Advanced strategy · Module 5

International expansion

Where should a firm go abroad, how should it enter, and why does distance cost more than managers expect?

Beyond the IB course UndergraduateMBAProfessional About 30 minutes · 3,091 words · checked 16 November 2026

From the IB course to this module

The IB course considers the impact of multinational companies on host countries (1.6), the opportunities and threats of international markets (4.6, HL) and offshoring and reshoring (5.4), with Hofstede's cultural dimensions in the toolkit. This module takes the firm's point of view and goes further: why firms invest abroad rather than export or license, how to measure distance, how to choose an entry mode, how internationalization unfolds over time, and how to organize across borders.

Section 01: Conceptual foundation

Foreign firms start at a disadvantage. They know less about local customers, laws and networks than domestic rivals, may be treated less favourably by governments and buyers, and must coordinate across distance. Hymer (1976) argued that a firm can operate abroad profitably only if it has an advantage large enough to offset this liability of foreignness, and Zaheer (1995) measured it in the extra costs borne by foreign banks' trading rooms.

Two decisions follow. The first is where: which markets offer enough demand, growth and profit, at what distance from the firm's home base and existing capabilities. The second is how: export, license or franchise, form an alliance or joint venture, acquire a local firm, or build from scratch, a greenfield investment. The modes differ in control, commitment, risk, speed and what the firm learns. More control protects know-how and allows integration; more commitment raises the cost of mistakes.

The evidence also corrects a common assumption. Most large firms remain regional rather than global: Rugman and Verbeke (2004) found that most of the largest multinationals earned the majority of their sales in their home region. Expanding abroad is hard enough that most firms do it near home first.

Section 02: Advanced explanation

Why firms invest abroad

Dunning's eclectic paradigm (1988) sets three conditions for foreign direct investment. The firm must have an ownership advantage, such as technology, a brand or management systems, that can be used abroad to offset the liability of foreignness. The foreign location must offer something the home base does not: customers, lower costs, resources or knowledge. And there must be a reason to internalise the advantage, exploiting it inside the firm rather than selling or licensing it, usually because the know-how is hard to price, specify or protect in a contract.

Motives fall into four groups: seeking markets, seeking efficiency through lower costs, seeking natural resources, and seeking strategic assets such as technology, brands or skills that the firm lacks. The last matters for firms from emerging economies, which often expand abroad to acquire capabilities rather than exploit them. Luo and Tung (2007) called this a springboard: buying assets abroad to compensate for weaknesses at home and to compete with established multinationals in their own markets.

The three conditions also guide the choice of mode. A firm whose advantage is easy to codify, such as a trademark with a documented operating system, can license or franchise it. One whose advantage lives in tacit know-how and routines will want control, and will invest or acquire.

Distance and its costs

Ghemawat (2001) argued that firms overestimate foreign markets because they look at size and growth and underweight distance, which has four dimensions: cultural (language, religion, social norms), administrative (laws, currency, trade agreements, political relations), geographic (physical distance, time zones, transport links) and economic (differences in income and costs). Which dimensions matter depends on the industry: culture for products tied to identity and language, geography for heavy or perishable goods, administration for industries governments treat as strategic.

A simple adjustment shows the effect. Suppose Market A has demand of €2,000 million and Market B €900 million. If the costs of distance would cut what the firm can realistically capture to 30% of A's nominal opportunity and 75% of B's, the adjusted opportunities are €600 million and €675 million: the smaller, nearer market is the larger opportunity for this firm. The percentages are judgements, but writing them down forces the analysis that headline market size hides.

Distance is also political. Investment screening, export controls, tariffs and sanctions have made administrative distance a moving variable, and a market's openness to a particular foreign owner can change faster than its demand.

Choosing an entry mode

Anderson and Gatignon (1986) ranked entry modes by the control they give and argued, from transaction cost economics, that firms should take more control when their know-how is proprietary and tacit and a local partner could exploit it. Control has costs: capital, management attention and exposure if the market disappoints.

Choosing between acquisition and greenfield entry trades speed against fit. An acquisition buys local customers, staff, sites and relationships at once, reducing the liability of foreignness, but brings a premium, an existing culture and assets that may not fit. A greenfield investment replicates the firm's own systems and culture, but is slow and must build relationships from nothing. Hennart and Park (1993), studying Japanese investors in the United States, found that firms with strong technological advantages tended to build new plants, transferring their routines intact, while diversifying investors tended to acquire.

A worked comparison clarifies the economics. Licensing a technology to a local firm for a 5% royalty on €200 million of sales yields €10 million a year with little capital at risk. A greenfield plant costing €150 million and earning a 12% operating margin on €300 million of sales yields €36 million a year, but only once the plant is built and the market won, and with the capital exposed if demand disappoints. The licence also creates a potential competitor, since the licensee knows the technology when the licence ends.

Internationalization as a process, and organizing across borders

The Uppsala model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) describes internationalization as incremental: firms commit resources abroad step by step, from occasional exports to sales subsidiaries to production, and enter psychically close markets first, because each step builds the experiential knowledge that reduces uncertainty. Their 2009 revision replaced foreignness with outsidership: what matters most is a firm's position in the relevant business networks. Oviatt and McDougall (1994) documented international new ventures that sell abroad from the start, which the original model did not predict.

Once established abroad, firms must decide what to standardize and what to adapt. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) described pressures for global integration (scale, efficiency, consistent quality) and for local responsiveness (tastes, regulation, distribution), and four responses: the global firm, which centralizes and standardizes; the multinational (often called multidomestic) firm, which delegates to national units; the international firm, which transfers home-country innovations; and the transnational, which tries to combine efficiency, responsiveness and worldwide learning. The transnational is more an aspiration than a common form, and the right balance differs by function: a firm can centralize research and purchasing while adapting marketing and service.

Section 03: Models and frameworks

Where each comes from, how to use it, and where it stops being useful.

Ghemawat (2001)

CAGE distance framework

Distance between countries has four dimensions, cultural, administrative, geographic and economic, and each reduces trade and investment in ways that headline market size conceals. Which dimensions matter most depends on the industry.

How to use it

For each candidate market, assess the four dimensions against the home base and the markets where the firm already operates, weighting them by industry. Culture can be measured with Hofstede's dimensions, which Kogut and Singh (1988) combined into a single index. Adjust each market's nominal opportunity for the costs of distance before ranking.

Where it fails

The dimensions are hard to quantify and the adjustments are judgements. Distance changes with policy and technology, and the framework says more about where not to go than about how to win once there.

Pankaj Ghemawat (2001). Distance still matters: the hard reality of global expansion. Harvard Business Review 79(8). Bruce Kogut and Harbir Singh (1988). The effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode. Journal of International Business Studies 19(3).

Dunning (1988)

The eclectic paradigm

Foreign direct investment occurs when a firm has an ownership advantage, a foreign location offers advantages its home base does not, and the firm gains more by internalising the advantage than by licensing it.

How to use it

State the ownership advantage and whether it travels; identify what the location adds; and judge whether a contract could protect the advantage if it were licensed. If not, invest; if it could, license or franchise. A screen of the host country's environment supports the location step.

Where it fails

The paradigm can explain almost any investment after the event, which weakens it as a predictive theory. It fits firms exploiting existing advantages better than firms, often from emerging economies, that go abroad to acquire them.

John H. Dunning (1988). The eclectic paradigm of international production: a restatement and some possible extensions. Journal of International Business Studies 19(1).

Johanson and Vahlne (1977)

The Uppsala model

Firms internationalize step by step, increasing commitment as experiential knowledge reduces uncertainty, and enter psychically close markets first. The 2009 revision puts position in business networks at the centre: the main liability is being an outsider.

How to use it

Use it to plan a sequence: which market to enter first in order to learn, what commitment to make at each stage, and what evidence would justify the next. Map the network of customers, suppliers and partners in a target market and plan how to become an insider, for example through a partner already embedded there.

Where it fails

International new ventures and digital firms often skip stages, and an acquisition can buy experience and network position at once. The model describes a common path, not a necessary one.

Jan Johanson and Jan-Erik Vahlne (1977). The internationalization process of the firm. Journal of International Business Studies 8(1). Jan Johanson and Jan-Erik Vahlne (2009). The Uppsala internationalization process model revisited: from liability of foreignness to liability of outsidership. Journal of International Business Studies 40(9).

Anderson and Gatignon (1986)

Entry mode and control

Entry modes range from low control (exporting, licensing) through shared control (joint ventures) to full control (acquisitions and wholly owned greenfield subsidiaries). Firms should take more control when their know-how is proprietary and hard to codify and partners could exploit it.

How to use it

List the modes available, then score them on control, capital at risk, speed, learning and political acceptability in the host country, weighting the criteria for the firm's situation; the option appraisal tool supports this. Check the transaction cost logic: the more tacit and valuable the advantage, the more control it needs.

Where it fails

It treats entry as a single choice, when firms often change mode over time, from licence to joint venture to ownership. Host governments may cap foreign ownership, removing the most controlling options, and political risk can make control a liability.

Erin Anderson and Hubert Gatignon (1986). Modes of foreign entry: a transaction cost analysis and propositions. Journal of International Business Studies 17(3).

Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989)

Integration and responsiveness

Firms abroad face pressures for global integration and for local responsiveness. Bartlett and Ghoshal described four responses: the global, multinational, international and transnational organization.

How to use it

Assess the strength of each pressure for each function and product line, not for the firm as a whole. Centralize where scale and consistency dominate, delegate where local needs dominate, and build mechanisms such as global product teams or centres of excellence to share learning across countries.

Where it fails

The types are ideal forms; most firms are hybrids, and the transnational is hard to build. The grid says what balance to seek, not how to manage the conflict between headquarters and subsidiaries that it creates.

Christopher A. Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal (1989). Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution. Harvard Business School Press.

Section 04: Real business applications

Real organizations appear only with dated, cited facts; illustrative examples are labelled.

Real organization, 2024-07

BYD in Thailand: from exports to a local plant

What the company reported. In July 2024 BYD opened a car plant in Rayong, Thailand, completed in 16 months, with capacity for 150,000 vehicles a year, covering stamping, painting, welding, final assembly and components, and expected to create 10,000 jobs. The company said that one in three electric vehicles sold in Thailand was a BYD. The company reported exports of 243,000 vehicles in 2023, up 337%, and more than 203,000 in the first half of 2024, out of 1.607 million new energy vehicles sold worldwide in that half, and listed passenger car production bases in Thailand, Brazil, Hungary and Uzbekistan. It describes itself as having mastered the core technologies of electric vehicles, including batteries, motors and electronic controls.

What it suggests. The sequence follows a compressed version of the Uppsala path: export first, learn the market, then commit to local production once demand is proven. In Dunning's terms, the ownership advantage is cost and technology from vertical integration, which is hard to license because it rests on integrated operations; Thailand adds an established car industry and a base for South-East Asia; and internalisation keeps the know-how inside the firm. Local production may also reduce exposure to trade policy in the markets served, though that is interpretation; the release does not say so.

Real organization, 2024-07

JD Sports and Hibbett: buying a local presence

What the company reported. In April 2024 JD Sports agreed to buy Hibbett, a US sports fashion retailer with 1,169 stores in 36 states, concentrated in the south-east, where JD had a limited presence, for $87.50 a share: an equity value of $1,083 million and an enterprise value of $1,109 million. Hibbett had net sales of $1,729 million and EBITDA of $186 million in its last financial year. JD said the deal would raise North America's share of group sales from about 32% to about 40%, provide a platform for rolling out the JD brand in the United States, and yield at least $25 million a year of cost synergies. The acquisition was completed in July 2024.

What it suggests. At about six times EBITDA, JD bought a local presence (stores, managers, supply chain and relationships with brands) faster than it could build one, the classic case for acquisition over greenfield entry when speed and local knowledge matter. The risk lies in what was bought: a regional store estate that must now carry a different brand strategy, and a management team whose knowledge JD needs to keep.

Illustrative

Illustrative: a master franchise in a distant market

The firm and figures are invented. A European bakery chain is offered a master franchise in a distant market: a local group will open 60 stores, paying an upfront fee of €3 million and 6% of sales. If each store sells €800,000 a year, the chain earns €2.88 million a year in royalties with no capital at risk. Owning the stores might earn a 10% margin, €4.8 million a year, but would need about €600,000 of investment per store, €36 million in all, and local managers it does not have. The franchise trades upside and control of the brand for speed and safety, and its success depends on a partner the chain must monitor without owning.

Section 05: Case studies

Fictional case, simulated figures

Tamarind Living chooses its first foreign market

Tamarind Living is a fictional Indian retailer of handcrafted furniture and home furnishings, with 90 stores at home and an online business. Its products are made by workshops in India, shipped in containers and sold at prices about 20% below comparable imported designer goods. It has €40 million for its first expansion abroad and is choosing between two markets, both simulated for this case.

Market A is large and mature, ten hours' flight away, with English widely used in business, low tariffs and no limit on foreign ownership. Market B is smaller and growing fast, four hours away, with a large population with family ties to India, higher tariffs and a rule that foreign retailers may own at most 49% of a local company.

Tamarind Living: the two candidate markets
Factor Market A Market B
Demand for furniture and furnishings (€m a year)2,000900
Expected market growth a year2%9%
Flight time from head office (hours)104
Share of population with family ties to India3%25%
English widely used in businessYesPartly
Import tariff on furniture4%12%
Average shop rent (€ per square metre a year)450300
Maximum foreign ownership of a retailer100%49%

Simulated data for fictional markets.

Questions

  1. Apply the CAGE framework to both markets. Which dimensions matter most for a furniture retailer, and which market is closer on them?
  2. Adjust each market's demand for the costs of distance, stating your percentages. Does the ranking by headline size survive?
  3. In Market B the ownership limit forces a local partner. Compare a joint venture with a franchise there, using the logic of control and transaction costs.
  4. How would the Uppsala model sequence Tamarind's expansion, and what evidence should trigger entry into the second market?

Section 06: Critical evaluation

What the evidence supports, where the debate is, and what the models leave out.

Global or regional? Levitt (1983) predicted that technology would homogenise tastes and reward firms selling standardized products worldwide. The evidence since is more mixed: Rugman and Verbeke (2004) found that most of the largest multinationals remain based in their home region, and Ghemawat's work documents how far cross-border flows remain below what a fully integrated world would produce. That most international business is regional is established; whether the trend is towards more or less integration is contested and varies by industry and period.

The Uppsala model and its challengers. The incremental pattern is well documented for many manufacturing firms, but international new ventures and acquisitions show it is not universal. The network-based revision is harder to test, because almost any path can be described in network terms.

Do the classic theories fit emerging-market multinationals? Dunning's paradigm assumes firms go abroad to exploit advantages, while firms from emerging economies often go abroad to acquire them, which the springboard perspective explains better. Interpretation: the two describe different motives rather than rival truths.

The liability of foreignness is changing. Digital channels have lowered some costs of distance, while investment screening, export controls and tariffs have raised political distance. This module's cases are consistent with both: one firm builds locally where it sells, and another buys the local knowledge an outsider lacks. Whether local production is chosen for market access, cost or political protection is usually a mix, and companies rarely say which.

Section 07: Decision exercise

A fictional situation. Decide before you read the guidance.

Vireo Robotics: how to enter the United States

Vireo Robotics is a fictional European maker of warehouse robots, with revenue of €320 million, 85% of it in Europe. Its advantage lies in software that coordinates fleets of robots and in engineers who adapt each installation to the warehouse. US retailers and logistics firms are asking for its systems, and a US rival is preparing a similar product. Vireo has €120 million available and wants a decision this year.

  1. Sell through a US integrator

    Sell through a US systems integrator that installs and services the robots. This is fast and cheap, but Vireo shares the margin, depends on the integrator's engineers and learns little about US customers.

  2. Joint venture with the integrator

    Form a 50:50 company to sell, install and service in North America. This shares the cost and brings local relationships, but decisions are shared and the partner gains access to Vireo's methods.

  3. Acquire a US integrator

    Buy a mid-sized integrator with 300 engineers for about €90 million. This brings customers and staff at once, but at a premium, with integration risk and a culture used to selling other firms' robots.

  4. Build a US subsidiary

    Open a subsidiary, hire engineers and build an assembly site over two years for about €80 million. This gives full control of know-how and brand, but is slow, and the rival may lock in early customers.

Judge the options on

  • Protection of the software and integration know-how
  • Speed relative to the US rival
  • Capital at risk and the cost of failure
  • Learning about US customers and networks
  • Exposure to trade policy and political risk
Read the guidance

Start with the nature of the advantage. Vireo's edge is tacit integration know-how plus software, which a partner could learn, so transaction cost logic argues for control; selling through an integrator suits only as a first, low-risk test of demand. The joint venture shares that knowledge with a partner who may become a competitor, which is acceptable only with strong protection for the software and clear exit terms.

Speed points the other way. If the rival can lock in large customers within two years, a new subsidiary may arrive too late, and an acquisition buys engineers and relationships at once. Its risks are the premium and integration: engineers used to installing many brands must become specialists in Vireo's systems, and some will leave.

A balanced answer might combine the acquisition of a smaller integrator, for speed and an insider's position in US networks, with a software and support centre under full control, sequencing larger commitments on early sales. Whatever the choice, the answer should say which risk it accepts: losing time, losing know-how or losing capital.

Section 08: Further reading

  • Pankaj Ghemawat (2001). Distance still matters: the hard reality of global expansion. Harvard Business Review 79(8).

    The CAGE framework, and a sobering argument about how much distance still matters.

  • Jan Johanson and Jan-Erik Vahlne (1977). The internationalization process of the firm. Journal of International Business Studies 8(1).

    The original Uppsala model of incremental internationalization.

  • Jan Johanson and Jan-Erik Vahlne (2009). The Uppsala internationalization process model revisited: from liability of foreignness to liability of outsidership. Journal of International Business Studies 40(9).

    The authors' revision, from the liability of foreignness to the liability of outsidership.

  • John H. Dunning (1988). The eclectic paradigm of international production: a restatement and some possible extensions. Journal of International Business Studies 19(1).

    The eclectic paradigm restated, with its ownership, location and internalisation conditions.

  • Christopher A. Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal (1989). Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution. Harvard Business School Press.

    The global, multinational, international and transnational organization, and the pressures behind each.

  • Srilata Zaheer (1995). Overcoming the liability of foreignness. Academy of Management Journal 38(2).

    Evidence on the liability of foreignness and on how foreign firms reduce it.

  • Alan M. Rugman and Alain Verbeke (2004). A perspective on regional and global strategies of multinational enterprises. Journal of International Business Studies 35(1).

    Why most large multinationals are regional rather than global.

Every work cited here is listed in the platform's sources register. Real organizations appear only with facts from the sources shown; everything else is labelled illustrative or fictional.