Leadership and organizational behaviour · Module 4

Change, organizational politics and conflict

Why do so many change efforts stall, who has the power to stop them, and how can conflict be resolved without destroying what it was about?

Beyond the IB course UndergraduateMBAProfessional About 18 minutes · 2,964 words · checked 16 November 2026

From the IB course to this module

The IB course covers resistance to change and force field analysis (2.1), conflict between employers and employees with conciliation and arbitration (2.7), and conflict between stakeholders (1.4). This module adds the competing theories of how organizations change, the sources and uses of power inside them, and the analytical tools of conflict management and negotiation.

Section 01: Conceptual foundation

Change management is the attempt to move an organization from one stable pattern of behaviour to another. Two views compete. The planned view treats change as a project with a beginning and an end, led from the top through stages. The emergent view treats change as continuous: organizations are always adapting, and the leader's job is to steer and amplify adjustments already under way.

Change redistributes resources, status and jobs, so it is always political. Organizational politics is the use of power to influence decisions where interests diverge. It is often treated as a pathology, but where goals conflict and information is ambiguous, politics is how organizations decide, and a change leader who refuses to engage in it usually loses to those who do.

Conflict is the perception that one party's interests are being blocked by another's. It is not always harmful: disagreement about the task can improve decisions, while conflict that becomes personal rarely does. Managing it means diagnosing what kind it is, choosing a response that fits and, where interests genuinely clash, negotiating well.

Section 02: Advanced explanation

Theories of change, and what the evidence says

The model taught most often is Kurt Lewin's three steps: unfreeze existing behaviour, move to a new state, refreeze it. Cummings, Bridgman and Brown (2016) showed that this neat sequence owes more to later writers than to Lewin, whose own work on group dynamics and action research was richer and more participative. The three steps survive as a reminder that people must first see a reason to change and that new behaviour fades unless it is embedded.

Kotter (1995) proposed eight stages: establish a sense of urgency, form a powerful guiding coalition, create and communicate a vision, remove obstacles, generate short-term wins, consolidate gains and anchor the change in the culture. Its strength is its attention to the politics of change; its evidence is the author's experience of transformation efforts rather than systematic comparison.

Beer and Nohria (2000) identified two archetypes. Theory E pursues economic value quickly and from the top, through structure, systems, incentives and often job cuts. Theory O builds organizational capability through participation, culture and learning. They argued that E alone brings short-lived gains and O alone is too slow for a firm in trouble, and that successful firms combined them, often making E's hard decisions first and using O's methods to work out how.

Weick and Quinn (1999) contrasted episodic change, intermittent and deliberate, with continuous change, ongoing and cumulative. The punctuated equilibrium view (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) holds that long periods of incremental adjustment are broken by short revolutionary ones, often triggered by a crisis or a change of leader.

Power and politics

French and Raven (1959) identified five bases of power: reward, coercive, legitimate (from position), referent (from being admired) and expert. Structural theories add that power comes from the work itself. In the strategic contingencies theory of Hickson and colleagues (1971), units gain power when they cope with uncertainty that matters to others, sit at the centre of the workflow and cannot be substituted. Pfeffer (1992) added control of resources, information and the agenda: deciding what gets discussed, and what never reaches a decision, is a quiet but potent form of power.

Mintzberg (1983) catalogued the political games played in organizations, from insurgency and alliance building to empire building, budget games and whistle-blowing. Some are corrosive; others, such as whistle-blowing or young managers challenging a failing strategy, can correct an organization that formal channels cannot.

For a change leader there are three practical consequences. First, map the power: who can block, who must implement, and whose support would bring others along. A stakeholder map is a start, but it needs the bases of power added. Second, build the coalition before announcing; Kotter's guiding coalition is a political instrument. Third, choose deliberately among the ways of dealing with resistance that Kotter and Schlesinger (1979) set out: education, participation, facilitation, negotiation, manipulation and coercion. Each works in some conditions and backfires in others. Coercion is fast but breeds resentment; participation is slow but builds commitment.

Conflict: what kind, and how to respond

Jehn (1995) distinguished task conflict, disagreement about the work itself, from relationship conflict, personal friction, and later added process conflict, about who does what. The early hope was that task conflict improves decisions while relationship conflict harms them. De Dreu and Weingart's (2003) meta-analysis was sobering: both were associated with lower team performance on average. A larger meta-analysis (de Wit, Greer and Jehn, 2012) refined the picture: task conflict was not consistently harmful, and it was positive in top management teams and where it did not spill into relationship conflict. The skill lies in keeping disagreement about ideas from becoming personal.

Thomas and Kilmann (1974) classified responses to conflict on two dimensions, assertiveness (satisfying one's own concerns) and cooperativeness (satisfying the other party's), giving five modes:

  • Competing: when quick, decisive action is vital, as in an emergency.
  • Collaborating: when both sides' concerns are too important to compromise and there is time to find an integrative solution.
  • Compromising: when goals matter but not enough to justify a harder fight, or as a fallback.
  • Avoiding: when the issue is trivial or tempers need to cool.
  • Accommodating: when the issue matters more to the other party, or to build goodwill.

Conflict also has a life cycle. Pondy (1967) traced how latent conditions become perceived and felt conflict before it becomes open, and how the aftermath of one episode sets up the next.

Negotiation: interests, alternatives and the zone of agreement

Walton and McKersie (1965), studying labour negotiations, distinguished distributive bargaining, dividing a fixed amount, from integrative bargaining, finding trades that leave both sides better off. Fisher and Ury (1981) turned this into principled negotiation: separate the people from the problem, focus on interests rather than positions, invent options for mutual gain and insist on objective criteria.

Each side's power rests on its BATNA, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement. Each side's walk-away point is its reservation value, and the overlap between the two is the zone of possible agreement (Raiffa, 1982).

A worked example. An employer can afford a pay rise of up to 4.5% before it would rather automate more of the work; the union would accept as little as 3.5% rather than strike. Any settlement from 3.5% to 4.5% beats both alternatives, and where it lands depends on skill and power. If the employer's limit were 3% and the union's 4%, there would be no zone on pay alone, and a deal would need integrative trades on other issues, such as job security, which may be worth more to employees than it costs an employer expecting growth.

First offers matter: Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) found that they act as anchors, pulling final agreements towards them. Where parties cannot agree, a mediator or conciliator helps without deciding, while an arbitrator decides. Under final-offer arbitration the arbitrator must pick one side's last offer whole, which pushes both towards reasonable positions.

Section 03: Models and frameworks

Where each comes from, how to use it, and where it stops being useful.

Lewin (1947); Cummings, Bridgman and Brown (2016)

The three-step change model

Change means unfreezing current behaviour by showing why it cannot continue, moving to new behaviour, and refreezing it through structures, routines and rewards. Force field analysis weighs the forces driving the change against those restraining it.

How to use it

Before a change, list the driving and restraining forces and their strength. It is usually more effective to weaken restraining forces, such as fears about jobs or skills, than to push harder on the driving ones, which tends to raise resistance.

Where it fails

The tidy sequence is largely a later simplification of Lewin's work. Refreezing sits awkwardly with organizations that must change continuously, and the model says little about power or about who decides what the new state should be.

Kurt Lewin (1947). Frontiers in Group Dynamics: Concept, Method and Reality in Social Science; Social Equilibria and Social Change. Human Relations, vol. 1, no. 1. Stephen Cummings, Todd Bridgman and Kenneth G. Brown (2016). Unfreezing change as three steps: rethinking Kurt Lewin's legacy for change management. Human Relations, 69(1).

Kotter (1995)

The eight-stage process

Transformations fail through predictable errors: too little urgency, a weak guiding coalition, a vision that is missing or poorly communicated, obstacles left in place, no short-term wins, victory declared too soon, and change never anchored in the culture.

How to use it

Use the stages as a diagnostic for a change already under way: which stage was skipped or rushed? Plan short-term wins deliberately, because they fund credibility for the harder later stages.

Where it fails

The evidence is the author's consulting experience rather than controlled comparison. The sequence assumes top-down, episodic change, and a manufactured sense of urgency can produce compliance and anxiety rather than commitment.

John P. Kotter (1995). Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail. Harvard Business Review.

Thomas and Kilmann (1974)

Conflict-handling modes

Five modes, competing, collaborating, compromising, avoiding and accommodating, arise from combining high or low assertiveness with high or low cooperativeness. None is best in general; each fits certain stakes, time pressures and relationships.

How to use it

Before a difficult conversation, decide which mode the situation calls for rather than defaulting to your habitual one. Ask how important the issue is to each side, how much time there is and how much the relationship matters later.

Where it fails

The instrument measures stated preferences, not behaviour under pressure. It treats conflict as a two-party choice and ignores the institutions, such as law, unions and procedures, that shape real disputes.

Kenneth W. Thomas and Ralph H. Kilmann (1974). Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument. Xicom. Kenneth W. Thomas (1976). Conflict and conflict management. In M. D. Dunnette (ed.), Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Rand McNally.

Fisher and Ury (1981)

Principled negotiation

Negotiate on interests rather than positions, generate options before deciding, use objective criteria, and know your BATNA. Integrative solutions exist wherever the parties value the issues differently.

How to use it

Prepare by writing down both sides' interests, BATNAs and reservation values, and by listing issues each side values more than the other does. Trade across those issues instead of splitting the difference on one.

Where it fails

It can be naive about power: a party with a strong BATNA may gain little from principled methods. Where values or identities are at stake rather than interests, trade-offs may be seen as betrayal.

Roger Fisher and William Ury (1981). Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. Houghton Mifflin. Howard Raiffa (1982). The Art and Science of Negotiation. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Section 04: Real business applications

Real organizations appear only with dated, cited facts; illustrative examples are labelled.

Real organization, 2023-05

Vodafone: "Vodafone must change" (2023)

On 16 May 2023, less than three weeks after being appointed group chief executive, Margherita Della Valle presented Vodafone's results with a blunt message: performance had not been good enough and, to deliver consistently, Vodafone must change. After a five-month strategic review the company noted that European telecoms had earned returns on capital below their cost of capital for over a decade, that Vodafone's comparative performance had worsened, and that it was "more complex than we need to be". The plan named three priorities, customers, simplicity and growth, including investment reallocated to customer experience and brand and 11,000 role reductions over three years across headquarters and local markets.

Interpretation. The announcement follows Kotter's first stage closely, building urgency from an external benchmark and a candid admission rather than exhortation. Its opening moves are mostly Theory E: structure, cost and portfolio. Whether the later stages, which depend on the commitment of those who remain, succeed cannot be judged from an announcement.

Real organization, 2025-11

Novo Nordisk: a transformation and a contest for control (2025)

In July 2025 Novo Nordisk appointed a new chief executive; its chair said the company needed to address recent market challenges with speed and ambition. On 10 September 2025 it announced a company-wide transformation to simplify the organization, speed decisions and redirect resources to diabetes and obesity, cutting about 9,000 of 78,400 positions, around 5,000 of them in Denmark, for annual savings of about DKK 8 billion by the end of 2026. The chief executive spoke of instilling an increased performance-based culture.

The pace of change was itself contested. At an extraordinary general meeting on 14 November 2025 the outgoing chair explained that the board had been unable to reach a common understanding with the Novo Nordisk Foundation, the controlling shareholder, on governance and board composition; the Foundation's chair said it had wanted the company to act with greater urgency than the outgoing board found necessary. The Foundation's candidates, including its own chair, were elected with more than 93% of the votes cast. The company's supplementary count showed that, excluding the main shareholder, 38.70% of votes cast supported the new chair.

Interpretation. Power over the change lay with whoever controlled the votes, the clearest possible case of structural power.

Real organization, 2025-06

Nippon Steel and U. S. Steel: from opposition to a negotiated settlement (2024 to 2025)

In March 2024, while its planned acquisition of U. S. Steel was under regulatory review, Nippon Steel said it had offered the United Steelworkers union significant commitments in continuing efforts to reach a mutually agreeable resolution: job and pension security, capital investment, technology sharing and the ability to enforce obligations after closing, including an extra $1.4 billion of investment and no layoffs or plant closures as a result of the deal. On 18 June 2025 the companies completed the deal under a National Security Agreement with the US government. Nippon Steel committed about $11 billion of new investment by 2028; U. S. Steel would keep its name and Pittsburgh headquarters, with a majority of US-citizen directors and US-citizen key managers. A golden share gives the US government the right to appoint one independent director and consent rights over matters including cuts to committed investment, moving production or jobs abroad and some plant closures.

Interpretation. The acquirer turned opponents' interests, jobs, national security and identity, into enforceable commitments, paying for the deal partly in managerial freedom.

Section 05: Case studies

Fictional case, simulated figures

Larkspur Logistics: automating the night shift

Larkspur Logistics, a fictional warehouse operator with a £24m annual payroll, is installing automated picking at its largest site. Management wants to remove 60 night-shift roles, cut the night premium and hold the pay rise down; the recognized union wants no compulsory redundancies, a large pay rise and the premium kept. Both sides have privately told a conciliator their real limits, shown below. The conciliator also knows that about 28 night-shift staff are expected to leave voluntarily over the next 18 months, and that the new automated hub at a nearby site needs 12 people with the skills the night shift already has.

Opening positions and private limits, as told to the conciliator
Issue Management opening Management limit Union opening Union limit
Pay rise in year one2.0%4.5%7.0%3.5%
Compulsory redundancies60at least 400at most 15
Night premium (share of base pay)15%20%25%20%

Simulated figures. A limit is the least favourable term each side would accept rather than walk away.

Questions

  1. Identify the zone of possible agreement on each issue, if there is one. What is each percentage point of pay worth?
  2. Using the information in the situation, show how separating interests from positions could resolve the redundancy issue.
  3. Which conflict-handling mode does each side's opening position reflect, and which would serve each side better?
  4. If talks fail, would you recommend conciliation to continue or final-offer arbitration? Explain the incentives each creates.

Section 06: Critical evaluation

What the evidence supports, where the debate is, and what the models leave out.

Failure rates. The claim that around 70% of change programmes fail is repeated widely. Hughes (2011) traced it to its sources and found no valid empirical basis: the figure comes from assertions and unpublished surveys that never said how success was measured. Change is hard, but its failure rate is not known.

The models. Lewin's three steps and Kotter's eight stages are practitioner frameworks, valued for clarity rather than tested in controlled comparisons. The cases used to support them are selected after the event, which favours stories in which following the model coincided with success. Beer and Nohria's synthesis is persuasive but also case-based.

Resistance. Ford, Ford and D'Amelio (2008) argued that resistance is partly a label that change agents attach to legitimate concerns, and that it often carries useful information about flaws in the plan. Treating every objection as resistance to be overcome can destroy that information.

Conflict. The evidence on task conflict is mixed: it helps in some teams and settings and harms in others, and studies measure it differently. Advice to encourage constructive conflict should be read with that in mind.

Power and ethics. Research on politics is largely descriptive, and its prescriptions raise ethical questions. Several of Kotter and Schlesinger's methods, notably manipulation and co-optation, work by withholding information or offering roles to buy compliance; they may succeed once and damage trust permanently.

Institutions. Negotiation research is strongest in experiments; real disputes are shaped by law, collective agreements and national practice, which differ greatly between countries. A model of two parties bargaining freely is a simplification.

Section 07: Decision exercise

A fictional situation. Decide before you read the guidance.

Cut first, or design together first?

Harlow Building Society, a fictional mutual lender with 2,400 staff, has lost money for two years, and its regulator wants a credible plan within six months. The new chief executive believes about 300 roles must go and the branch network must shrink, but the people who know where the costs and the customers' frustrations really sit are branch and operations staff, whose union is wary of any plan made without them.

  1. A. Theory E first

    Announce the cost target, the new structure and the branch closures at once, and consult only on implementation.

  2. B. Theory O first

    Spend three months on joint diagnosis and design with staff and the union, and decide the cuts afterwards.

  3. C. Fix the what, design the how together

    Announce the non-negotiables now (cost target, deadline, no weakening of lending standards) and give joint teams of staff and managers eight weeks to propose how to meet them.

Judge the options on

  • Speed and credibility with the regulator
  • Quality of the redesign
  • Trust and retention of key staff
  • Risk that opponents block or capture the process
  • Legal duties to consult
Read the guidance

The binding constraint is time: the regulator needs a credible plan within six months, so a pure B risks producing an excellent design too late, and invites capture by those who would prefer no cuts. A pure A is fast and credible to the regulator but throws away the knowledge of the people who see where costs and customer pain lie, and it makes the union an opponent from the first day.

C combines the archetypes in the sequence Beer and Nohria observed in successful changes: the economic decision is made from the top and stated plainly, which supplies urgency and limits capture, while the method of meeting it is designed with the people who must deliver it, which improves the design and builds commitment. It also satisfies duties to consult more naturally than an announcement does. Its risk is that joint teams return proposals that miss the target; the guard against that is to agree in advance that management will decide if the eight weeks produce no adequate plan, a form of consensus with qualification.

Section 08: Further reading

  • Kurt Lewin (1947). Frontiers in Group Dynamics: Concept, Method and Reality in Social Science; Social Equilibria and Social Change. Human Relations, vol. 1, no. 1.

    Lewin's original article; read it to see how far it differs from the three-step summary.

  • Stephen Cummings, Todd Bridgman and Kenneth G. Brown (2016). Unfreezing change as three steps: rethinking Kurt Lewin's legacy for change management. Human Relations, 69(1).

    How the three-step model was constructed after Lewin, and what was lost.

  • John P. Kotter (1995). Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail. Harvard Business Review.

    The eight errors of transformation, concise and still widely used.

  • Michael Beer and Nitin Nohria (2000). Cracking the code of change. Harvard Business Review 78(3).

    Theory E and Theory O, and the argument for combining them.

  • Jeffrey Pfeffer (1992). Managing with Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations. Harvard Business School Press.

    A frank account of where power comes from in organizations and how it is used.

  • Roger Fisher and William Ury (1981). Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. Houghton Mifflin.

    The standard introduction to principled negotiation.

  • Frank R. C. de Wit, Lindred L. Greer and Karen A. Jehn (2012). The paradox of intragroup conflict: a meta-analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 97(2).

    The best current evidence on when conflict in teams helps or harms.

Every work cited here is listed in the platform's sources register. Real organizations appear only with facts from the sources shown; everything else is labelled illustrative or fictional.