementing, from decision control, ratifying and monitoring.

Stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997) starts from the opposite assumption: many executives are motivated by achievement and identification with the organization. On this view heavy monitoring and contingent pay can signal distrust and crowd out the motivation that makes managers good stewards, and structures that empower executives may perform well when the executive is a steward. The two theories really differ on an empirical question, managers' motives, which probably varies by person and situation.

Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) argues that firms should be managed for all groups with a stake in them: employees, customers, suppliers and communities as well as shareholders. Critics reply that a manager accountable to everyone is accountable to no one, since almost any decision can be justified by some stakeholder's interest. Hart and Zingales (2017) proposed a middle position: maximize shareholder welfare rather than market value, because shareholders care about more than money, about pollution for instance, and companies may be better placed than individuals to act on those preferences.

Boards: independence, information and judgement

Boards are expected to monitor management, advise it and connect the firm to resources. Since the 1990s governance codes have pushed for more independent directors, with no ties to management, on the theory that independence makes monitoring credible. The evidence is weaker than the codes' confidence. Bhagat and Black (2002) found no evidence that firms with more independent boards performed better over the long term. Part of the reason is information: independent directors depend on management for what they know, and Adams and Ferreira (2007) showed that a chief executive shares more information with a board that does not monitor too aggressively, so more independence can mean less information.

Board structures differ between countries. The UK and the US use unitary boards of executives and non-executives. Germany separates a management board from a supervisory board, on which employees of large companies elect a share of the members. Codes in many countries separate the roles of chair and chief executive, expect boards to evaluate themselves and plan succession, and give key oversight to audit, remuneration and nomination committees.

In the UK the governance code works on a comply or explain basis: a listed company may depart from a provision if it explains why. That allows flexibility, but its value depends on investors reading and challenging the explanations, and many explanations are boilerplate.

Shareholder voice, exit and control

Shareholders hold managers to account mainly through votes and engagement. In the UK an advisory shareholder vote on the remuneration report was introduced in 2002; Ferri and Maber (2013) found that it made pay more sensitive to poor performance at firms facing high dissent, and that controversial practices were often dropped. UK practice also expects a company facing significant opposition to a resolution to explain how it will respond, as the Unilever application below shows.

Concentrated control changes the problem. A controlling owner monitors managers far better than dispersed shareholders can, but creates a new conflict: the controller may take private benefits at minority shareholders' expense. Dual-class shares, which give some shares more votes than others, let founders or families keep control while raising outside equity. Supporters say this protects long-term strategies from impatient markets; critics say it entrenches insiders after their judgement fades or they leave. Bebchuk and Kastiel (2017) argued that the case for dual-class structures weakens as companies age and proposed sunset clauses that end the extra votes after a fixed period.

Activist investors combine voice with the threat of a proxy fight or a takeover. Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas (2008) found that hedge fund activism in the United States was followed, on average, by positive returns and improved operating performance, though critics question whether the gains last and who bears the costs.

Executive pay and personal accountability

Three views of executive pay compete. The optimal contracting view treats pay as the board's answer to the agency problem; Jensen and Murphy (1990) found that chief executives' wealth changed by only about $3.25 for each $1,000 change in shareholder wealth, too little, they argued, to align interests. The managerial power view (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) holds that boards captured by executives set pay too high and too insensitive to performance, camouflaged in complex plans. The market for talent view (Gabaix and Landier, 2008) explains much of the growth in pay as competition for scarce managers in ever larger firms, where a small difference in talent is worth more.

Design details carry real money. A long-term incentive plan typically grants shares that vest after three years if targets are met. When an executive leaves early, the question is whether awards are time pro-rated. A worked example: an award worth £3.0m at grant, with performance expected to vest 60%, is worth £1.8m; if the executive leaves after 20 of 36 months, pro-rating cuts it to £1.8m × 20 ÷ 36 = £1.0m. Disapplying pro-ration hands the leaver £0.8m for service not given.

Malus, reducing awards not yet paid, and clawback, recovering pay already paid, let rewards respond to problems discovered later. Personal accountability regimes go further, attaching named individuals to defined responsibilities so that a failure can be traced to a person as well as to a firm.

Section 03: Models and frameworks

Where each comes from, how to use it, and where it stops being useful.

Jensen and Meckling (1976)

Agency theory

When managers own little of the firm they run, they bear only part of the cost of their decisions, so their interests diverge from owners'. Agency costs are the sum of monitoring costs, bonding costs and the residual loss that remains.

How to use it

For any governance arrangement, ask which divergence of interest it addresses and at what cost. For a pay plan: does it reward what owners value, over the horizon they care about, without paying for luck?

Where it fails

It assumes self-interest and treats the shareholder as the only principal. It explains why monitoring is needed better than how much is enough, and it can justify incentive pay that itself creates new distortions.

Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4). Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2).

Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997)

Stewardship theory

Many executives are motivated by achievement and identification with the organization, so they act as stewards. For stewards, empowering structures and trust outperform tight monitoring and contingent pay, which can undermine their motivation.

How to use it

Use it to question one-size-fits-all controls. Where a leader's track record and motives are well established, a board may choose more delegation, simpler pay and fewer metrics, while keeping the right to intervene.

Where it fails

Motives are hard to observe in advance, and the cost of misjudging a self-interested manager as a steward can be large. The theory offers little guidance on how to tell the two apart.

James H. Davis, F. David Schoorman and Lex Donaldson (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of management. Academy of Management Review, 22(1).

Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997)

Stakeholder salience

Managers attend to stakeholders according to three attributes: power to influence the firm, legitimacy of their claim and urgency of the claim. Stakeholders with all three are definitive; those with one are latent and easily ignored until something changes.

How to use it

Map stakeholders on the three attributes and watch for shifts: a regulator gaining power, or a community's claim becoming urgent after an incident. The library's Mendelow matrix maps power against interest; salience adds legitimacy and urgency.

Where it fails

It describes whom managers do attend to, not whom they should. The attributes are judgements, and powerful but illegitimate claims can still dominate in practice.

Ronald K. Mitchell, Bradley R. Agle and Donna J. Wood (1997). Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts. Academy of Management Review, vol. 22, no. 4.

Hirschman (1970)

Exit, voice and loyalty

Members of an organization respond to decline by leaving (exit) or by speaking up to change it (voice); loyalty delays exit and makes voice more likely. Each response sends a different signal to management.

How to use it

Ask which channel a governance arrangement relies on. Dispersed shareholders in liquid markets tend to exit; large, long-term or index investors who cannot easily sell must rely on voice through votes and engagement.

Where it fails

It does not specify when voice works. Voice is costly for any single investor while the benefits are shared by all, so it is often under-supplied; and for controlled companies, minority voice may change little.

Albert O. Hirschman (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Harvard University Press.

Section 04: Real business applications

Real organizations appear only with dated, cited facts; illustrative examples are labelled.

Real organization, 2026-04

Personal accountability by regulation (UK, 2016 to 2026)

The UK's Senior Managers and Certification Regime grew out of the recommendations of the Parliamentary Commission for Banking Standards, set up after the 2008 banking crisis and the manipulation of LIBOR. It applied to banks from March 2016, to insurers from December 2018 and to most other financial firms a year later. Its stated aim is to make individuals more accountable for their conduct and competence. It has three parts: a regime for the most senior managers, a Certification Regime for other staff whose roles could cause significant harm, and Conduct Rules setting minimum standards of behaviour. In 2019 an FCA review of banks found that senior managers had become clear about what accountability meant for them.

In April 2026 the FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority announced a first phase of reforms that kept the principle of senior accountability while cutting the number of certification roles by around 15%; the government proposed removing the Certification Regime from legislation, as part of reforms intended to halve the regime's burden on firms.

Interpretation. The regime makes accountability concrete by mapping responsibilities to named people, much as a RACI matrix does for a project. The reforms show the trade-off every accountability system faces: clarity and deterrence against cost and defensive behaviour.

Real organization, 2025-10

Unilever: a remuneration vote and the response (2025)

At Unilever's annual general meeting on 30 April 2025, 72.29% of votes were cast for the advisory resolution approving the directors' remuneration report. Six months later the company said it had contacted its largest shareholders, holding 46.3% of the register, and others who voted against, in 22 meetings. Opponents had cited two concerns: the decision not to time pro-rate three outstanding long-term incentive awards for a former chief executive and a former finance director who retired in 2022 and 2023, and the approach to setting the new chief executive's fixed pay. The company called the first exceptional decisions taken at a time of disruption, confirmed that future leavers' awards would be pro-rated, as they had been for the chief executive who left in March 2025, and set the new finance director's salary below the predecessor's, to rise over two to three years subject to performance. It published the statement as required by the UK Corporate Governance Code.

Interpretation. An advisory vote has no legal force, yet dissent of around 28% produced a public account and a change of practice: accountability through voice and reputation.

Real organization, 2025-07

Wise: a dual-class extension bundled with a US listing (2025)

In June 2025 Wise, a payments company listed in London since 2021, proposed moving its primary listing to the United States through a scheme of arrangement creating a new holding company, whose dual-class structure would keep enhanced votes for Class B shares for ten years from the change. A co-founder's investment company, holding 5.1% of the shares, used section 314 of the Companies Act to circulate a statement to all shareholders. It said that Class B shares had carried about 90.63% of the votes at the 2021 listing, that investors had been promised the enhanced rights would end in July 2026, and that bundling the extension with the listing denied owners a separate vote. The board replied that reformed UK listing rules allowed weighted voting rights and that a scheme is legally a single proposal. On 28 July 2025 the proposal passed: 90.58% by value of the Class A shares voted at the court meeting, and about 84.7% of votes at the general meeting, were in favour. The chief executive's votes are capped at one below 50% of those eligible.

Interpretation. Control and accountability pull apart in dual-class firms, and the design of the vote, here the bundling of two decisions, can decide which prevails.

Section 05: Case studies

Fictional case, simulated figures

Calloway Group: the departing chief executive's awards

The chief executive of Calloway Group plc, a fictional listed engineering company, is leaving on 30 September 2025 by mutual agreement after the board lost confidence in the strategy. The remuneration policy says unvested long-term incentive awards will be time pro-rated for leavers unless the remuneration committee decides otherwise. The chair argues for disapplying pro-ration, to secure a smooth handover and a non-compete agreement. Two large shareholders have said privately that they would vote against the remuneration report if that happens. The committee has the figures below.

The departing chief executive's unvested long-term incentive awards (£000)
Award Face value at grant Expected vesting Value before pro-ration Months served of 36 Value after pro-ration
2023 plan (granted 1 April 2023)2,40070%1,680301,400
2024 plan (granted 1 April 2024)2,60055%1,43018715
2025 plan (granted 1 April 2025)2,80040%1,1206187
Total7,8004,2302,302

Simulated figures. Expected vesting is the committee's estimate of final performance; values assume today's share price. Pro-rated value is value before pro-ration multiplied by months served divided by 36, rounded to the nearest £000.

Questions

  1. Check the calculations in the exhibit. How much would disapplying pro-ration add to the chief executive's awards?
  2. Use agency theory and stewardship theory to set out the case for and against disapplying pro-ration in this situation.
  3. What could the large shareholders do if the committee disapplies pro-ration, and how effective is each response likely to be?
  4. Draft the principle the committee should publish for future leavers, and say how it would handle a leaver who departs because of ill health.

Section 06: Critical evaluation

What the evidence supports, where the debate is, and what the models leave out.

Boards. The push for independent directors rests more on logic than on evidence of better performance. Studies find weak or no links between board independence and long-term results, partly because independence costs information and partly because firms choose their boards in response to their circumstances, which makes causal estimates hard.

Governance indices. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) found that firms with stronger shareholder rights earned higher returns in the 1990s. Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang (2013) showed that the association disappeared in the following decade, apparently as investors learned to price governance. Rankings of governance quality should be read with that history in mind.

Executive pay. The three views are not mutually exclusive, and the evidence supports parts of each: pay has become more sensitive to performance since 1990, captured boards overpay in some firms, and firm size explains much of the long-run growth in pay. Votes on pay have had modest effects.

Dual-class shares. The debate is live. Founders argue that control protects long-term investment; investors argue it removes accountability. Evidence that the costs grow with company age has supported sunset clauses as a compromise, but the right length of a sunset is a judgement, as the Wise case shows.

Stakeholder governance. Critics such as Bebchuk and Tallarita (2020) argue that commitments to stakeholders mostly protect managers from accountability, because they are rarely enforceable; defenders reply that long-term value depends on stakeholder relationships (Edmans, 2020). The disagreement is partly empirical and partly about values.

Accountability regimes. Whether personal accountability rules change behaviour or mainly paperwork is hard to measure; regulators' own reviews report clearer responsibilities, but independent evidence on misconduct is limited.

Section 07: Decision exercise

A fictional situation. Decide before you read the guidance.

Should a founder keep control after listing?

Quillon, a fictional software company founded twelve years ago, is preparing to list its shares. Its founder and chief executive owns 22% of the equity and wants to keep control to pursue a ten-year research programme that will depress profits for several years. Some large investors have said they will buy only with equal voting rights; others will accept weighted votes with safeguards.

  1. A. One share, one vote

    List with a single class of shares. The founder's influence then rests on a 22% stake, reputation and the board's confidence.

  2. B. Dual-class with a seven-year sunset

    Give the founder's shares ten votes each, converting to one vote automatically after seven years or earlier if the founder leaves the company.

  3. C. Dual-class without a time limit

    Give the founder's shares ten votes each, converting only if the founder sells them or leaves.

Judge the options on

  • Protection of the long-term research programme
  • Demand from investors and the cost of capital
  • Accountability of management to all shareholders
  • Succession risk if the founder's judgement or health changes
Read the guidance

The case for founder control is strongest when the founder holds knowledge or vision the market cannot easily verify and when the strategy needs patience that quarterly scrutiny would punish. Both apply to Quillon's research programme. The case weakens with time: the founder's informational advantage fades, the company matures and the risk of entrenchment grows, which is the logic behind sunset clauses.

B is usually the strongest choice here. It protects the research programme for most of its life, converts automatically rather than relying on a later vote that the founder could block, and it removes control if the founder leaves, the moment when the case for weighted votes disappears entirely. A would maximize accountability and investor demand but could expose the programme to pressure in its loss-making years. C gives the most protection but offers no end to it, and investors are likely to price that in. Whatever is chosen, strengthen the board's independent directors and require approval by minority shareholders for transactions with the founder.

Section 08: Further reading

  • Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Macmillan.

    The founding statement of the separation of ownership and control.

  • Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4).

    The agency theory of the firm; demanding, but its definitions of agency costs are still used everywhere.

  • Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1997). A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 52(2).

    A survey of how investors get a return on their money, across legal systems and ownership structures.

  • Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (2004). Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation. Harvard University Press.

    The managerial power critique of executive pay, with extensive evidence.

  • Albert O. Hirschman (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Harvard University Press.

    A short classic on how members respond to decline, with obvious lessons for shareholders.

  • Alex Edmans (2020). Grow the Pie: How Great Companies Deliver Both Purpose and Profit. Cambridge University Press.

    A recent, evidence-based argument that purpose and profit can be reconciled, with clear chapters on pay and stewardship.

Every work cited here is listed in the platform's sources register. Real organizations appear only with facts from the sources shown; everything else is labelled illustrative or fictional.