Why firms invest abroad
Dunning's eclectic paradigm (1988) sets three conditions for foreign direct investment. The firm must have an ownership advantage, such as technology, a brand or management systems, that can be used abroad to offset the liability of foreignness. The foreign location must offer something the home base does not: customers, lower costs, resources or knowledge. And there must be a reason to internalise the advantage, exploiting it inside the firm rather than selling or licensing it, usually because the know-how is hard to price, specify or protect in a contract.
Motives fall into four groups: seeking markets, seeking efficiency through lower costs, seeking natural resources, and seeking strategic assets such as technology, brands or skills that the firm lacks. The last matters for firms from emerging economies, which often expand abroad to acquire capabilities rather than exploit them. Luo and Tung (2007) called this a springboard: buying assets abroad to compensate for weaknesses at home and to compete with established multinationals in their own markets.
The three conditions also guide the choice of mode. A firm whose advantage is easy to codify, such as a trademark with a documented operating system, can license or franchise it. One whose advantage lives in tacit know-how and routines will want control, and will invest or acquire.
Distance and its costs
Ghemawat (2001) argued that firms overestimate foreign markets because they look at size and growth and underweight distance, which has four dimensions: cultural (language, religion, social norms), administrative (laws, currency, trade agreements, political relations), geographic (physical distance, time zones, transport links) and economic (differences in income and costs). Which dimensions matter depends on the industry: culture for products tied to identity and language, geography for heavy or perishable goods, administration for industries governments treat as strategic.
A simple adjustment shows the effect. Suppose Market A has demand of €2,000 million and Market B €900 million. If the costs of distance would cut what the firm can realistically capture to 30% of A's nominal opportunity and 75% of B's, the adjusted opportunities are €600 million and €675 million: the smaller, nearer market is the larger opportunity for this firm. The percentages are judgements, but writing them down forces the analysis that headline market size hides.
Distance is also political. Investment screening, export controls, tariffs and sanctions have made administrative distance a moving variable, and a market's openness to a particular foreign owner can change faster than its demand.
Choosing an entry mode
Anderson and Gatignon (1986) ranked entry modes by the control they give and argued, from transaction cost economics, that firms should take more control when their know-how is proprietary and tacit and a local partner could exploit it. Control has costs: capital, management attention and exposure if the market disappoints.
Choosing between acquisition and greenfield entry trades speed against fit. An acquisition buys local customers, staff, sites and relationships at once, reducing the liability of foreignness, but brings a premium, an existing culture and assets that may not fit. A greenfield investment replicates the firm's own systems and culture, but is slow and must build relationships from nothing. Hennart and Park (1993), studying Japanese investors in the United States, found that firms with strong technological advantages tended to build new plants, transferring their routines intact, while diversifying investors tended to acquire.
A worked comparison clarifies the economics. Licensing a technology to a local firm for a 5% royalty on €200 million of sales yields €10 million a year with little capital at risk. A greenfield plant costing €150 million and earning a 12% operating margin on €300 million of sales yields €36 million a year, but only once the plant is built and the market won, and with the capital exposed if demand disappoints. The licence also creates a potential competitor, since the licensee knows the technology when the licence ends.
Internationalization as a process, and organizing across borders
The Uppsala model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) describes internationalization as incremental: firms commit resources abroad step by step, from occasional exports to sales subsidiaries to production, and enter psychically close markets first, because each step builds the experiential knowledge that reduces uncertainty. Their 2009 revision replaced foreignness with outsidership: what matters most is a firm's position in the relevant business networks. Oviatt and McDougall (1994) documented international new ventures that sell abroad from the start, which the original model did not predict.
Once established abroad, firms must decide what to standardize and what to adapt. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) described pressures for global integration (scale, efficiency, consistent quality) and for local responsiveness (tastes, regulation, distribution), and four responses: the global firm, which centralizes and standardizes; the multinational (often called multidomestic) firm, which delegates to national units; the international firm, which transfers home-country innovations; and the transnational, which tries to combine efficiency, responsiveness and worldwide learning. The transnational is more an aspiration than a common form, and the right balance differs by function: a firm can centralize research and purchasing while adapting marketing and service.