No. 02 The Boardroom Briefings Acquisition
Should a business acquire a competitor?
Quarrystone Climbing is offered its closest rival
The founders of Dublin's second-largest climbing business want to sell. Buying it would make Quarrystone the city's dominant operator, if the price, the regulator and the climbers allow.
- Company
- Quarrystone Climbing, Dublin, Ireland
- Industry
- Sports
- Decision
- Acquisition
- Functions
- Strategy and management, Finance and accounts, Human resource management
- Key concepts
- Change, Ethics
- Editions
- Student, then Analysis
You are reading the Student edition. The recommendation is withheld.
This briefing has two editions. The Student edition comes first: the case and the questions. The Analysis edition follows it, closed, so that you can decide before you read the recommendation.
The edition switch could not start. Both editions are on the page: the Analysis edition follows the Student edition.
The Student edition
Section 01: Executive summary
The decision in brief. In this edition the summary stops short of a recommendation.
The situation
Quarrystone Climbing runs four climbing centres in Dublin and one in Cork. Its closest rival, Brackenhold Bouldering, has three centres in Dublin, and its founders want to sell. They have asked €3.6m, and they have told Quarrystone that a British climbing chain is also interested.
The decision
Whether to buy Brackenhold, and at what price; or to grow another way, by building a new centre or by forming an alliance with Brackenhold that leaves its ownership as it is.
What is at stake
Together the two businesses would have most of the climbing visits in Dublin. The deal would more than double Quarrystone's borrowing, bring in staff with their own way of doing things, and could draw the attention of the competition authority. Losing Brackenhold to a stronger rival carries risks too.
Section 02: Business background
Niamh Doyle opened Quarrystone's first climbing wall in a former warehouse in 2009. There are now five centres, four in Dublin and one in Cork, with 6,900 members and 140 employees. Revenue reached €9.6m in 2025, with an operating profit of €1,248k, a margin of 13% (Exhibit 2). Niamh owns 80% of the company; the other 20% belongs to the staff, through an employee share ownership scheme set up in 2019.
Brackenhold Bouldering was founded in 2014 by a brother and sister, Ciarán and Orla Brennan. Its three bouldering centres in Docklands, Rathmines and Swords have a younger, more social crowd and a reputation for the best route setting in the city. It is smaller and less profitable than Quarrystone: revenue of €4.2m and an operating profit of €378k, a margin of 9%, from 3,100 members and 60 staff.
The Brennans want to step back. Their adviser has sent Quarrystone a sale memorandum with an asking price of €3.6m for the whole company (Exhibit 3), and mentioned that a British climbing chain has also asked to see it. Quarrystone's bank has offered a loan of €3.0m towards the purchase. Niamh must put a recommendation to her board, which includes a director elected by the staff shareholders.
- Company
- Quarrystone Climbing
- Business
- Indoor climbing centres
- Based in
- Dublin, Ireland
- Size
- Five centres, 140 employees and revenue of €9.6m in 2025
- Ownership
- Privately held company, 80% owned by its founder, Niamh Doyle, and 20% by its staff through an employee share ownership scheme
- Figures in
- EUR, in thousands (€000)
- Status
- A fictional company. Every figure is simulated for teaching and checked for consistency.
Section 03: Strategic context
The industry and the forces on the decision, in general terms. The only figures in this briefing are the company's own.
Indoor climbing has grown from a niche sport into a mainstream way to keep fit and meet people. A centre is expensive to open, with a large building, high walls and constant route setting, and most of its costs are fixed, so profit depends on keeping it busy. Members choose a centre for its location, the quality of its routes and its atmosphere, and many are loyal to the community they climb with.
When two rivals in the same market combine, they can share costs, buy equipment more cheaply and plan where to open without undercutting each other. But they also face fewer competitors, and customers may end up paying more or getting less choice. Competition authorities can examine a merger that would reduce competition in a local market, and can block it or allow it only on conditions.
Acquisitions often look better on paper than in practice. The savings that justify the price take longer to arrive than planned, staff who chose a small business may not stay in a larger one, and the buyer who wants a deal most is the one most likely to pay too much for it.
Section 04: Relevant evidence
The company's own evidence (simulated), established research (cited, and stated only as its central idea) and how the market works.
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The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data
Two profitable businesses of different sizes
Quarrystone earns a 13% operating margin on €9.6m of revenue; Brackenhold earns 9% on €4.2m (Exhibit 2). At the asking price, Quarrystone would pay 9.5 times Brackenhold's operating profit, and €2,100k more than the value of its net assets: goodwill, for its members, its staff and its name (Exhibit 3).
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The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data
Most of Dublin's climbing in two hands
Climbing visits in Dublin grew from 560,000 in 2024 to 600,000 in 2025 (Exhibit 1). Quarrystone's centres had 228,000 of them in 2025 and Brackenhold's 162,000; the rest were shared by independent walls, a university wall and leisure centres.
See Exhibit 1
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The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data
The savings, and what they depend on
Quarrystone's finance team expects €300k a year of savings from the second year, from one booking system, one head office and buying equipment for eight centres instead of five, after a one-off cost of €400k to combine the businesses (Exhibit 3). Half the savings would come in the first year.
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Established research Cited research
Bidders tend to overpay
The hubris hypothesis holds that bidders often pay more than a target is worth because their managers are too confident in their own valuations: the more a buyer wants the deal, the less it questions its own estimate of what the target will earn under its ownership.
Source: Richard Roll (1986), The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers
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Established research Cited research
Build, borrow or buy
A firm that needs new resources can build them itself, borrow them through an alliance or contract, or buy them by acquiring another firm. Buying is fastest, but it is the hardest to integrate and to reverse, so it suits the cases where the other two routes cannot work.
Source: Laurence Capron and Will Mitchell (2012), Build, Borrow, or Buy: Solving the Growth Dilemma
The exhibits
Climbing visits in Dublin, 2024 and 2025 (thousands)
Source: Simulated data| Operator | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Quarrystone Climbing (four Dublin centres) | 210 | 228 |
| Brackenhold Bouldering (three centres) | 150 | 162 |
| Independent walls, a university wall and leisure centres | 200 | 210 |
| All climbing visits in Dublin | 560 | 600 |
Visits are counted when a climber enters a centre, members and day visitors alike.
Section 05: Financial information
Exhibit 2 compares the two businesses in 2025. Exhibit 3 sets out the asking price, the savings and how the purchase would be paid for, and Exhibit 4 shows Quarrystone's long-term borrowing and equity before and after. Exhibit 5 gives the forecast net cash flows of buying Brackenhold at the asking price and of building a new centre instead, over ten years. Quarrystone appraises investments at a discount rate of 8%.
The two businesses in 2025
Source: Simulated data| Measure | Quarrystone Climbing | Brackenhold Bouldering |
|---|---|---|
| Centres | 5 | 3 |
| Members at the year end | 6,900 | 3,100 |
| Employees | 140 | 60 |
| Revenue (€000) | 9,600 | 4,200 |
| Operating costs (€000) | 8,352 | 3,822 |
| Operating profit (€000) | 1,248 | 378 |
| Operating profit margin (%) | 13 | 9 |
The offer, the savings and the financing
Source: Simulated data| Item | Figure |
|---|---|
| Asking price (€000) | 3,600 |
| Brackenhold's net assets: fit-out, equipment and cash (€000) | 1,500 |
| Goodwill at the asking price (€000) | 2,100 |
| Asking price as a multiple of Brackenhold's operating profit (times) | 9.5 |
| Cost savings a year from the second year (€000) | 300 |
| One-off cost of combining the businesses (€000) | 400 |
| New bank loan offered (€000) | 3,000 |
| To be paid from Quarrystone's cash (€000) | 600 |
Half of the savings would come in the first year. The loan would carry interest at 6% a year.
Quarrystone's long-term borrowing and equity (€000)
Source: Simulated data| Item | At the end of 2025 | After buying at the asking price |
|---|---|---|
| Non-current liabilities (bank loans) | 2,400 | 5,400 |
| Equity | 6,000 | 6,000 |
The purchase is paid for with the new loan and cash, so equity does not change.
Forecast net cash flows (€000)
Source: Simulated data| Option | Year 0 | Year 1 | Year 2 | Year 3 | Each year, years 4 to 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A. Buy Brackenhold at the asking price | −3,600 | 128 | 678 | 678 | 678 |
| C. Build a new centre in north Dublin | −2,800 | −150 | 300 | 420 | 520 |
For the purchase, the net cash flow is Brackenhold's operating profit plus the savings, less the one-off cost in year 1. The new centre would lose money while it builds its membership, and would take some members from Quarrystone's own centres.
Section 06: Stakeholder implications
Who has a stake in the decision, how much they care and how much they can affect it, what they want, and what the decision would mean for them.
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Niamh Doyle and the board
- What they want
- A stronger business that the British chain cannot outflank, without risking the company she built.
- What the decision means for them
- The purchase would more than double the company's long-term borrowing, from €2,400k to €5,400k at the asking price, and tie up management for a year of integration.
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Staff shareholders
- What they want
- Secure jobs and a rising value for the shares they hold through the scheme.
- What the decision means for them
- A good purchase raises the value of their 20%; an expensive one, with €180k a year of new interest, lowers it. Their elected director will ask what the deal means for their workload.
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Ciarán and Orla Brennan
- What they want
- A fair price, and a buyer who will look after their staff and their centres' character.
- What the decision means for them
- A low bid or an alliance gives them less money now; they may prefer the British chain if it pays more, or Quarrystone if it promises to keep the Brackenhold name and team.
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Brackenhold's staff
- What they want
- Their jobs, and the culture of a smaller, more social business.
- What the decision means for them
- Their route setters are much of what Quarrystone would be paying for. If they leave after the purchase, the goodwill leaves with them.
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Climbers in Dublin
- What they want
- Good routes, fair prices and a choice of walls.
- What the decision means for them
- Shared memberships across eight centres would be convenient, but with most of the city's climbing under one owner, prices could rise and choice could narrow.
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The competition authority
- What they want
- Mergers that do not harm competition and customers.
- What the decision means for them
- With two-thirds of the city's climbing visits in one business, the deal could be examined, delayed or allowed only on conditions.
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The bank
- What they want
- Repayment, from a business that can carry its debts.
- What the decision means for them
- Lends €3,000k at the asking price, and will watch how much of Quarrystone's capital is borrowed.
Section 07: The strategic options
The courses of action open to the board. Each is set out on its own terms; the Analysis edition judges them.
Section 08: Evaluation criteria
How the board has said it will judge the options, and how much each criterion counts. The weights add up to 100.
| Criterion | How it is judged | Weight |
|---|---|---|
| Value for money | Net present value at 8% over ten years, and whether it stays positive if the savings fall short. | 30% |
| Strategic position | How strong Quarrystone would be in Dublin, and how well the option keeps a stronger rival out. | 25% |
| Financial and regulatory risk | The borrowing it adds, and the chance that the competition authority delays, blocks or conditions it. | 20% |
| People and culture | Whether the staff of both businesses, and Brackenhold's route setters above all, would stay and work well together. | 15% |
| Climbers | Prices, choice and the quality of climbing for Dublin's climbers. | 10% |
Section 09: Discussion questions
Answer them before you open the Analysis edition, which has notes on each.
In the style of the IB course
The platform's own questions, written for this briefing; they are not IB examination questions. The marks are each question's own allocation.
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Using Exhibit 4, calculate Quarrystone's gearing ratio at the end of 2025 and after buying Brackenhold at the asking price.
[4 marks]
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Explain two economies of scale the combined business could gain.
[4 marks]
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Discuss the risk of a culture clash if Quarrystone buys Brackenhold Bouldering.
[10 marks]
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Evaluate whether Quarrystone should buy Brackenhold Bouldering.
[10 marks]
HL-only questions are hidden in the SL view. Choose HL above to see them.
For seminars, beyond the course
For undergraduate, MBA and professional readers. These questions go beyond the IB course and are labelled as enrichment.
- If bidders tend to be overconfident, what should Quarrystone's board do, before it bids, to protect itself from its own optimism?
- If the competition authority would approve the deal only with a promise to hold prices for two years, should Quarrystone accept?
- Jensen argued that managers with spare cash may spend it on growth that does not create value, and that debt can discipline them. Does his argument help or hinder the case for this deal?
The Analysis edition The worked discussion: the evidence, the assumptions, every option judged and the recommendation. Open it when you have decided. About 7 minutes to read.
The Analysis edition
From here, the page gives the platform's reading of the case: its interpretation of the evidence, its judgement and its recommendation. It adds no new facts, and the same evidence can support other conclusions if they are argued well.
Section A1: Executive summary
Recommended Option B: Bid, but walk away above €3,000k
Bid for Brackenhold, but set a walk-away price of €3,000k and keep to it (option B). The business is worth buying: it keeps a stronger rival out of Dublin, its savings are real and its members and route setters are an asset Quarrystone could not build quickly. But at the asking price of €3.6m the purchase pays only if every euro of the planned savings arrives: with half of them, the NPV at 8% falls to −€496.9k. At €3,000k it stays positive with half the savings. If the Brennans will not sell at that price, Quarrystone should let the deal go and turn to an alliance or a new centre.
Section A2: What the evidence shows
The exhibits worked through. Every figure here is recomputed from the exhibits on every build.
- At the asking price the deal is marginal. Ten years of forecast cash flows give an NPV of €440.1k at 8%, and the payback is over six years (Exhibits 5 and A1). Almost all of the value depends on the €300k a year of savings.
- The price matters more than the forecasts. At €3,000k the NPV is €1,040.1k with full savings, €103.1k with half and −€834.0k with none; at €3,600k the same three cases give €440.1k, −€496.9k and −€1,434.0k (Exhibit A1).
- Building is worse on the numbers: a new centre has an NPV of −€199.1k at 8%, before counting the members it would take from Quarrystone's own centres (Exhibit 5).
- The combined business would have 65.0% of climbing visits in Dublin, against 38.0% for Quarrystone now (Exhibit 1), in a market that grew by 7.1% last year. That is strength against the British chain, and a reason for the competition authority to look closely.
- Gearing would rise from 28.6% to 47.4% at the asking price, or to 44.4% at €3,000k (Exhibit A2). Either is a large step for a business that has never carried that much debt.
The purchase at two prices: NPV at 8% over ten years (€000)
Source: Simulated data| Price paid | Full savings | Half the savings | No savings |
|---|---|---|---|
| A. The asking price, €3,600k | 440.1 | −496.9 | −1,434.0 |
| B. The walk-away price, €3,000k | 1,040.1 | 103.1 | −834.0 |
In every case year 1 bears the €400k cost of combining the businesses and half a year of savings. The NPVs use the guide's discount factors at 8%.
Quarrystone's gearing before and after (%)
Source: Simulated data| Position | Non-current liabilities (€000) | Capital employed (€000) | Gearing ratio (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| At the end of 2025 | 2,400 | 8,400 | 28.6 |
| After buying at the asking price | 5,400 | 11,400 | 47.4 |
| After buying at €3,000k | 4,800 | 10,800 | 44.4 |
Section A3: The assumptions
What the analysis takes as given, and how a manager would test it before relying on it.
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The savings of €300k a year will arrive in full from the second year.
How to test it Ask which savings are contracted and which are hoped for. Exhibit A1 shows the deal at the asking price fails if only half arrive.
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Brackenhold's members and route setters will stay after the purchase.
How to test it Talk to the setters before bidding; offer them retention terms; plan to keep the Brackenhold name and centres as they are.
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The British chain is a real bidder.
How to test it The sellers' adviser has every reason to mention a rival. Quarrystone cannot verify the claim, so it should bid at its own valuation, not at its fear.
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The competition authority will allow the deal.
How to test it Take advice early, and decide in advance which conditions, such as a hold on prices, Quarrystone could accept.
Section A4: The trade-offs
What the board gives up to get what it wants. No option avoids all of them.
Winning the deal, or winning on the deal
Paying the asking price makes the purchase certain; holding to €3,000k makes it worth having. The board must decide how much certainty is worth, and the answer from Exhibit A1 is: less than €600k.
Market strength, or customers' trust
Owning most of the city's climbing protects Quarrystone from a new rival, but climbers and the authority will judge it by what happens to prices and choice. The strength is worth having only if it is not used against them.
Speed, or integration
Buying is the fastest way to grow, but it imports a culture and a team. Combining back offices quickly brings the savings sooner, and risks the people who make Brackenhold worth buying.
Section A5: The alternatives, judged
Every option judged against the evidence, then scored against the board's criteria.
The options scored against the board's criteria
Each option is scored from 1 (poor) to 5 (strong) on each criterion. The weighted score is the sum of each weight times its score, divided by 100. The scores are the analysis's judgement; a scoring matrix organizes judgement, it does not replace it.
| Criterion | Weight | Option A | Option B | Option C | Option D |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Value for money | 30% | 2 | 4 | 1 | 2 |
| Strategic position | 25% | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 |
| Financial and regulatory risk | 20% | 2 | 3 | 3 | 5 |
| People and culture | 15% | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 |
| Climbers | 10% | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Weighted score | 100% | 2.90 | 3.55 (the highest) | 2.65 | 3.20 |
Section A6: The recommended course of action
Option B: Bid, but walk away above €3,000k
Bid up to €3,000k for the whole of Brackenhold, and walk away above it. Finance the purchase with a €2,400k loan and €600k of cash. Promise to keep the Brackenhold name, its three centres and its route-setting team, and offer the competition authority a commitment to hold membership prices for two years.
Why
- At €3,000k the deal still pays if only half the savings arrive; at €3.6m it does not.
- It keeps the strategic prize, a strong position in Dublin against a new rival, without betting the company on it.
- Borrowing rises less, to a gearing ratio of 44.4% rather than 47.4%.
- Keeping the name and the team protects the goodwill that most of the price pays for.
On these conditions
The recommendation assumes due diligence confirms Brackenhold's profits and that its route setters agree to stay. If the Brennans sell to the British chain instead, Quarrystone should not chase them with a higher bid, but compete: first through better routes and memberships, then with a new centre if a site is found.
Section A7: Implementation
What happens, in what order, and who answers for it.
- Weeks 1 to 4 Agree the walk-away price with the board before meeting the Brennans; take advice on the competition authority; meet Brackenhold's route setters. Niamh Doyle and the finance director
- Weeks 4 to 12 Bid, complete due diligence on Brackenhold's accounts, leases and memberships, and agree retention terms for the route setters. Finance director with advisers
- Months 3 to 6 Notify the competition authority, with the offer to hold membership prices, and secure the loan. Niamh Doyle
- Months 6 to 18 Combine booking systems and head offices; open all eight centres to members of either business; keep Brackenhold's name, centres and setters. Integration lead, reporting to the board
Section A8: Evaluation: how to tell if it is working
The evaluation criteria, applied after the decision: what to measure, what counts as working, and when to look.
| Measure | Target | Reviewed |
|---|---|---|
| Savings achieved | €150k in the first year and €300k a year from the second, tracked against Exhibit 3. | Every quarter |
| Members kept | At least the 3,100 members Brackenhold had at the purchase, a year later. | Every month for the first year |
| Route setters kept | Every Brackenhold route setter still in post after a year. | Every six months |
| Borrowing | Gearing back below the 28.6% of 2025 within five years, as the loan is repaid. | Every year |
Section A9: Limitations
What the analysis cannot see, and what would change its recommendation.
The limits of the analysis
- The savings and Brackenhold's future profits are estimates by people who want the deal to happen, on one side or the other.
- The analysis cannot know what the British chain would pay, or whether it exists as a bidder at all.
- The ten-year horizon and the 8% discount rate are Quarrystone's choices; a higher rate would make every option look worse.
What would change the recommendation
- If due diligence shows Brackenhold's profits are lower than the memorandum says, the walk-away price should fall with them.
- If the competition authority would demand the sale of a centre, the deal may no longer be worth doing.
- If a suitable building for a new centre came up cheaply, option C would look better than its NPV suggests.
Section A10: Notes on the discussion questions
What a strong answer to each discussion question does. Guidance, not a markscheme.
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Question 1 [4 marks]
Market share = the firm's visits ÷ all visits × 100. Quarrystone: 228 ÷ 600 × 100 = 38.0%. Brackenhold: 162 ÷ 600 × 100 = 27.0%. Combined: 65.0%. One mark for the method, one for each share, one for the combined figure.
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Question 2 [4 marks]HL
Gearing = non-current liabilities ÷ capital employed × 100, where capital employed is non-current liabilities plus equity. Now: 2,400 ÷ 8,400 × 100 = 28.6%. After: 5,400 ÷ 11,400 × 100 = 47.4%. Two marks for each, with the working.
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Question 3 [4 marks]
Purchasing economies (buying holds, mats and equipment for eight centres), managerial economies (one head office and one booking system), marketing economies (one membership offer across the city). Each explained with its effect on cost, in the context of climbing centres.
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Question 4 [10 marks]HL
Strong answers contrast a larger, more formal business with a smaller, social one whose route setters are central to its value, explain how a clash could cost the goodwill Quarrystone pays for (€2,100k at the asking price), weigh ways to reduce the risk such as keeping the brand and the team, and reach a judgement.
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Question 5 [10 marks]
Good answers weigh the appraisal (an NPV of €440.1k at the asking price only if the full savings arrive), the combined share of 65.0%, the higher borrowing and the integration risk against the threat of a stronger rival, and consider the price at which the deal still makes sense. A conclusion that depends on the price is a strong conclusion.
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Seminar question 1 Enrichment
Ideas: set a walk-away price before talking to the sellers; test the deal with half the savings; ask someone outside the deal team to argue against it; tie part of the price to Brackenhold's later profits. The best answers recognize that the British chain's interest is exactly the pressure that makes buyers overpay.
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Seminar question 2 Enrichment
A price promise limits one benefit of market power, but leaves the savings and the shared membership. Good answers ask whether the deal still pays without price rises, and what happens to climbers when the promise ends.
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Seminar question 3 Enrichment
The deal is mostly paid for with borrowing, which commits Quarrystone to paying interest and so disciplines it, but a founder-led business with a desire to grow may still overpay. Answers should separate the discipline of debt from the quality of the decision.
Notes on HL-only questions are hidden in the SL view.
The course and beyond
Where this briefing meets the IB course, and, kept apart and labelled, the ideas it draws on from beyond it.
Subtopics
- 1.5 Growth and evolution Mergers and acquisitions as external growth, economies of scale from combining, and the reasons to grow.
- 1.4 Stakeholders Conflict between stakeholders: sellers, staff, climbers and the competition authority want different things from the deal.
- 2.5 Organizational (corporate) culture HL The culture clash that can follow when a larger business buys a smaller one.
- 3.4 Final accounts Goodwill, the intangible asset a buyer pays for above the value of the net assets.
- 3.6 Efficiency ratio analysis HL The gearing ratio before and after a purchase paid for with debt.
- 3.8 Investment appraisal Payback, and at HL net present value, applied to a purchase price and its savings.
- 4.1 Introduction to marketing Market share and market growth, and the importance of market leadership (HL).
Frameworks in the course
- The Ansoff matrix IB toolkit Buying a rival in the same city is market penetration by acquisition; a new centre in north Dublin is market penetration by internal growth.
Course terms
Ideas beyond the course
- The winner's curse In an auction for something of uncertain value, the winner is often the bidder who overestimated it most. The hubris hypothesis applies the idea to takeovers. The usual defences are a walk-away price set before negotiations begin, prices tied to the target's later results, and a board that asks to see the case against the deal. Source: Richard Roll (1986), The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers; Michael C. Jensen (1986), Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
- Build, borrow or buy Capron and Mitchell's framework asks whether a firm should develop a resource itself, obtain it through a contract or alliance, or acquire another firm. Here the three are options C, D and A or B: the framework's question is which route gives Quarrystone what it needs with the least difficulty of integration. Source: Laurence Capron and Will Mitchell (2012), Build, Borrow, or Buy: Solving the Growth Dilemma
Frameworks beyond the course
- Porter's five forces Enrichment The purchase would reduce rivalry in Dublin, but the threat of a new entrant (the British chain) is what makes it urgent.
- Mendelow's matrix Enrichment Map the stakeholders by power and interest; the competition authority has high power but, until notified, low interest.
- The McKinsey 7S model Enrichment Plan the integration by comparing the two businesses' shared values, style and staff, not only their systems.
Go further: Advanced Management
- Mergers, acquisitions and strategic alliances Beyond the IB course Advanced strategy: the module behind this decision, with real organizations, models and a decision exercise.
- Valuation fundamentals Beyond the IB course Advanced financial management: the module behind this decision, with real organizations, models and a decision exercise.
Work it through
The platform's tools that apply the briefing's ideas to its figures, or to your own.
- Strategy Studio Five Forces assessor Analyse the Dublin climbing market before and after the purchase.
- Strategy Studio Stakeholder map Map the stakeholders and how to manage each through the deal.
- Financial Laboratory Gearing ratio Work the gearing ratio at each price (HL).
- Financial Laboratory Net present value (NPV) Rework the NPVs in Exhibit A1 at 8% and at other rates (HL).
- IB toolkit guide Ansoff matrix The toolkit guide to the growth directions the options represent.
Sources and method
- Method How the Boardroom Briefings and their figures were made, Arjun Agrawal | The Business Brief (2026). The platform’s own method.
- Research The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers, Richard Roll, Journal of Business 59(2) (1986). Cited as a reference; not opened for this release.
- Research Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers, Michael C. Jensen, American Economic Review 76(2) (1986). Cited as a reference; not opened for this release.
- Research Build, Borrow, or Buy: Solving the Growth Dilemma, Laurence Capron and Will Mitchell, Harvard Business Review Press (2012). Cited as a reference; not opened for this release.
Arjun Agrawal | The Business Brief, https://the-business-brief-dun.vercel.app/boardroom-briefings/acquiring-a-competitor/. Original teaching material, not an IB publication. The organizations in the teaching cases are fictional unless a case says otherwise.