No. 01 The Boardroom Briefings Market entry

Should a company enter a new international market?

Hartwell & Rye weighs its first step into Japan

Japanese customers found a British skincare brand before it went looking for them. Now the board must decide whether to follow them home, and by which door.

Source: Simulated data Fictional company Updated 16 November 2026
Company
Hartwell & Rye, Bath, England
Industry
FMCG (fast-moving consumer goods)
Decision
Market entry
Functions
Strategy and management, Marketing, Finance and accounts
Key concepts
Change, Creativity
Editions
Student, then Analysis
Choose an edition

You are reading the Student edition. The recommendation is withheld.

This briefing has two editions. The Student edition comes first: the case and the questions. The Analysis edition follows it, closed, so that you can decide before you read the recommendation.

The Student edition

The case and the questions, with the recommendation withheld · about 8 minutes to read

Section 01: Executive summary

The decision in brief. In this edition the summary stops short of a recommendation.

The situation

Hartwell & Rye, a natural skincare company from Bath, has customers in Japan it never set out to win. Orders shipped to Japan from its British website more than doubled in 2025, and a six-week counter in a Tokyo department store sold out of its two best serums. A Japanese distributor and a Japanese drugstore chain have both made offers.

The decision

Whether to enter the Japanese market in 2026, and if so by which route: through a distributor, through a joint venture with a drugstore chain, or through a subsidiary of its own. Or whether to stay out and keep serving Japan from Britain.

What is at stake

The routes ask for very different commitments. The smallest puts £0.6m at risk; the largest, £3.6m, more than half of the cash the company holds. The choice also decides who controls the brand in Japan, and how much the company learns there.

Section 02: Business background

Hartwell & Rye was founded in Bath in 2011 by two pharmacists, Clare Hartwell and Tom Rye, who wanted to make skincare from plant extracts with a pharmacy's discipline behind it. It sells 34 products, from cleansers to a mineral sunscreen, through British pharmacies, department stores and its own website, and employs 180 people, most of them at its own production site outside the city.

The company has grown steadily and profitably. Revenue rose from £29.4m in 2023 to £38.6m in 2025, with a gross profit margin of 61% and an operating profit margin of 10% last year, and the year ended with £6.2m in cash and no borrowing (Exhibit 3). The founders own 70% of the shares. Larchfield Capital, a growth investor, bought the other 30% in 2021 and expects to sell its stake within four years.

Japan arrived uninvited. A Japanese beauty writer praised the company's serum in 2023, and orders began to arrive through the British website, sent by post. In 2025 the company tested demand with a six-week pop-up counter in a Tokyo department store. Two offers followed: Kasumi Trading, a Tokyo distributor of imported beauty brands, offered to take the brand into drugstores across Japan, and Hinata Drugstores, a chain of 280 stores, proposed a joint venture.

Company
Hartwell & Rye
Business
Natural skincare
Based in
Bath, England
Size
180 employees; revenue of £38.6m in 2025
Ownership
Privately held company, 70% owned by its founders and 30% by Larchfield Capital, a growth investor
Figures in
GBP, in thousands (£000)
Status
A fictional company. Every figure is simulated for teaching and checked for consistency.

Section 03: Strategic context

The industry and the forces on the decision, in general terms. The only figures in this briefing are the company's own.

Skincare is a crowded, brand-led business. A product costs little to make compared with its price, so most of the margin pays for whatever persuades a shopper to choose it: packaging, advertising, samples, displays and advice at the counter. A brand new to a country has to pay for all of that before it sells much, which is why entering a market abroad tends to cost money before it makes any.

A foreign brand can reach shoppers in several ways. It can sell to a distributor, which buys the stock, registers and relabels the products, deals with the retail chains and keeps a large share of the shelf price for doing so. It can share a venture with a local company that already has customers and shelves. It can set up its own company in the country, which keeps all the margin, all the decisions and all the risk. Or it can sell across the border from its own website, which needs no local presence but leaves delivery, returns and service at a distance.

Every market abroad adds risks the home market does not have: a currency that can move against the business, rules on ingredients and labels that differ from country to country, partners whose interests are not quite the brand's, and local competitors who know the customers better.

Section 04: Relevant evidence

The company's own evidence (simulated), established research (cited, and stated only as its central idea) and how the market works.

  • The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data

    Customers in Japan found the brand first

    Orders shipped to Japan from the British website rose from £520k in 2024 to £1,140k in 2025, a rise of 119.2%, with no marketing aimed at Japan (Exhibit 3). They are still small: 3.0% of the company's revenue. Online customers in Japan are loyal, though: 38% bought again within the year (Exhibit 1).

    See Exhibit 3, Exhibit 1

  • The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data

    The Tokyo pop-up

    The six-week counter took 2,950 orders worth £186k (Exhibit 1), and two serums sold out in the fourth week. Pop-up customers spent less per order than online customers, £63.05 against £85.07, and fewer bought again within the six weeks: 22%. Many were trying the brand for the first time.

    See Exhibit 1

  • The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data

    What 800 skincare buyers said

    The company's survey of 800 skincare buyers aged 20 to 49 (Exhibit 2) found that 6% had heard of Hartwell & Rye. After trying a sample, 41% said they would consider buying, but only 33% would pay the planned price for the serum. More than half prefer to buy skincare in a drugstore (52%), against 21% for department stores and 27% online.

    See Exhibit 2

  • Established research Cited research

    Firms tend to enter foreign markets in stages

    A long-standing model of internationalization holds that firms commit to a foreign market step by step. They begin with routes that need little commitment, such as selling through an agent, learn about the market, and commit more, with a sales company and then production, as that knowledge reduces the uncertainty they face. The model describes a common pattern. It does not say that caution is always right.

    Source: Jan Johanson and Jan-Erik Vahlne (1977), The internationalization process of the firm

  • Established research Cited research

    Distance between countries has more than one dimension

    The CAGE framework treats the distance between two countries as cultural, administrative, geographic and economic, and argues that companies tend to judge foreign markets by their size and pay too little attention to how far away they are on each of the four.

    Source: Pankaj Ghemawat (2001), Distance still matters: the hard reality of global expansion

The exhibits

Exhibit 1

Two tests of demand in Japan, 2025

Source: Simulated data
Channel Orders Revenue (£000) Average order (£) Customers who bought again (%)
Online orders shipped to Japan, full year13,4001,14085.0738
Tokyo department store pop-up, six weeks2,95018663.0522

Online customers who bought again did so within the year; pop-up customers, within the six weeks of the counter.

Source Hartwell & Rye sales records (simulated).
Exhibit 2

Survey of 800 skincare buyers in Japan, aged 20 to 49, October 2025

Source: Simulated data
Question Answering yes (%)
Had heard of Hartwell & Rye6
Would consider buying the serum after trying a sample41
Would pay the planned price for the serum33
Prefer to buy skincare in a drugstore52
Prefer to buy skincare in a department store21
Prefer to buy skincare online27

An online panel chosen by quota to match skincare buyers by age and region. The last three questions asked where people prefer to buy, so their answers add up to 100%.

Source Survey commissioned by Hartwell & Rye (simulated).

Section 05: Financial information

Exhibit 3 gives the company's results for the last three years: revenue, profit and margins, the cash it holds, and the part of its revenue that already comes from Japan. Exhibit 4 gives the board's forecasts of the net cash flow each route into Japan would bring Hartwell & Rye, year by year. For the joint venture and the subsidiary these are yen earnings translated into pounds at the board's planning rate; Kasumi Trading would pay in pounds. The board appraises the routes at a discount rate of 10%.

Exhibit 3

Hartwell & Rye's results, 2023 to 2025 (£000)

Source: Simulated data
Year Revenue Gross profit Operating profit Operating profit margin (%) Online orders from Japan Cash at the year end
202329,40018,2283,23411.02104,100
202433,80020,9563,71811.05205,300
202538,60023,5463,86010.01,1406,200

Online orders from Japan are part of revenue. The company has no borrowing.

Source Hartwell & Rye management accounts (simulated).
Exhibit 4

Forecast net cash flow to Hartwell & Rye from each route (£000)

Source: Simulated data
Route Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Total, years 1 to 5
A. Distributor (Kasumi Trading)−6001502803804204401,670
B. Joint venture (Hinata Drugstores)−1,8001004507509501,0503,300
C. Subsidiary of its own−3,600−4005001,3001,9002,3005,600

Year 0 is the capital cost of entry. Under route B the cash flows are Hartwell & Rye's half of the venture's dividends, with its royalties. Under route C the subsidiary makes a loss in its first year.

Source Board paper on entering Japan, forecasts by the finance director (simulated).

Section 06: Stakeholder implications

Who has a stake in the decision, how much they care and how much they can affect it, what they want, and what the decision would mean for them.

  • Clare Hartwell and the board

    Stakeholder
    Internal
    Interest
    High
    Power
    High
    What they want
    Growth abroad that keeps the brand's standards, without betting the company on one market.
    What the decision means for them
    Route C would take more than half of the company's cash and much of its managers' time. Route A asks for little of either, but hands the brand's future in Japan to a partner.
  • Larchfield Capital

    Stakeholder
    Internal
    Interest
    High
    Power
    High
    What they want
    A larger, faster-growing business to sell its 30% stake into within four years; an international brand is worth more to a buyer.
    What the decision means for them
    Likely to favour the larger routes, whose returns come later. A slow start in Japan, or a contract that ties the brand to one distributor, could lower the value of its stake when it sells.
  • Employees in Bath

    Stakeholder
    Internal
    Interest
    Medium
    Power
    Low
    What they want
    More work at the production site, and secure jobs.
    What the decision means for them
    Every route adds output in Bath. A subsidiary would also take a few managers to Tokyo and stretch the rest.
  • Kasumi Trading

    Stakeholder
    External
    Interest
    High
    Power
    Medium
    What they want
    An exclusive, long contract for a brand with proven demand.
    What the decision means for them
    Under route A it would set prices, choose retailers and run promotion in Japan. Its effort, more than the brand's, would decide how well the launch goes.
  • Hinata Drugstores

    Stakeholder
    External
    Interest
    High
    Power
    Medium
    What they want
    A distinctive British brand its competitors do not stock.
    What the decision means for them
    Route B gives it half the venture and the brand's first placing in its 280 stores. Rival chains might then refuse a brand half-owned by a competitor.
  • Customers in Japan

    Stakeholder
    External
    Interest
    Medium
    Power
    Medium
    What they want
    The products at a fair price, in shops they already use.
    What the decision means for them
    Routes A, B and C put the brand on shelves; route D keeps it online, with slow delivery from Britain, out of reach of the many who prefer to buy in a drugstore.

Section 07: The strategic options

The courses of action open to the board. Each is set out on its own terms; the Analysis edition judges them.

  1. Option A: Export through a distributor (Kasumi Trading)

    Kasumi buys the products in pounds, registers and relabels them, sells them to drugstores and department stores, and runs the promotion. Hartwell & Rye spends £600k on changes to the products and support for the launch.

    What it needs
    A contract with Kasumi, which wants five years of exclusive rights; product registration; a narrower launch range.
    What it could gain
    Fast access to retailers, little capital at risk, no exposure to the yen and a partner who knows the trade.
    What could go wrong
    Little control over price and presentation; dependence on one partner; Kasumi's margin leaves less for the brand; a weak launch is hard to put right while an exclusive contract runs.

    Evidence: Exhibit 4

  2. Option B: Joint venture with Hinata Drugstores

    A Japanese company owned half by each partner sells the brand through Hinata's 280 stores, and later to other retailers. Hartwell & Rye invests £1,800k for its half.

    What it needs
    Agreement on control, pricing and how the venture would end; a manager sent to Tokyo; accounts kept in yen.
    What it could gain
    Shelf space in a large chain from the first day, local knowledge, shared costs and half the profits.
    What could go wrong
    Disputes between partners; rival chains may shun the brand; the returns are in yen, so they rise and fall with the currency.

    Evidence: Exhibit 2, Exhibit 4

  3. Option C: A subsidiary of its own

    Hartwell & Rye sets up its own Japanese company with a team in Tokyo, sells to retailers directly and runs its own marketing, for an investment of £3,600k.

    What it needs
    A local team recruited from nothing; registrations and retail relationships built from scratch; a great deal of senior time.
    What it could gain
    Full control and all the profits; the deepest knowledge of the market; the strongest position if Japan succeeds.
    What could go wrong
    The largest sum at risk; a loss in the first year; the slowest payback; all of the exposure to the yen; managers drawn away from the British business.

    Evidence: Exhibit 4

  4. Option D: Stay out: serve Japan from Britain

    Keep sending online orders from Bath, perhaps with a Japanese website and faster delivery, and invest in Britain instead.

    What it needs
    Very little beyond a translated website and a delivery partner.
    What it could gain
    No capital at risk, full control of the brand, and managers who stay focused on the home market.
    What could go wrong
    Leaves out of reach the shoppers who buy in stores, and leaves room for a competitor to take the place the brand has found.

    Evidence: Exhibit 3, Exhibit 1

Section 08: Evaluation criteria

How the board has said it will judge the options, and how much each criterion counts. The weights add up to 100.

Criterion How it is judged Weight
Financial return Net present value at 10% over five years, the payback period and the average rate of return, from the forecasts in Exhibit 4. 30%
Risk to the company The capital at stake, the exposure to the yen, and how far a poor launch would hurt the rest of the business. 25%
Control of the brand Who would set prices, choose retailers and decide how the brand is presented in Japan. 20%
Learning and long-term position How much the company would learn about Japanese customers, and how strong its position would be in ten years. 15%
Demands on management The senior time each route needs from a small team that also runs the British business. 10%

Section 09: Discussion questions

Answer them before you open the Analysis edition, which has notes on each.

Source: Original practice question
Show content for

Showing everything. HL-only material is marked HL.

In the style of the IB course

The platform's own questions, written for this briefing; they are not IB examination questions. The marks are each question's own allocation.

  1. Using Exhibit 4, calculate for route B, the joint venture, (a) the payback period and (b) the average rate of return (ARR).

    Calculate AO4 3.8 Investment appraisal

    [4 marks]

  2. Explain one advantage and one disadvantage to Hartwell & Rye of entering Japan through a joint venture with Hinata Drugstores.

    Explain AO2 1.5 Growth and evolution

    [4 marks]

  3. Explain two threats Hartwell & Rye would face in operating in the Japanese market.

    Explain AO2 4.6 International marketing HL

    [4 marks]

  4. Discuss the impact on Japan, as the host country, of Hartwell & Rye setting up a subsidiary of its own there.

    Discuss AO3 1.6 Multinational companies (MNCs)

    [10 marks]

  5. Using the information in this briefing, recommend which route into Japan Hartwell & Rye should take.

    Recommend AO3 1.5 Growth and evolution; 3.8 Investment appraisal

    [10 marks]

HL-only questions are hidden in the SL view. Choose HL above to see them.

For seminars, beyond the course

Source: Enrichment

For undergraduate, MBA and professional readers. These questions go beyond the IB course and are labelled as enrichment.

  1. The stages model says a firm should commit more as it learns. When is entering cautiously the riskier choice?
  2. Draft the three clauses you would most want in the contract with Kasumi Trading, and say what behaviour each is meant to produce.
  3. Use the four kinds of distance to compare Japan with another market Hartwell & Rye could enter. Which distance matters most to a skincare brand?
The Analysis edition The worked discussion: the evidence, the assumptions, every option judged and the recommendation. Open it when you have decided. About 8 minutes to read.

The Analysis edition

The worked discussion and the recommendation · about 8 minutes to read

Source: Arjun Agrawal frameworkThe Business Brief's analysis

From here, the page gives the platform's reading of the case: its interpretation of the evidence, its judgement and its recommendation. It adds no new facts, and the same evidence can support other conclusions if they are argued well.

Section A1: Executive summary

Recommended Option A: Export through a distributor (Kasumi Trading)

Enter Japan now, through Kasumi Trading (route A), on a contract that keeps the way open to a deeper commitment: a shorter first term, sales targets that end exclusivity if they are missed, and the right to buy back distribution. Route A has the best financial case on every measure, with a net present value of £613.3k at 10%, a payback of 2.4 years and an ARR of 35.7%. It puts only £0.6m at risk, and Kasumi pays in pounds. Its cost is control, and the contract and a brand manager of the company's own in Tokyo are how the board buys that control back.

Section A2: What the evidence shows

The exhibits worked through. Every figure here is recomputed from the exhibits on every build.

  • The demand is real but early. Online orders from Japan grew by 119.2% in 2025 without any marketing, and 38% of online customers bought again (Exhibits 3 and 1). But Japan is 3.0% of revenue, and the survey suggests the wider market barely knows the brand: 6% awareness (Exhibit 2).
  • The survey shrinks as it goes: 41% would consider the serum after a sample, but 33% would pay the planned price, and people say they will buy more often than they do. Most prefer drugstores (52%), so the routes that reach drugstores, A and B, match how people shop.
  • On the board's five-year forecasts, route A beats B and C on every measure: payback of 2.4 years against 3.5 and 4.1, ARR of 35.7% against 16.7% and 11.1%, and NPV of £613.3k against £527.1k and £152.0k (Exhibit A1).
  • The currency changes the risk ranking. A yen 10% weaker than the planning rate leaves route A untouched, because Kasumi pays in pounds, but cuts route B's NPV to £294.4k and turns route C's negative, at −£223.2k (Exhibit A1).
Exhibit A1

The routes appraised, at 10% (£000)

Source: Simulated data
Route Payback (years) ARR (%) NPV at 10% NPV if the yen is 10% weaker
A. Distributor (Kasumi Trading)2.435.7613.3613.3
B. Joint venture (Hinata Drugstores)3.516.7527.1294.4
C. Subsidiary of its own4.111.1152.0−223.2

Payback assumes each year's cash arrives evenly through the year. The NPVs use the guide's discount factors at 10%. Kasumi pays in pounds, so a weaker yen leaves route A unchanged; under routes B and C every yen-earned flow is worth a tenth less.

Source The Business Brief's analysis of Exhibit 4 (simulated data).
Exhibit A2

Route B worked: payback and net present value (£000)

Source: Simulated data
Measure Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Net cash flow−1,8001004507509501,050
Cumulative net cash flow−1,800−1,700−1,250−5004501,500
Discount factor at 10%10.90910.82640.75130.6830.6209
Present value at 10%−1,80090.91371.88563.48648.85651.95

The cost is recovered during year 4, when the cumulative figure turns positive. The present values of years 1 to 5 add up to £2,327.1k; less the capital cost of £1,800k, the NPV is £527.1k.

Source The Business Brief's working, from Exhibit 4 and the guide's discount factors (simulated data).

Section A3: The assumptions

What the analysis takes as given, and how a manager would test it before relying on it.

  • The forecasts in Exhibit 4 are equally reliable for every route.

    How to test it They are not. Route A's depend on Kasumi's effort, and route C's on a sales team that does not yet exist. Ask for a cautious and a hopeful case for each, and see whether the ranking survives.

  • Five years is the right horizon for the appraisal.

    How to test it Most of route C's value would come after year five. Extend the forecasts to ten years, with a cautious value for the business after that, and see whether C overtakes A.

  • The yen will hold at the board's planning rate.

    How to test it Exhibit A1 shows the effect of a 10% fall. Ask how much the company could protect by buying yen forward, and at what cost.

  • A distributor that pays in pounds removes the currency risk.

    How to test it It moves the risk to Kasumi, which will price for it. If the yen weakens, Kasumi will want to raise shelf prices or spend less on promotion, so the risk returns as lower sales.

Section A4: The trade-offs

What the board gives up to get what it wants. No option avoids all of them.

Return now, or control later

Route A earns the most, soonest, by letting someone else run the brand in Japan. Every point of control the company keeps (over prices, displays, retailers) it must buy, either with capital (routes B and C) or with concessions in the contract.

Learning, or commitment

The company knows little about Japanese shoppers beyond one website and one counter. A small first step lets it learn before it commits, but the knowledge that matters most (how drugstores sell, what shoppers pay) is learned best by those doing the selling, and under route A that is Kasumi.

Speed, or flexibility

Kasumi can put the brand in shops within a year, but asks for five exclusive years. A long exclusive contract is the main way route A could turn from the safest choice into a trap.

Section A5: The alternatives, judged

Every option judged against the evidence, then scored against the board's criteria.

  1. Option A: Export through a distributor (Kasumi Trading)

    Best supported by the evidence

    The best supported, provided the contract is right. It has the strongest appraisal, the least capital at risk and no exposure to the yen, and it reaches the drugstores most buyers prefer. Its weakness, control, is one the board can reduce through the contract and a brand manager of its own.

  2. Option B: Joint venture with Hinata Drugstores

    Defensible if its conditions hold

    Defensible if Hinata commits shelf space and marketing in writing and agrees how the venture would end. It gives more control and learning than A, but at three times the capital, with yen exposure and the risk that rival chains shut the brand out.

  3. Option C: A subsidiary of its own

    Weakly supported by the evidence

    The deepest commitment on the thinnest knowledge. Its five-year NPV is the lowest, it turns negative if the yen weakens by a tenth, and it would take more than half of the company's cash. It may be the right step later, once the company knows the market.

  4. Option D: Stay out: serve Japan from Britain

    Defensible if its conditions hold

    Defensible only if the board cannot get acceptable terms from Kasumi or Hinata. It risks nothing, but it leaves out of reach the shoppers who buy in shops, and the evidence of demand is the reason to act now.

The options scored against the board's criteria

Each option is scored from 1 (poor) to 5 (strong) on each criterion. The weighted score is the sum of each weight times its score, divided by 100. The scores are the analysis's judgement; a scoring matrix organizes judgement, it does not replace it.

Criterion Weight Option A Option B Option C Option D
Financial return 30% 5422
Risk to the company 25% 5314
Control of the brand 20% 2355
Learning and long-term position 15% 3451
Demands on management 10% 5314
Weighted score 100% 4.10 (the highest) 3.45 2.70 3.15

Section A6: The recommended course of action

Option A: Export through a distributor (Kasumi Trading)

Enter Japan through Kasumi Trading, but negotiate the contract as the real decision: a three-year first term rather than five, annual sales targets that end exclusivity if they are missed, approval of prices and displays, and the right to buy back distribution at a price agreed now. Appoint a Hartwell & Rye brand manager in Tokyo to work alongside Kasumi.

Why

  • Route A has the strongest appraisal on every measure, and the smallest sum at risk.
  • It reaches drugstores, where most Japanese skincare buyers prefer to shop, within a year.
  • It carries no direct exposure to the yen, the risk that most damages routes B and C.
  • With the right contract, it is a first step towards B or C rather than an alternative to them.

On these conditions

The recommendation holds only if Kasumi accepts targets and a buy-back right. If it insists on five exclusive years on its own terms, route B, with written commitments from Hinata, becomes the better choice.

Section A7: Implementation

What happens, in what order, and who answers for it.

  1. Months 1 to 3 Negotiate the Kasumi contract, with a three-year first term, annual sales targets, exclusivity that lapses if targets are missed, approval rights over prices and displays, and a right to buy back distribution at a set price. Chief executive and finance director
  2. Months 1 to 6 Choose a narrow launch range led by the two serums that sold out in Tokyo, and complete registration and Japanese labelling. Head of product
  3. Month 4 Appoint a brand manager in Tokyo, employed by Hartwell & Rye, to agree launch plans, prices and displays with Kasumi and to report on the market. Chief executive
  4. Months 6 to 12 Launch in drugstores chosen with Kasumi, and keep the Japanese website running so that loyal online customers are not lost. Kasumi Trading with the brand manager
  5. Month 30 Review the launch against the measures below, and decide whether to renew the contract, renegotiate it or buy back distribution and move to a joint venture or a subsidiary. The board

Section A8: Evaluation: how to tell if it is working

The evaluation criteria, applied after the decision: what to measure, what counts as working, and when to look.

Measure Target Reviewed
Net cash flow from Kasumi At or above the forecast in Exhibit 4, £150k in year 1 and £280k in year 2. Every quarter
Brand awareness From 6% to 15% of skincare buyers within two years, measured by repeating the survey. Every year
Shelf presence Stocked in 400 stores within two years. Every six months
Repeat purchase At least the pop-up's 22% of customers buying again, rising towards the 38% seen online. Every six months

Section A9: Limitations

What the analysis cannot see, and what would change its recommendation.

The limits of the analysis

  • The forecasts come from the parties who would gain from each route, and none of them has been tested against a cautious case.
  • The appraisal stops at year five, which favours the routes that pay back fastest over those whose value comes later.
  • The survey measures what people say they would do, and the pop-up drew curious first-time buyers in a single store in one city.

What would change the recommendation

  • If Kasumi will not accept sales targets and a buy-back right, route B becomes the better route.
  • If ten-year forecasts with a cautious value after year ten show route C clearly ahead, and the yen can be hedged at a fair cost, a subsidiary deserves another look.
  • If online orders from Japan keep doubling without any local presence, the case for waiting (route D) grows stronger.

Section A10: Notes on the discussion questions

What a strong answer to each discussion question does. Guidance, not a markscheme.

Source: Assessment explanation
  1. Question 1 [4 marks]

    (a) The cumulative net cash flow is −£1,800k at the start, then −£1,700k, −£1,250k and −£500k at the end of year 3, so £500k of year 4's £950k is needed: 3 + 500 ÷ 950 = 3.5 years, or 3 years and 6.3 months (Exhibit A2). (b) The returns total £3,300k; less the capital cost of £1,800k, that leaves £1,500k over five years, or £300k a year. ARR = 300 ÷ 1,800 × 100 = 16.7%. Two marks for each, with the working shown.

  2. Question 2 [4 marks]

    An advantage applied to the case: shelf space in 280 stores from the first day, and a partner that knows Japanese shoppers, which matters when only 6% have heard of the brand. A disadvantage: shared control and the risk of disputes, or rival chains refusing a brand half-owned by a competitor. Each point explained in context earns two marks.

  3. Question 3 [4 marks]HL

    Strong answers choose threats the case supports: the exchange rate (a 10% weaker yen cuts route B's NPV from £527.1k to £294.4k and turns route C's negative, Exhibit A1); local competitors who know customers better; product rules that require registration and relabelling; dependence on a partner. Each threat is explained with its effect on the business.

  4. Question 4 [10 marks]

    A balanced answer weighs jobs in sales and marketing, taxes on profits and more choice for shoppers against the pressure on Japanese skincare brands and the profits sent back to Britain. It notes that a subsidiary that sells imported products creates fewer local jobs than one that makes them, and reaches a judgement on the balance.

  5. Question 5 [10 marks]

    The strongest answers use the appraisal (route A: payback 2.4 years, ARR 35.7%, NPV £613.3k) but do not stop at it: they weigh control, the evidence of demand and the yen, consider whether a cautious route can be made to keep the bigger options open, and give a clear recommendation with its conditions. Any route can earn full marks if it is justified against the evidence.

  6. Seminar question 1 Enrichment

    When the market rewards the first mover, when a distributor's weak effort could fix a poor image of the brand, or when a cautious contract locks the firm out of the deeper routes it would later want. Good answers apply this to the length and exclusivity of Kasumi's contract.

  7. Seminar question 2 Enrichment

    Typical choices: sales targets that end exclusivity if missed (effort); approval rights over prices and displays (brand protection); a right to buy back distribution at a set price (a path to a deeper commitment). Each clause has a cost: Kasumi will ask for something in return.

  8. Seminar question 3 Enrichment

    Cultural distance shapes what customers want from a product and how it is sold; administrative distance includes the rules on ingredients and labels; geographic distance raises the cost of shipping and service; economic distance affects prices. Good answers argue for one and test it against the case.

Notes on HL-only questions are hidden in the SL view.

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Go further: Advanced Management

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