Should Marigold Kitchens grow, and if it should, by which route?
Marigold Kitchens has four profitable restaurants in Pune and five routes in front of it: open its own restaurants in Mumbai, franchise, form a joint venture with a mall operator, buy a weaker rival, or stay at four restaurants and add a lunch service for offices. Each route makes the business bigger in a different way, and each changes who controls it, how it is financed and what it is like to work for.
Fictional case. An invented organization. Every figure is simulated for teaching and checked for consistency.
01
Section 01: The story so far
Meera Rao opened the first Marigold Kitchens in Pune in 2017, with eleven tables and a menu built from her grandmother's recipes: dal, seasonal vegetables, millet rotis, a rice of the day and one dessert. Nine years later there are four restaurants across the city, all of them profitable, and the queue at lunchtime is still the best advertisement the business has.
The question in front of Meera this autumn is not whether Marigold is successful. It is what success should look like next. In the last twelve months, forty-one people have asked to open a Marigold franchise. A mall operator, Sterling Malls, has proposed a joint venture that would put Marigold into six of its malls in three cities. A rival with nine restaurants, Tiffin Lane, is for sale because its owner wants to retire. Meera's bank has offered a loan for company-owned restaurants in Mumbai. And her head chef, Sunil Patil, has a different view entirely: four excellent restaurants and a new lunch service for offices would make the business better without making it bigger.
Each route would change more than the size of the business. Franchising would put the brand in the hands of people Meera has not trained. The joint venture would mean sharing decisions with a partner whose business is footfall, not food. Buying Tiffin Lane would bring nine sites and their staff at once, along with a reputation for cutting corners, and it would need an investor, Banyan Growth Partners, who would want thirty per cent of Marigold in return. Growing organically keeps control, but it is slow, it needs a large loan, and it would make Marigold's profit fall before it rose.
Meera's finance manager, Farah Sheikh, has built the forecasts in the exhibits from the restaurants' own figures. They are careful, but they are forecasts. The things that worry Farah most are not in the tables: how long a new restaurant takes to find its regulars, whether franchisees will follow the recipes when nobody is watching, and how many of Tiffin Lane's staff would stay.
Meera has written down what she wants (Exhibit 6). Her four aims do not all point the same way. That is the decision.
02
Section 02: The evidence
8 exhibits. Each is labelled with what kind of evidence it is.
Exhibit 1
Restaurant economics, last financial year (one restaurant)
Source: Simulated data
Item
₹m a year
Share of revenue (%)
Revenue
24.00
100
Food and packaging
7.68
32
Staff
6.00
25
Rent
3.60
15
Utilities and maintenance
1.20
5
Other costs
1.20
5
Restaurant profit
4.32
18
Food and packaging rise and fall with sales. Staff, rent, utilities and other costs do not change with the number of meals within a restaurant's normal range.
SourceSimulated teaching data, prepared by the finance manager from the four restaurants' accounts. The four restaurants are assumed identical.
Exhibit 2
The group today
Source: Simulated data
Restaurants
4All in Pune
Revenue
₹96.0m4 × ₹24.0m
Restaurants' combined profit
₹17.28m4 × ₹4.32m
Central costs
₹4.50mManagement, marketing, accounts
Operating profit
₹12.78m₹17.28m − ₹4.50m
Cash available to invest
₹20mRetained profit
SourceSimulated teaching data.
Exhibit 3
The five routes, as forecast by the finance manager
Source: Simulated data
Route
What it involves
Money needed and where it comes from
Key terms and forecast assumptions
Organic growth
Four company-owned restaurants in Mumbai, opened over two years.
₹72m (₹18m a restaurant). ₹20m from cash and a ₹52m bank loan at 11% a year.
Mumbai rent ₹5.4m a year; other restaurant costs as in Pune. Sales ₹26m a restaurant when mature, about 85% of that in the first full year. Central costs rise to ₹7.0m for an area manager and training.
Franchising
Twelve franchised restaurants over two years, mainly in Mumbai and Bengaluru.
₹10m from cash for a training academy, an operations manual and franchise recruitment.
Fee ₹1.5m a franchise, once. Royalty 6% of the franchisee's sales; marketing levy 2%, spent on marketing for the whole network. Franchisees' sales about ₹19m each in year two, ₹21m when mature. Support team ₹6.0m a year; academy ₹1.5m a year.
Joint venture
A company owned 50:50 with Sterling Malls, opening six restaurants in its malls in Pune, Mumbai and Bengaluru.
₹45m from each partner (₹15m a restaurant). Marigold's share from ₹15m of cash and a ₹30m loan at 11%.
Rent 15% of sales. Staff ₹6.6m and utilities and other costs ₹2.4m a restaurant. Sales ₹25.2m a restaurant in year two, ₹28m when mature. Joint venture overheads ₹2.0m a year; Marigold's oversight ₹0.5m a year.
Acquisition
Buy Tiffin Lane's nine restaurants. Convert the six best to the Marigold format; close the three weakest.
₹120m from Banyan Growth Partners for 30% of Marigold (₹96m price, ₹24m for conversions). Closures ₹6m from cash, once.
Buying for the whole group lowers food and packaging to 30% of sales. Converted restaurants sell ₹20m in year two and ₹23m when mature, with costs of ₹11m a year each besides food. Central costs ₹8.0m a year.
Stay focused
Stay at four restaurants and add a weekday lunch service for offices in Pune, cooked in the existing kitchens.
₹3m from cash for vans and equipment.
Sales ₹6m in year two, ₹9m when mature. Food and packaging 36% of sales; delivery and selling costs ₹1.2m a year.
SourceSimulated teaching data. Year two is the first full year after the decision; mature means year four. Taxes, depreciation and inflation are left out.
Exhibit 4
Tiffin Lane, last financial year
Source: Simulated data
Item
One restaurant, ₹m
Nine restaurants, ₹m
Revenue
16.00
144.00
Food and packaging (34% of sales)
5.44
48.96
Other restaurant costs
9.80
88.20
Restaurant profit
0.76
6.84
Central costs
3.00
Operating profit
3.84
The asking price is ₹96m, twenty-five times Tiffin Lane's operating profit.
SourceSimulated teaching data, from the information pack supplied by Tiffin Lane's owner.
Exhibit 5
Customers and staff
Source: Simulated data
Marigold average review rating
4.6 out of 52,310 reviews in the last twelve months
Tiffin Lane average review rating
3.6 out of 54,870 reviews in the last twelve months
Marigold visits by returning customers
62%From the loyalty card
Marigold staff turnover
18% a year
Tiffin Lane staff turnover
46% a year
Time to train a new cook to Marigold's standard
About four monthsTrained by the head chef
SourceSimulated teaching data.
Exhibit 6
What the founder wants
Source: Simulated data
Four things matter to me. The food stays as good as it is now: people come back because it tastes like home. Marigold should be known in at least three cities within five years. I will not give up control of what I built. And the people who grew with us should grow with the business.
SourceFictional note, written for this case.
Exhibit 7
Who wants a Marigold franchise?
Source: Simulated data
Franchise inquiries
41In the last twelve months
From Mumbai
17
From Bengaluru
9
From other cities
15
With restaurant experience
9
Able to fund a restaurant without a loan
4A franchised restaurant costs its owner about ₹16m to open
SourceSimulated teaching data, from the inquiries log.
Exhibit 8
Decision tree estimates for three routes (value over ten years)
Source: Simulated data
Route
Money invested, ₹m
Probability of strong demand
Value if demand is strong, ₹m
Value if demand is weak, ₹m
Organic growth
72
0.6
150
60
Franchising
10
0.6
95
30
Stay focused
3
0.6
40
25
Value is the extra profit the route adds over ten years, before subtracting the money invested and without discounting. Strong and weak demand are the only outcomes considered.
SourceSimulated teaching data, prepared for a decision tree. These are rough judgements, not forecasts.
03
Section 03: Constraints
Cash available to invest is ₹20m. Anything larger needs a loan, a partner or an investor.
The bank will lend up to ₹55m at 11% a year for company-owned restaurants, secured on the business.
The recipes depend on fresh, local produce and on cooks trained by the head chef. Training a new cook takes about four months.
Tiffin Lane's owner will consider other buyers if there is no offer by the end of the year.
04
Section 04: The people with a stake
Stakeholder
Interest
Influence
Stake
Concern
Meera Rao, founder and sole owner
Control, the quality of the food and the future of the business she built.
High
High
Losing the character of the food and of the business.
Employees (118)
Jobs, pay, training and the chance of promotion.
Medium
High
Growth could bring promotion, or a new owner's rules and more pressure.
Customers
Food that tastes the same every time, at a fair price.
Medium
Medium
A Marigold in a mall, or run by a franchisee, may not taste like the one they know.
Banyan Growth Partners (possible investor)
A return on its investment and a sale of its stake in five to seven years.
High
Medium
A business that grows too slowly to sell at a good price.
Sterling Malls (possible joint venture partner)
Restaurants that bring shoppers to its malls, and the rent they pay.
High
Medium
Restaurants that do not draw enough footfall.
Prospective franchisees
A profitable restaurant and real support from the brand.
Medium
High
Paying fees and royalties to a brand that cannot help them succeed, with their own savings at risk.
The bank
Interest, and repayment of the loan.
Medium
Medium
Lending against forecasts for a city Marigold has never traded in.
Tiffin Lane's owner and staff
A fair price for the owner; jobs for the staff.
Low
High
Closures and new rules after a sale.
Local farms and dairies
Steady orders at fair prices.
Low
Medium
Being replaced by large suppliers if the business grows.
05
Section 05: Strategic alternatives
Organic growth in Mumbai
Open four company-owned restaurants in Mumbai over two years.
Requires
₹72m, of which ₹52m is borrowed; an area manager; cooks trained to Marigold's standard before each opening.
Upside
Full control of the food, the culture and the brand; growth that can be paused after the first openings.
Risks
Profit falls before it rises, because new restaurants take time to find customers and interest is due from the start. Debt magnifies a weak start.
From data to a recommendation, in the order an examiner rewards. Try your own before you read it.
Show the worked analysis
Source: Arjun Agrawal framework
DataWhat the exhibits say
Each restaurant earns ₹4.32m on ₹24m of sales (18%). The four together earn ₹17.28m, and central costs of ₹4.5m leave an operating profit of ₹12.78m (Exhibits 1 and 2).
The routes differ most in three things. Capital needed runs from ₹3m to ₹126m. Control runs from full, through shared, to diluted. And profit rises at once on some routes and only after two or more years on others (Exhibit 3).
Tiffin Lane earns ₹3.84m on ₹144m of sales, a margin under 3%, with a review rating a full point below Marigold's and staff turnover of 46% (Exhibits 4 and 5).
Only four of the forty-one franchise inquirers could fund a restaurant without borrowing (Exhibit 7).
InsightWhat it means
Marigold's advantage is its food and the cooks who make it. Any route that loosens control of the kitchen puts that advantage at risk, which is why the founder's first and third aims matter more than the forecasts suggest.
The routes that look best by year four, the acquisition and the joint venture, depend most on the things that are hardest to control. One is integrating a weaker business. The other is working with a partner whose priorities are different.
Franchising looks capital-light, but the plan needs twelve capable franchisees in two years and the evidence shows four with the means. The bottleneck is people, not money.
Organic growth lowers profit in year two, because new restaurants take time to find customers and interest is paid from the start. It is the slowest route and the one most consistent with the founder's aims.
OptionsWhat each choice does
Organic growth meets the aims on quality, control and people. It reaches a second city, but not a third, within two years.
The joint venture reaches three cities fastest with moderate capital, at the cost of shared control in the malls.
The acquisition builds the largest business and the largest forecast profit, at the cost of 30% of the company and the highest integration risk.
Franchising and staying focused sit at the two extremes, one of reach and the other of control.
RecommendationOne defensible answer
One defensible recommendation is organic growth in Mumbai, taken in steps. Open two restaurants first, and train a second head chef in Pune before each opening. Decide on the second pair only when the first pair reaches 85% of mature sales. Add the office lunch service now, because it uses spare kitchen capacity at little risk. Revisit a joint venture for mall sites only on terms that give Marigold control of the menu and a way out. This keeps the first, third and fourth aims, and moves towards the second more slowly than Meera would like.
CaveatWhen it would change
The recommendation depends on Mumbai demand coming close to the forecast and on the bank's terms. If first-year sales in Mumbai came in well below ₹22m a restaurant, the second pair should not open, and the joint venture's mall footfall would look more valuable. A founder whose first aim was reach could reasonably choose the joint venture instead.
Prompts for undergraduate and MBA seminars. They go beyond the IB course and are labelled as enrichment.
Source: Enrichment
Compare the five routes by what each does to the founder's control, the capital at risk and the speed of reaching three cities. Which of these would an investor such as Banyan Growth Partners and a founder weigh differently, and why?
The asking price for Tiffin Lane is twenty-five times its operating profit. What would have to be true of the combined business for that price to be good value?
Franchising is often described as a way to grow without capital. Using Exhibit 7, argue whether the constraint that binds Marigold's growth is capital, people or control.
Arjun Agrawal | The Business Brief, https://the-business-brief-dun.vercel.app/cases/marigold-kitchens/. Original teaching material, not an IB publication.
The organizations in the teaching cases are fictional unless a case says otherwise.