No. 08 The Boardroom Briefings Make or buy

Should a business vertically integrate its supply chain?

Tallowood Cafés is offered the roaster behind its coffee

A Melbourne café chain can buy the roastery that supplies it, build one of its own, or stay a customer on better terms. Owning the supply chain looks like control; the evidence asks what control is worth.

Source: Simulated data Fictional company Updated 16 November 2026
Company
Tallowood Cafés, Melbourne, Australia
Industry
Hospitality and restaurants
Decision
Make or buy
Functions
Operations management, Finance and accounts, Strategy and management
Key concepts
Change, Sustainability
Editions
Student, then Analysis
Choose an edition

You are reading the Student edition. The recommendation is withheld.

This briefing has two editions. The Student edition comes first: the case and the questions. The Analysis edition follows it, closed, so that you can decide before you read the recommendation.

The Student edition

The case and the questions, with the recommendation withheld · about 7 minutes to read

Section 01: Executive summary

The decision in brief. In this edition the summary stops short of a recommendation.

The situation

Tallowood Cafés buys all its coffee, 210 tonnes a year, from one roaster, Kiln & Copper. The roaster's owner is retiring and has offered to sell the business to Tallowood for A$9.0m. Tallowood has had growing problems with the roaster's late deliveries and uneven batches.

The decision

Whether to integrate backwards into roasting, by buying Kiln & Copper or by building a roastery of its own; or to stay a customer, either on a long-term contract with Kiln & Copper or by buying from several roasters.

What is at stake

Coffee is Tallowood's signature and 13.0% of its revenue. The choice decides who controls its quality and cost, how much capital it ties up in a business it has never run, and whether it ends up supplying its own competitors.

Section 02: Business background

Priya Nair opened the first Tallowood café in Fitzroy in 2012, built a following for its house blend, and grew the chain to 42 cafés across Melbourne. In 2025 Tallowood earned revenue of A$61.2m and an operating profit of A$4.3m, a margin of 7.0% (Exhibit 2). The founders own 65% of the company; a hospitality investment group owns 35%.

From the start, Tallowood's coffee has been roasted by Kiln & Copper, an independent roastery in Brunswick, to a blend the two developed together. Tallowood bought 210 tonnes in 2025 at A$38.00 a kilogram, A$7,980k in all. Kiln & Copper also roasts for other cafés, some of them Tallowood's competitors, and for two grocery chains (Exhibit 3).

The relationship has frayed. Kiln & Copper is near the end of its owner's working life and has invested little: nine of its 104 deliveries to Tallowood in 2025 were late, and six of 52 batches failed Tallowood's taste test (Exhibit 1). Its owner has now offered the business to Tallowood for A$9.0m. An engineer has also quoted Tallowood A$3.4m to fit out a roastery of its own, sized for its needs.

Company
Tallowood Cafés
Business
Café chain
Based in
Melbourne, Australia
Size
42 cafés, 610 employees and revenue of A$61.2m in 2025
Ownership
Privately held company, 65% owned by its founders and 35% by a hospitality investment group
Figures in
AUD, in thousands (A$000)
Status
A fictional company. Every figure is simulated for teaching and checked for consistency.

Section 03: Strategic context

The industry and the forces on the decision, in general terms. The only figures in this briefing are the company's own.

Specialty coffee roasting is a competitive trade. There are many roasters, the equipment can be bought and the skills can be hired, so a café chain is rarely short of suppliers. What is harder to replace is a particular blend roasted the same way every week, which customers notice when it changes.

Owning a stage of the supply chain brings control over quality, supply and cost, and keeps the supplier's profit in the group. It also brings capital tied up, a business to run that may be unlike the core one, and the loss of the freedom to switch suppliers. A supplier owned by one customer may lose its other customers, especially those who compete with the owner.

Contracts are the alternative to ownership. A long contract with standards for quality and delivery, and penalties if they are missed, can give much of the control of ownership, but it can never foresee every problem, and it depends on a supplier able to keep its promises.

Section 04: Relevant evidence

The company's own evidence (simulated), established research (cited, and stated only as its central idea) and how the market works.

  • The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data

    Coffee is a large and visible cost

    Tallowood spent A$7,980k on roasted coffee in 2025, 13.0% of its revenue, against an operating profit of A$4,284k (Exhibit 2). A saving of a few dollars a kilogram matters to the chain's margin.

    See Exhibit 2

  • The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data

    A supplier with spare capacity and slipping standards

    Kiln & Copper roasted 520 tonnes in 2025 in a roastery that can handle 700, a capacity utilization rate of 74.3%, and earned a profit of A$3,300k (Exhibit 3). Late deliveries reached 8.7% and failed batches 11.5% (Exhibit 1).

    See Exhibit 3, Exhibit 1

  • The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data

    The cost to buy against the cost to make

    Buying 210 tonnes at A$38.00 a kilogram costs A$7,980k a year. A roastery of Tallowood's own would cost A$1,450k a year to run plus A$24.50 a kilogram in beans, energy and packaging: A$6,595k for the same coffee (Exhibit 4). Kiln & Copper has offered a five-year contract at A$36.50 a kilogram instead.

    See Exhibit 4

  • Established research Cited research

    Why firms make rather than buy

    Transaction cost economics explains the boundary of the firm: using the market has costs, of finding suppliers, agreeing terms and enforcing them, and when those costs are high, as when few suppliers can do the work and contracts cannot cover every problem, firms do better to organize the activity themselves. When many suppliers compete, buying is usually cheaper.

    Source: Ronald H. Coase (1937), The Nature of the Firm; Oliver E. Williamson (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications

  • Established research Cited research

    The value chain

    Porter's value chain describes a firm as a set of activities, from bringing in materials to serving customers, each of which adds cost and can add value. A firm gains an advantage by performing some activities better or more cheaply than rivals, which is the test any decision to take on a new activity must pass.

    Source: Michael E. Porter (1985), Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance

The exhibits

Exhibit 1

Kiln & Copper's service to Tallowood, 2025

Source: Simulated data
Measure Number Of Per cent
Deliveries more than a day late91048.7
Batches that failed Tallowood's taste test65211.5

A failed batch is one that Tallowood's head of coffee rejected for flavour or roast colour; it was replaced, but cafés ran short in the meantime.

Source Tallowood's supplier records (simulated).

Section 05: Financial information

Exhibit 2 gives Tallowood's results and what it pays for coffee. Exhibit 3 gives Kiln & Copper's accounts for 2025 and its asking price. Exhibit 4 compares the cost of Tallowood's 210 tonnes under each option: buying as now, buying on the offered contract or by tender, and roasting it in a roastery of its own. Tallowood appraises investments at 8% over eight years.

Exhibit 2

Tallowood Cafés in 2025

Source: Simulated data
Item 2025
Cafés42
Revenue (A$000)61,200
Operating profit (A$000)4,284
Operating profit margin (%)7
Roasted coffee bought (tonnes)210
Price paid (A$ a kilogram)38
Cost of coffee (A$000)7,980
Coffee as a share of revenue (%)13
Source Tallowood's management accounts (simulated).
Exhibit 3

Kiln & Copper Roasters in 2025

Source: Simulated data
Item 2025
Roasting capacity (tonnes a year)700
Coffee roasted (tonnes)520
Capacity utilization rate (%)74.3
Sold to Tallowood (tonnes)210
Sold to other cafés and grocers (tonnes)310
Price to other customers (A$ a kilogram)36
Revenue from Tallowood (A$000)7,980
Revenue from other customers (A$000)11,160
Variable costs at A$24.50 a kilogram (A$000)12,740
Fixed costs (A$000)3,100
Profit (A$000)3,300
Asking price for the business (A$000)9,000

Variable costs are green beans, energy and packaging. The other customers include cafés that compete with Tallowood; those buying 124 of their 310 tonnes have said they would stop if a café chain owned the roastery.

Source Kiln & Copper's accounts, shared with Tallowood under a confidentiality agreement (simulated).
Exhibit 4

The cost of 210 tonnes a year under each option

Source: Simulated data
Option Fixed costs (A$000 a year) Cost per kilogram (A$) Total cost (A$000 a year)
Buy from Kiln & Copper, as now (cost to buy)038.007,980
Roast in a roastery of Tallowood's own (cost to make)1,45024.506,595
Buy on Kiln & Copper's five-year contract036.507,665
Buy from several roasters chosen by tender037.007,770

The roastery's fixed costs are staff, the lease and maintenance; depreciation of the A$3,400k fit-out is not included, because the appraisal counts the fit-out as a cost when it is paid. The tender price is the average of three quotes.

Source Engineer's quotation, Kiln & Copper's contract offer and three roasters' quotes (simulated).

Section 06: Stakeholder implications

Who has a stake in the decision, how much they care and how much they can affect it, what they want, and what the decision would mean for them.

  • Priya Nair and the founders

    Stakeholder
    Internal
    Interest
    High
    Power
    High
    What they want
    Coffee they are proud of in every cup, and a chain that keeps growing.
    What the decision means for them
    Buying Kiln & Copper or building a roastery puts roasting under their control, and makes them responsible for running a manufacturing business alongside 42 cafés.
  • The hospitality investment group

    Stakeholder
    Internal
    Interest
    Medium
    Power
    High
    What they want
    A good return on its 35%, and capital used where it earns most.
    What the decision means for them
    It will ask why A$9.0m should go into a roastery rather than new cafés, and what happens to the roaster's profit if its other customers leave.
  • Kiln & Copper's owner and staff

    Stakeholder
    External
    Interest
    High
    Power
    Medium
    What they want
    A buyer who keeps the business and its people; the owner wants a fair price to retire on.
    What the decision means for them
    A sale to Tallowood keeps the roastery going; if Tallowood builds its own, Kiln & Copper loses its largest customer and may not find another buyer.
  • Kiln & Copper's other customers

    Stakeholder
    External
    Interest
    High
    Power
    Medium
    What they want
    Reliable coffee from a roaster that does not belong to a competitor.
    What the decision means for them
    Those buying 124 of the 310 tonnes say they would leave if Tallowood owned the roastery, which would cut the profit Tallowood is paying for.
  • Café managers and baristas

    Stakeholder
    Internal
    Interest
    Medium
    Power
    Low
    What they want
    Coffee that arrives on time and tastes the same every week.
    What the decision means for them
    They bear the late deliveries and failed batches today, and would bear the teething problems of a new roastery.
  • Coffee growers

    Stakeholder
    External
    Interest
    Medium
    Power
    Low
    What they want
    Steady buyers who pay fairly for good beans.
    What the decision means for them
    A roastery of Tallowood's own could buy directly from farms it chooses, which would let it set and check standards for how the beans are grown and paid for.

Section 07: The strategic options

The courses of action open to the board. Each is set out on its own terms; the Analysis edition judges them.

  1. Option A: Buy Kiln & Copper

    Pay the asking price of A$9.0m, keep the roastery's staff and its other customers where possible, and run it as a subsidiary that supplies Tallowood first.

    What it needs
    A$9.0m, managers who can run a roastery, and a plan to keep the other customers.
    What it could gain
    Control of the blend, supply and quality at once, and the roaster's profit kept in the group.
    What could go wrong
    Customers buying 124 tonnes say they would leave; the price pays for a profit that would shrink; and Tallowood would be selling coffee to its own competitors.

    Evidence: Exhibit 3, Exhibit 1

  2. Option B: Sign a five-year contract with Kiln & Copper

    Stay a customer, on a five-year contract at A$36.50 a kilogram, with standards for delivery and taste and penalties if they are missed.

    What it needs
    A supplier able to keep its promises, which depends on who buys Kiln & Copper when the owner retires.
    What it could gain
    A$315k a year saved, no capital tied up, and management attention kept on the cafés.
    What could go wrong
    The contract cannot guarantee quality from a roaster that is not investing; a new owner may not honour its spirit.

    Evidence: Exhibit 1, Exhibit 4

  3. Option C: Build a roastery of its own

    Fit out a roastery sized for Tallowood's 210 tonnes for A$3,400k, hire two experienced roasters, and keep buying from Kiln & Copper for the 12 months it takes to commission.

    What it needs
    A$3,400k, roasting skills hired in, and a year of overlap with the present supplier.
    What it could gain
    The lowest cost of coffee, A$6,595k a year against A$7,980k, control of the blend, and no competitors as customers.
    What could go wrong
    A new business to learn; teething problems with quality in the first months; the costs are an engineer's estimate; and a roastery sized for today leaves little room for growth.

    Evidence: Exhibit 4

  4. Option D: Buy from several roasters by tender

    Put the coffee out to tender, split the volume between two or three roasters, and switch supply when one falls short.

    What it needs
    A blend that more than one roaster can reproduce, and a head of coffee to manage several suppliers.
    What it could gain
    A$210k a year saved, competition between suppliers, and no dependence on one.
    What could go wrong
    The signature blend may vary between roasters, and customers notice; no supplier has much reason to invest for Tallowood.

    Evidence: Exhibit 4

Section 08: Evaluation criteria

How the board has said it will judge the options, and how much each criterion counts. The weights add up to 100.

Criterion How it is judged Weight
Cost of coffee The saving each year against buying as now, and the net present value at 8% over eight years. 25%
Quality and security of supply Control of the blend, the reliability of deliveries and the risk of running short. 25%
Capital and execution risk The capital tied up, and what could go wrong in carrying the option out. 20%
Management focus How far the option draws managers away from running and growing the cafés. 15%
Flexibility How easily Tallowood could change course if the market or its needs change. 15%

Section 09: Discussion questions

Answer them before you open the Analysis edition, which has notes on each.

Source: Original practice question
Show content for

Showing everything. HL-only material is marked HL.

In the style of the IB course

The platform's own questions, written for this briefing; they are not IB examination questions. The marks are each question's own allocation.

  1. Using Exhibit 4, calculate the cost to buy (CTB) and the cost to make (CTM) for Tallowood's 210 tonnes of coffee a year.

    Calculate AO4 5.6 Production planning HL

    [4 marks]

  2. Using Exhibit 3, calculate Kiln & Copper's capacity utilization rate in 2025.

    Calculate AO4 5.6 Production planning HL

    [2 marks]

  3. Explain one advantage and one disadvantage of backward vertical integration for Tallowood Cafés.

    Explain AO2 1.5 Growth and evolution

    [4 marks]

  4. Discuss whether Tallowood should insource the roasting of its coffee.

    Discuss AO3 5.4 Location

    [10 marks]

  5. Recommend which of the four options Tallowood should choose.

    Recommend AO3 1.5 Growth and evolution; 3.8 Investment appraisal

    [10 marks]

HL-only questions are hidden in the SL view. Choose HL above to see them.

For seminars, beyond the course

Source: Enrichment

For undergraduate, MBA and professional readers. These questions go beyond the IB course and are labelled as enrichment.

  1. Transaction cost economics says firms should make what is costly to buy through the market. Is roasting coffee such an activity for Tallowood?
  2. Why might a supplier lose customers when one of them buys it? How should Tallowood value a business whose customers may leave?
  3. Would owning a roastery let Tallowood do more for the farmers who grow its coffee? Is that a reason to integrate?
The Analysis edition The worked discussion: the evidence, the assumptions, every option judged and the recommendation. Open it when you have decided. About 6 minutes to read.

The Analysis edition

The worked discussion and the recommendation · about 6 minutes to read

Source: Arjun Agrawal frameworkThe Business Brief's analysis

From here, the page gives the platform's reading of the case: its interpretation of the evidence, its judgement and its recommendation. It adds no new facts, and the same evidence can support other conclusions if they are argued well.

Section A1: Executive summary

Recommended Option C: Build a roastery of its own

Integrate, but by building rather than buying (option C). A roastery of Tallowood's own would roast its 210 tonnes for A$6,595k a year against A$7,980k now, an NPV of A$4,559.0k at 8% over eight years, and would put the blend under its control without making it a supplier to its own competitors. Buying Kiln & Copper looks better only if its other customers stay, and those buying 124 of their 310 tonnes say they would not. The contract on offer is the right fallback, and the right arrangement for the year it takes to build.

Section A2: What the evidence shows

The exhibits worked through. Every figure here is recomputed from the exhibits on every build.

  • Making is cheaper than buying: A$6,595k against A$7,980k a year for the same coffee, a saving of A$1,385k (Exhibit 4). The contract saves A$315k and a tender A$210k.
  • On the appraisal, building has the highest NPV, A$4,559.0k, and the fastest payback, 2.5 years; buying Kiln & Copper has an NPV of A$1,769.1k and a payback of 4.8 years if 40% of the other customers' volume leaves (Exhibit A1).
  • The purchase depends on customers Tallowood cannot keep. If none left, buying would be worth A$9,963.8k; if 80% left, it would lose A$6,425.5k (Exhibit A2). The asking price, 2.7 times this year's profit, pays for customers who say they will go.
  • The supplier's problems are real: 8.7% of deliveries late and 11.5% of batches failed in 2025 (Exhibit 1). A contract with the same roaster, under an owner about to leave, would not fix them by itself.
Exhibit A1

The options appraised at 8% over eight years (A$000)

Source: Simulated data
Option Capital cost Saving a year Payback (years) NPV at 8%
A. Buy Kiln & Copper (40% of the other volume leaves)9,0001,8744.81,769.1
B. Sign a five-year contract with Kiln & Copper0315No capital1,810.2
C. Build a roastery of its own3,4001,3852.54,559.0
D. Buy from several roasters by tender0210No capital1,206.8

For A, the saving is the coffee Tallowood no longer buys plus the profit on the other customers who stay, less the roastery's costs. B and D need no capital, so their figure is the present value of the savings, assuming the contract is renewed on the same terms after five years.

Source The Business Brief's analysis of Exhibits 3 and 4 (simulated data).
Exhibit A2

Buying Kiln & Copper if its other customers leave (A$000)

Source: Simulated data
Share of the other customers' volume that leaves Saving a year NPV at 8% over eight years
None3,3009,963.8
40%, as the customers say1,8741,769.1
80%448−6,425.5

If no customer left, Tallowood would keep the whole of Kiln & Copper's profit; each customer who leaves takes its contribution with it while the roastery's fixed costs stay.

Source The Business Brief's analysis of Exhibit 3 (simulated data).

Section A3: The assumptions

What the analysis takes as given, and how a manager would test it before relying on it.

  • The roastery's costs will be as the engineer quoted, A$1,450k a year plus A$24.50 a kilogram.

    How to test it Ask other café groups that roast their own what their costs turned out to be, and add a margin for the first year's waste.

  • Tallowood can hire roasters who can reproduce its blend.

    How to test it Recruit them before committing to the fit-out, and have them roast trial batches on rented equipment.

  • Customers buying 124 tonnes would leave Kiln & Copper if Tallowood bought it.

    How to test it It is what they say; some might stay for a price cut. Exhibit A2 shows how far the purchase depends on them.

  • Tallowood's needs will stay near 210 tonnes.

    How to test it If the chain grows, a roastery sized for today will need expanding; plan the site with room to add a second roaster.

Section A4: The trade-offs

What the board gives up to get what it wants. No option avoids all of them.

Control, or freedom

Owning roasting gives Tallowood control of its signature product, but ends the freedom to switch suppliers. A contract keeps that freedom and gives up some control.

Buying a business, or building a capability

Buying Kiln & Copper gets a working roastery and experienced staff at once, with customers attached that Tallowood may lose. Building takes a year and has teething problems, but carries nothing Tallowood does not want.

Saving money, or adding a business

A roastery saves A$1,385k a year, but it is a manufacturing business that managers must learn to run. The saving is worth having only if it does not distract from the 42 cafés that earn the profit.

Section A5: The alternatives, judged

Every option judged against the evidence, then scored against the board's criteria.

  1. Option A: Buy Kiln & Copper

    Weakly supported by the evidence

    Weakly supported. Its value rests on customers who say they will leave, it makes Tallowood a supplier to its competitors, and its NPV swings from strongly positive to strongly negative on that one assumption.

  2. Option B: Sign a five-year contract with Kiln & Copper

    Defensible if its conditions hold

    Defensible, and the right arrangement for the year it takes to build. As the long-term answer it depends on a roaster that is not investing and is about to change hands.

  3. Option C: Build a roastery of its own

    Best supported by the evidence

    The best supported. It has the lowest cost and the highest NPV, it gives Tallowood control of its blend, and it avoids the competitor problem. Its risks, skills and teething problems, can be managed by hiring first and keeping supply from Kiln & Copper until the new roastery is proven.

  4. Option D: Buy from several roasters by tender

    Weakly supported by the evidence

    Weakly supported for a chain whose coffee is its signature. It saves least, and splitting a blend between roasters risks the consistency customers notice.

The options scored against the board's criteria

Each option is scored from 1 (poor) to 5 (strong) on each criterion. The weighted score is the sum of each weight times its score, divided by 100. The scores are the analysis's judgement; a scoring matrix organizes judgement, it does not replace it.

Criterion Weight Option A Option B Option C Option D
Cost of coffee 25% 3251
Quality and security of supply 25% 5442
Capital and execution risk 20% 1535
Management focus 15% 2534
Flexibility 15% 1335
Weighted score 100% 2.65 3.70 3.75 (the highest) 3.10

Section A6: The recommended course of action

Option C: Build a roastery of its own

Build a roastery of Tallowood's own. First hire two experienced roasters and have them reproduce the blend on rented equipment; then fit out a leased site for A$3,400k, with room for a second roaster. Meanwhile, sign Kiln & Copper's contract for a short term, with the delivery and taste standards, to cover the year it takes to commission. Decline the offer to buy Kiln & Copper.

Why

  • Making is A$1,385k a year cheaper than buying, with the highest NPV of any option.
  • It puts the signature blend under Tallowood's control.
  • It avoids paying for customers who say they would leave, and selling coffee to competitors.
  • A short contract with Kiln & Copper protects supply while the roastery is built and proven.

On these conditions

If the roasters Tallowood hires cannot reproduce the blend in trials, it should not build; it should sign the five-year contract (option B) and look for a second roaster to keep Kiln & Copper honest.

Section A7: Implementation

What happens, in what order, and who answers for it.

  1. Months 1 to 3 Recruit two experienced roasters; reproduce the blend on rented equipment; sign a short contract with Kiln & Copper with delivery and taste standards. Head of coffee
  2. Months 3 to 12 Lease and fit out the roastery, with space for a second roaster; set up quality checks and buying of green beans. Operations director
  3. Months 12 to 15 Commission the roastery, running it alongside Kiln & Copper's supply and moving cafés across in stages. Head of coffee
  4. Month 24 Review costs, quality and supply against the measures below, and decide whether to buy directly from growers. The board

Section A8: Evaluation: how to tell if it is working

The evaluation criteria, applied after the decision: what to measure, what counts as working, and when to look.

Measure Target Reviewed
Cost of coffee At or below A$6,595k a year for 210 tonnes, the engineer's estimate, from the second year. Every quarter
Quality Fewer failed batches than Kiln & Copper's 11.5% in 2025, falling towards none. Every week at first, then every month
Supply Late deliveries to cafés below Kiln & Copper's 8.7%. Every month
Return The A$3,400k fit-out paid back within the 2.5 years of the appraisal. Every year

Section A9: Limitations

What the analysis cannot see, and what would change its recommendation.

The limits of the analysis

  • The roastery's costs are an engineer's estimate for a business Tallowood has never run.
  • Customers' statements about leaving Kiln & Copper may not match what they would do.
  • The eight-year appraisal assumes Tallowood's needs stay near 210 tonnes and coffee prices move alike under every option.

What would change the recommendation

  • If trial roasting showed the blend could not be reproduced, the contract (option B) would be the better choice.
  • If Kiln & Copper's other customers committed in writing to stay, buying it (option A) would be worth much more than it now appears.
  • If Tallowood planned to grow fast, a larger roastery, or the purchase of one with spare capacity, would deserve another look.

Section A10: Notes on the discussion questions

What a strong answer to each discussion question does. Guidance, not a markscheme.

Source: Assessment explanation
  1. Question 1 [4 marks]HL

    CTB = price × quantity = 38.00 × 210,000 kg = A$7,980k. CTM = fixed costs + variable cost × quantity = 1,450 + 24.50 × 210 = A$6,595k. Making saves A$1,385k a year, before the A$3,400k fit-out. Two marks for each.

  2. Question 2 [2 marks]HL

    Capacity utilization = actual output ÷ productive capacity × 100 = 520 ÷ 700 × 100 = 74.3%. The roastery has 180 tonnes of spare capacity, which a buyer might fill.

  3. Question 3 [4 marks]

    Advantage: control over the quality and supply of its signature coffee, and the supplier's margin kept in the group. Disadvantage: capital tied up in a business unlike its own, and, if it buys Kiln & Copper, the loss of customers who compete with Tallowood. Each applied to the case.

  4. Question 4 [10 marks]

    Good answers weigh the lower cost (A$6,595k against A$7,980k), control and quality against the fit-out, the skills it lacks and the loss of flexibility, compare insourcing with a long contract, and reach a judgement.

  5. Question 5 [10 marks]

    The best answers compare the appraisals in Exhibit A1, test the purchase against the loss of the roaster's other customers (Exhibit A2), consider quality and management focus, and make a clear recommendation with conditions.

  6. Seminar question 1 Enrichment

    Many roasters compete, which argues for buying; but a particular blend, roasted consistently, is harder to buy, and Tallowood's experience with Kiln & Copper shows the cost of a supplier that falls short. Good answers decide which matters more here.

  7. Seminar question 2 Enrichment

    Competitors fear that their orders, prices and blends will be seen by a rival, and that they will be served second. Value the business on the customers likely to stay, as Exhibit A2 does.

  8. Seminar question 3 Enrichment

    A roaster can buy directly and set standards for how beans are grown and paid for, which a café buying roasted coffee cannot. Good answers ask whether this is a benefit of ownership or something a contract could also require.

Notes on HL-only questions are hidden in the SL view.

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