No. 03 The Boardroom Briefings Profit recovery

How should a company respond to declining profitability?

Kittiwake Air's margins fall for a third year

A regional airline in Atlantic Canada is carrying more passengers than ever and making almost no money. Its board has four ways to restore its profits, and each would hurt someone.

Source: Simulated data Fictional company Updated 16 November 2026
Company
Kittiwake Air, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
Industry
Aviation
Decision
Profit recovery
Functions
Finance and accounts, Operations management, Marketing, Human resource management
Key concepts
Change, Ethics
Editions
Student, then Analysis
Choose an edition

You are reading the Student edition. The recommendation is withheld.

This briefing has two editions. The Student edition comes first: the case and the questions. The Analysis edition follows it, closed, so that you can decide before you read the recommendation.

The Student edition

The case and the questions, with the recommendation withheld · about 8 minutes to read

Section 01: Executive summary

The decision in brief. In this edition the summary stops short of a recommendation.

The situation

Kittiwake Air flies from Halifax to cities and smaller communities across Atlantic Canada and to Toronto and Montréal. It carried 1,090,000 passengers in 2025, more than ever, but its operating profit fell from C$13.8m in 2023 to C$1.9m, and the finance team forecasts a loss in 2027 if nothing changes.

The decision

How to restore the airline's profitability: by cutting its two loss-making routes, raising fares where it has no competitor, cutting its costs with its workforce and suppliers, or giving up its Toronto route to a low-cost rival.

What is at stake

The airline's profit margin has fallen from 8.0% to 1.0% in two years. Each response affects someone the airline depends on: its staff and their unions, passengers in remote communities with no other airline, or the routes that feed its network.

Section 02: Business background

Kittiwake Air was founded in 1998 by a group of pilots who saw that the smaller cities of Atlantic Canada were poorly served. It now flies 14 turboprop aircraft from its base in Halifax, to Toronto, Montréal, St. John's, Charlottetown and Sydney, and along the Labrador coast under a contract with the provincial government. It employs 1,150 people, most of them members of a pilots' union or a cabin crew union.

For most of its history the airline made steady profits. Then its costs rose faster than its fares: between 2023 and 2025 its operating costs grew by 16.4% while its revenue grew by 8.1%, and its profit margin fell from 8.0% to 1.0% (Exhibits 2 and 3). In 2024 a low-cost airline began flying between Halifax and Toronto, Kittiwake's busiest route, and Kittiwake cut its fares there to keep its passengers.

The airline is owned 60% by a regional pension fund and 40% by the founders' families. Both want it back in good health. The chief executive, Marie Thibodeau, has asked her team to cost four responses (Exhibit 5), and will put one of them to the board next month.

Company
Kittiwake Air
Business
Regional airline
Based in
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
Size
14 turboprop aircraft, 1,150 employees and revenue of C$186.0m in 2025
Ownership
Privately held company, 60% owned by a regional pension fund and 40% by the founders' families
Figures in
CAD, in millions (C$m)
Status
A fictional company. Every figure is simulated for teaching and checked for consistency.

Section 03: Strategic context

The industry and the forces on the decision, in general terms. The only figures in this briefing are the company's own.

An airline's costs are mostly fixed in the short run. The aircraft, the leases, the crews and the maintenance teams have to be paid for whether a flight leaves full or half empty, so the share of seats filled, the load factor, decides whether a route makes money. A small fall in passengers or fares can wipe out a thin profit, and a small rise can restore it.

Regional airlines sit between two kinds of competitor. National airlines connect the regions to the rest of the world and can offer frequent flyers more; low-cost airlines take the busiest routes with fewer frills and lower fares. A regional airline that tries to match both can end up with the costs of one and the fares of the other.

Some regional routes are essential services. Remote communities may have no road or no reliable one, and depend on the airline for travel, health care and supplies. Governments often pay airlines to keep such routes running, and expect a say in their fares and schedules.

Section 04: Relevant evidence

The company's own evidence (simulated), established research (cited, and stated only as its central idea) and how the market works.

  • The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data

    More passengers, thinner margins

    Revenue rose from C$172.0m to C$186.0m between 2023 and 2025, but operating profit fell from C$13.8m to C$1.9m, and the return on capital employed from 23.0% to 3.0% (Exhibit 2). Revenue per passenger rose only slowly, from C$165.38 to C$170.64, while the load factor slipped from 68.4% to 66.5% (Exhibit 1).

    See Exhibit 2, Exhibit 1

  • The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data

    Where the costs rose

    Maintenance costs rose by 34.3% and staff costs by 20.2% between 2023 and 2025, both faster than revenue (Exhibit 3). The three oldest aircraft, all over 25 years old, account for much of the maintenance bill.

    See Exhibit 3

  • The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data

    Which routes pay

    In 2025 the routes earned a total contribution of C$12.4m towards the C$10.5m of costs no single route can be charged with (Exhibit 4). St. John's earned the most, C$5.9m. Two routes lost money: Sydney, at −C$1.4m, and the Labrador coast, at −C$2.6m. Toronto, the busiest route, earned C$2.6m, at an average of C$200.00 a passenger against C$214 before the low-cost airline arrived.

    See Exhibit 4

  • Established research Cited research

    The danger of being stuck in the middle

    Porter argued that a firm earns above-average returns by competing either on cost or on difference, across a whole market or in a focused part of it, and that a firm which tries to do both without achieving either risks being stuck in the middle, with neither the lowest costs nor a premium.

    Source: Michael E. Porter (1980), Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors

  • How the market works General context

    Why airline profits swing

    Because most of an airline's costs are fixed in the short run, its profit changes much more than its revenue when passenger numbers or fares change. The same leverage that turns a small fall in revenue into a large fall in profit works in the other direction once costs are brought back under control.

The exhibits

Exhibit 1

Passengers, seats and fares, 2023 to 2025

Source: Simulated data
Year Passengers (000) Seats flown (000) Load factor (%) Revenue per passenger (C$)
20231,0401,52068.4165.38
20241,0751,59067.6168.84
20251,0901,64066.5170.64

The load factor is the share of the seats flown that carried a passenger, the airline's capacity utilization rate.

Source Kittiwake Air's traffic records (simulated).

Section 05: Financial information

Exhibit 2 gives the airline's results and returns for three years, and Exhibit 3 its operating costs by type. Exhibit 4 shows the contribution each route made in 2025, before the costs that cannot be charged to a route. Exhibit 5 gives the finance team's estimates of what each response would add to operating profit each year from 2027, and what it would cost once in 2026. If nothing changes, the team forecasts an operating loss of C$4.2m in 2027.

Exhibit 2

Kittiwake Air's results, 2023 to 2025 (C$m)

Source: Simulated data
Year Revenue Operating costs Operating profit Profit margin (%) Capital employed ROCE (%)
2023172.0158.213.88.060.023.0
2024181.5174.27.34.062.011.8
2025186.0184.11.91.064.03.0

Operating profit is profit before interest and tax. The profit margin and ROCE are worked as on the guide's formula sheet.

Source Kittiwake Air's annual accounts (simulated).
Exhibit 3

Operating costs by type, 2023 and 2025 (C$m)

Source: Simulated data
Cost 2023 2025 Change (%)
Fuel36.241.013.3
Staff52.062.520.2
Maintenance18.124.334.3
Airport and navigation charges25.627.99.0
Aircraft leases17.818.64.5
Sales and other costs8.59.815.3
All operating costs158.2184.116.4
Source Kittiwake Air's management accounts (simulated).
Exhibit 4

What each route contributed in 2025

Source: Simulated data
Route Passengers (000) Revenue (C$m) Direct costs (C$m) Contribution (C$m) Load factor (%)
Halifax to Toronto26052.049.42.671
Halifax to Montréal15027.825.12.769
Halifax to St. John's19036.130.25.974
Halifax to Charlottetown14019.617.02.666
Halifax to Sydney12017.518.9−1.458
Labrador coast service9021.023.6−2.655
Charters and cargo14012.09.42.6Not measured
All routes1,090186.0173.612.466.5

Direct costs are the costs a route causes, such as fuel, crews on the route, landing fees and maintenance by flying hour. Costs that cannot be charged to a route, such as head office and standby aircraft, came to C$10.5m. The Labrador coast service is flown under a contract with the provincial government that runs to 2028.

Source Kittiwake Air's route profitability report (simulated).
Exhibit 5

The finance team's estimates for each response (C$m)

Source: Simulated data
Response Added to operating profit each year from 2027 One-off cost in 2026
A. Cut the Sydney and Labrador routes2.91.5
B. Raise fares by 8% on the four routes with no competitor3.20.0
C. Cut costs with the workforce, suppliers and a newer fleet9.03.5
D. Leave the Toronto route to the low-cost airline0.80.6

A loses the C$1.1m contribution that Sydney and Labrador passengers make on their connecting flights, and pays C$1.5m to leave the Labrador contract early. B assumes a price elasticity of demand of −0.6 on those routes. C saves C$2.4m on a new maintenance contract, C$2.7m net by replacing the three oldest aircraft with two newer ones, and C$3.9m from new crew rosters, which the unions must agree. D moves three aircraft to two new regional routes expected to contribute C$3.4m.

Source Finance team's estimates for the board (simulated).

Section 06: Stakeholder implications

Who has a stake in the decision, how much they care and how much they can affect it, what they want, and what the decision would mean for them.

  • The pension fund and the founders' families

    Stakeholder
    Internal
    Interest
    High
    Power
    High
    What they want
    An airline that earns a fair return again and keeps its reputation in the region.
    What the decision means for them
    Every option needs their approval. Option C costs C$3.5m before it saves anything, which the owners must be willing to wait for.
  • Pilots and cabin crew, and their unions

    Stakeholder
    Internal
    Interest
    High
    Power
    High
    What they want
    Secure jobs, fair pay and rosters they can live with.
    What the decision means for them
    Option C saves C$3.9m only if the unions agree new rosters, so it gives them great influence over the result. Options A and D could cut flying, and with it jobs.
  • Communities along the Labrador coast

    Stakeholder
    External
    Interest
    High
    Power
    Low
    What they want
    A reliable service at fares they can pay; for some, the airline is the only way in or out.
    What the decision means for them
    Option A would end their service unless another airline takes it on; option B would make it dearer. They have little power on their own, but they are heard through the provincial government.
  • The provincial government

    Stakeholder
    External
    Interest
    Medium
    Power
    High
    What they want
    The Labrador service kept running under the contract, at a fair cost to taxpayers.
    What the decision means for them
    Leaving the contract early costs C$1.5m and goodwill. The government might pay more to keep the route, which would change the case for option A.
  • Passengers on the busiest routes

    Stakeholder
    External
    Interest
    Medium
    Power
    Medium
    What they want
    Low fares and convenient times; on Toronto they now have a cheaper choice.
    What the decision means for them
    Option D would leave Toronto passengers to the low-cost airline and the national carrier. Raising fares on the routes with no competitor (option B) does not touch them.
  • Aircraft lessors and the maintenance contractor

    Stakeholder
    External
    Interest
    Medium
    Power
    Medium
    What they want
    Long contracts and payment on time.
    What the decision means for them
    Option C asks the maintenance contractor for a cheaper contract and the lessors to swap three old aircraft for two newer ones. Both will want something in return, such as longer terms.

Section 07: The strategic options

The courses of action open to the board. Each is set out on its own terms; the Analysis edition judges them.

  1. Option A: Cut the two loss-making routes

    Stop flying to Sydney and along the Labrador coast, which lost C$1.4m and C$2.6m in 2025, and use the aircraft and crews elsewhere or return them.

    What it needs
    Leaving the Labrador contract early, at a cost of C$1.5m, and agreement with the government on what replaces the service.
    What it could gain
    An estimated C$2.9m a year added to profit, after the C$1.1m that these passengers contribute on their connecting flights.
    What could go wrong
    Communities left without an air service, a damaged relationship with the government, and aircraft that cost money if they cannot be redeployed.

    Evidence: Exhibit 4, Exhibit 5

  2. Option B: Raise fares where Kittiwake has no competitor

    Raise fares by 8% on the four routes where no other airline flies: St. John's, Charlottetown, Sydney and the Labrador coast. With demand estimated to be inelastic there, revenue would rise even though fewer people would fly.

    What it needs
    Nothing but a pricing decision, and the government's agreement on Labrador fares.
    What it could gain
    An estimated C$3.2m a year, at once and at no cost.
    What could go wrong
    Passengers and the government may see it as exploiting a captive market; the elasticity is an estimate; and higher fares invite a competitor onto the best of these routes.

    Evidence: Exhibit 1, Exhibit 4, Exhibit 5

  3. Option C: Cut costs with the workforce, suppliers and a newer fleet

    A two-year cost programme: a new maintenance contract, three of the oldest aircraft replaced by two newer, more efficient ones, and new crew rosters that fly the same schedule with fewer hours of standby.

    What it needs
    Agreement with the pilots' and cabin crew unions on rosters, a deal with the lessors, and C$3.5m of one-off costs in 2026.
    What it could gain
    An estimated C$9.0m a year from 2027, the largest of any option, without cutting a route or raising a fare.
    What could go wrong
    The unions may refuse or demand pay in return; the savings take two years to arrive; and new aircraft bring new problems at first.

    Evidence: Exhibit 3, Exhibit 5

  4. Option D: Leave the Toronto route to the low-cost airline

    Stop competing on the route where the low-cost airline has cut fares, and move three aircraft to two new routes between regional cities that no airline serves directly.

    What it needs
    Demand on the new routes, which is untested, and a C$0.6m cost to start them.
    What it could gain
    An end to the fare war on Toronto, and aircraft used where Kittiwake has no rival.
    What could go wrong
    Toronto is the busiest route and feeds others; the new routes may not fill; and leaving the route tells competitors that Kittiwake will retreat when challenged.

    Evidence: Exhibit 4, Exhibit 5

Section 08: Evaluation criteria

How the board has said it will judge the options, and how much each criterion counts. The weights add up to 100.

Criterion How it is judged Weight
Profit recovery How much the response adds to operating profit, and how soon. 30%
Risk of delivery How likely the estimate is to be achieved, and what happens if it is not. 20%
Employees and their unions The effect on jobs, pay and the airline's relations with its workforce. 20%
Communities and passengers Whether the communities and passengers who depend on the airline are treated fairly. 15%
Strategic position Whether the airline ends up with a clearer and stronger position against its competitors. 15%

Section 09: Discussion questions

Answer them before you open the Analysis edition, which has notes on each.

Source: Original practice question
Show content for

Showing everything. HL-only material is marked HL.

In the style of the IB course

The platform's own questions, written for this briefing; they are not IB examination questions. The marks are each question's own allocation.

  1. Using Exhibit 2, calculate Kittiwake Air's profit margin and its return on capital employed (ROCE) for 2025.

    Calculate AO4 3.5 Profitability and liquidity ratio analysis

    [4 marks]

  2. Using Exhibit 1, calculate the airline's capacity utilization rate (its load factor) in 2023 and in 2025.

    Calculate AO4 5.6 Production planning HL

    [4 marks]

  3. Explain why a fall in passenger numbers has a larger effect on Kittiwake Air's profit than on its revenue.

    Explain AO2 3.3 Costs and revenues

    [4 marks]

  4. Discuss the proposal to raise fares by 8% on the four routes where Kittiwake Air has no competitor.

    Discuss AO3 4.5 The seven Ps of the marketing mix HL

    [10 marks]

  5. Evaluate the cost programme (option C) as a strategy to improve Kittiwake Air's profitability ratios.

    Evaluate AO3 3.5 Profitability and liquidity ratio analysis

    [10 marks]

HL-only questions are hidden in the SL view. Choose HL above to see them.

For seminars, beyond the course

Source: Enrichment

For undergraduate, MBA and professional readers. These questions go beyond the IB course and are labelled as enrichment.

  1. Is a regional airline that competes with both a low-cost airline and a national carrier stuck in the middle? If so, what is its way out?
  2. Should a business keep a loss-making service that a remote community depends on? Who should pay for it?
  3. Most of an airline's costs are fixed in the short run. What does that imply for the order in which Kittiwake should try the four responses?
The Analysis edition The worked discussion: the evidence, the assumptions, every option judged and the recommendation. Open it when you have decided. About 7 minutes to read.

The Analysis edition

The worked discussion and the recommendation · about 7 minutes to read

Source: Arjun Agrawal frameworkThe Business Brief's analysis

From here, the page gives the platform's reading of the case: its interpretation of the evidence, its judgement and its recommendation. It adds no new facts, and the same evidence can support other conclusions if they are argued well.

Section A1: Executive summary

Recommended Option C: Cut costs with the workforce, suppliers and a newer fleet

Restore profitability through costs, not through routes or captive passengers (option C). The airline's problem is that its costs rose by 16.4% in two years while its revenue rose by 8.1%; the cost programme answers that directly, and is worth an estimated C$9.0m a year, enough to turn a forecast loss of C$4.2m in 2027 into a profit of C$4.8m. It depends on an agreement with the unions, so the board should negotiate it openly, share the gains, and set a date by which, without agreement, it will reconsider the routes.

Section A2: What the evidence shows

The exhibits worked through. Every figure here is recomputed from the exhibits on every build.

  • The fall in profit is a cost problem more than a revenue problem. Revenue grew by 8.1% between 2023 and 2025, but maintenance rose by 34.3% and staff costs by 20.2% (Exhibit 3), and the load factor fell from 68.4% to 66.5% (Exhibit 1), so each passenger carried more cost.
  • The losing routes are a small part of the problem. Sydney and Labrador lost C$4.0m between them, but cutting them saves only C$2.9m once lost connections are counted, and costs C$1.5m to leave the Labrador contract (Exhibit 5).
  • Only option C closes the gap. Against a forecast loss of C$4.2m in 2027, the options would leave operating profit at −C$1.3m (A), −C$1.0m (B), C$4.8m (C) and −C$3.4m (D) (Exhibit A1).
  • The fare rise works on paper because demand on those routes is estimated to be inelastic: at −0.6, an 8% rise loses 4.8% of passengers but raises revenue by 2.816%. That estimate is the weakest number in the paper, and the routes are the ones whose passengers have nowhere else to go.
Exhibit A1

Operating profit in 2027 under each response (C$m)

Source: Simulated data
Response Added each year Operating profit in 2027
No change0.0−4.2
A. Cut the Sydney and Labrador routes2.9−1.3
B. Raise fares by 8% on the four routes with no competitor3.2−1.0
C. Cut costs with the workforce, suppliers and a newer fleet9.04.8
D. Leave the Toronto route to the low-cost airline0.8−3.4

Without a roster agreement, option C would add C$5.1m, leaving a profit of C$0.9m in 2027.

Source The Business Brief's analysis of Exhibit 5 and the finance team's forecast (simulated data).

Section A3: The assumptions

What the analysis takes as given, and how a manager would test it before relying on it.

  • The unions will agree new rosters that save C$3.9m a year.

    How to test it Open talks before the board commits, and share the numbers. If a deal includes a pay rise, rework the saving net of it.

  • The newer aircraft will save C$2.7m a year net of their higher lease cost.

    How to test it Ask the lessors for firm terms and check the fuel and maintenance savings against other airlines flying the same type.

  • Demand on the routes with no competitor has a price elasticity of −0.6.

    How to test it It is an estimate. Test a smaller rise on one route first and measure what happens to bookings.

  • Without action, the airline would lose C$4.2m in 2027.

    How to test it The forecast assumes costs keep rising at recent rates. Check it against the fuel price and the pay settlements already agreed.

Section A4: The trade-offs

What the board gives up to get what it wants. No option avoids all of them.

Speed, or depth

A fare rise adds money at once; the cost programme takes two years and costs C$3.5m first. The faster fix leaves the cause, rising costs, untouched.

Profit, or the region's trust

Cutting the Labrador service or charging its passengers more improves the accounts by exploiting the weakest stakeholders. An airline whose brand is the region may lose more in goodwill than it gains.

Savings, or relations with the workforce

The largest saving needs the unions' agreement. Imposing new rosters could save money on paper and cost it in disputes and departures; negotiating them shares some of the gain with the crews.

Section A5: The alternatives, judged

Every option judged against the evidence, then scored against the board's criteria.

  1. Option A: Cut the two loss-making routes

    Weakly supported by the evidence

    Weakly supported. It fixes the smallest part of the problem at the greatest cost to the most dependent passengers, breaks a contract with the government, and still leaves the airline in loss in 2027.

  2. Option B: Raise fares where Kittiwake has no competitor

    Defensible if its conditions hold

    Defensible only as a small, tested change on the routes where service is improving, not as the plan. It rests on an estimated elasticity and on charging captive passengers more, and it leaves the costs untouched.

  3. Option C: Cut costs with the workforce, suppliers and a newer fleet

    Best supported by the evidence

    The best supported. It is the only response that returns the airline to profit, it acts on the cause of the decline, and it keeps every route. Its risk is the union agreement, which the board can manage by negotiating early and sharing the gains.

  4. Option D: Leave the Toronto route to the low-cost airline

    Weakly supported by the evidence

    Weakly supported. It gives up the busiest route, which feeds the rest of the network, for new routes whose demand is untested, and it adds only C$0.8m a year.

The options scored against the board's criteria

Each option is scored from 1 (poor) to 5 (strong) on each criterion. The weighted score is the sum of each weight times its score, divided by 100. The scores are the analysis's judgement; a scoring matrix organizes judgement, it does not replace it.

Criterion Weight Option A Option B Option C Option D
Profit recovery 30% 3351
Risk of delivery 20% 3432
Employees and their unions 20% 3423
Communities and passengers 15% 1244
Strategic position 15% 2243
Weighted score 100% 2.55 3.10 3.70 (the highest) 2.35

Section A6: The recommended course of action

Option C: Cut costs with the workforce, suppliers and a newer fleet

Adopt the cost programme: a new maintenance contract, three of the oldest aircraft replaced by two newer ones, and new crew rosters negotiated with the unions, with part of the saving shared with the crews through a profit-related bonus. Keep every route, hold fares, and ask the government to review the Labrador contract on the evidence of its cost.

Why

  • It acts on the cause of the decline, costs rising twice as fast as revenue.
  • It is the only response that returns the airline to profit in 2027.
  • It keeps the routes and fares that the airline's reputation in the region rests on.
  • Sharing the gain gives the unions a reason to agree, which is the plan's main risk.

On these conditions

If no roster agreement is reached by the end of 2026, the saving falls to C$5.1m a year, which still returns the airline to a small profit of C$0.9m in 2027; the board should then reconsider the Sydney route, not the Labrador service.

Section A7: Implementation

What happens, in what order, and who answers for it.

  1. Months 1 to 2 Share the route and cost figures with the unions and open talks on rosters, with a profit-related bonus on the table. Chief executive and the head of people
  2. Months 1 to 4 Tender the maintenance contract and agree terms with the lessors for two newer aircraft. Finance director and head of engineering
  3. Months 4 to 12 Retire the three oldest aircraft as the newer ones arrive, and train crews on the new type. Head of operations
  4. Month 6 Present the Labrador route's costs to the provincial government and agree how the contract will be reviewed. Chief executive
  5. Month 12 Review progress against the measures below; if rosters are not agreed, reopen the case for the Sydney route. The board

Section A8: Evaluation: how to tell if it is working

The evaluation criteria, applied after the decision: what to measure, what counts as working, and when to look.

Measure Target Reviewed
Operating profit A return to profit in 2027, C$4.8m on the finance team's estimates, against a loss of C$4.2m with no action. Every quarter
Costs by type Maintenance and staff costs growing no faster than revenue from 2027. Every quarter
Load factor Back above the 68.4% of 2023 as the smaller, newer fleet flies fuller aircraft. Every month
Relations with the workforce A roster agreement signed by both unions, with no industrial action. Every month during talks

Section A9: Limitations

What the analysis cannot see, and what would change its recommendation.

The limits of the analysis

  • Every saving is an estimate by the finance team, and the largest depends on negotiations whose outcome nobody can know.
  • The route contributions depend on how shared costs are divided between routes; a different method would move the numbers.
  • The forecast loss for 2027 assumes that recent cost increases continue; a fall in the fuel price would ease the pressure on every option.

What would change the recommendation

  • If the unions refuse new rosters outright, the case for cutting the Sydney route grows.
  • If the government offered to pay the full cost of the Labrador service, option A would no longer need to touch it, and the comparison would change.
  • If the low-cost airline left the Toronto route, fares there would recover and the urgency of every option would fall.

Section A10: Notes on the discussion questions

What a strong answer to each discussion question does. Guidance, not a markscheme.

Source: Assessment explanation
  1. Question 1 [4 marks]

    Profit margin = profit before interest and tax ÷ revenue × 100 = 1.9 ÷ 186.0 × 100 = 1.0%. ROCE = profit before interest and tax ÷ capital employed × 100 = 1.9 ÷ 64.0 × 100 = 3.0%. Two marks for each, with the working.

  2. Question 2 [4 marks]HL

    Capacity utilization rate = actual output ÷ productive capacity × 100, here passengers ÷ seats flown. 2023: 1,040 ÷ 1,520 × 100 = 68.4%. 2025: 1,090 ÷ 1,640 × 100 = 66.5%. The airline flew more seats but filled a smaller share of them, so its unit costs rose.

  3. Question 3 [4 marks]

    Most costs (aircraft leases, crews, maintenance, head office) are fixed in the short run and do not fall with passengers, so lost revenue comes almost straight off profit. Applied to the case: an operating profit of C$1.9m on revenue of C$186.0m leaves very little room.

  4. Question 4 [10 marks]HL

    Strong answers use the price elasticity of demand: at −0.6, passengers fall by 4.8% and revenue on those routes rises by 2.816%, about C$2.65m, plus C$0.57m of costs saved. They then weigh the estimate's reliability, the ethics of raising prices on a captive market, the government's view of the Labrador service and the risk of attracting a competitor, and reach a judgement.

  5. Question 5 [10 marks]

    Good answers note that C adds the most to profit, C$9.0m a year, turning the forecast loss of C$4.2m into a profit of C$4.8m and a profit margin of about 2.5%, still well below 2023's 8.0%. They weigh the union agreement it depends on, the C$3.5m of one-off costs and the two-year delay, and compare it with cheaper but more damaging options.

  6. Seminar question 1 Enrichment

    Arguments for: it has neither the lowest costs nor the network of the national carrier. Against: it may have a focus strategy, serving the region's smaller cities better than either. Good answers use the route contributions to say where its advantage lies, which is not on Toronto.

  7. Seminar question 2 Enrichment

    This turns on the business's objectives, its obligations under the contract, and whether the community's need is better met by a subsidy than by a cross-subsidy from other passengers. Good answers distinguish what the airline owes from what the government should buy.

  8. Seminar question 3 Enrichment

    Fixed costs make volume precious: cutting routes or giving one up shrinks the base that carries them, while cost and price changes act on the same base. Many answers will argue for costs first, prices second and routes last.

Notes on HL-only questions are hidden in the SL view.

The course and beyond

Where this briefing meets the IB course, and, kept apart and labelled, the ideas it draws on from beyond it.

IB course

Subtopics

Frameworks in the course

Course terms

Source: EnrichmentBeyond the IB course

Ideas beyond the course

Frameworks beyond the course

Go further: Advanced Management

Work it through

The platform's tools that apply the briefing's ideas to its figures, or to your own.

Sources and method