No. 05 The Boardroom Briefings Crisis leadership
How should a CEO manage a major organizational crisis?
Velantra Cold Chain's systems go dark at three in the morning
Criminals have locked a cold-chain distributor out of its own warehouses, with hospitals, pharmacies and supermarkets waiting for deliveries. The chief executive has hours, not weeks, to decide how to lead.
- Company
- Velantra Cold Chain, Columbus, Ohio, United States
- Industry
- Logistics and distribution
- Decision
- Crisis leadership
- Functions
- Strategy and management, Operations management, Human resource management, Marketing, Finance and accounts
- Key concepts
- Ethics, Change
- Editions
- Student, then Analysis
You are reading the Student edition. The recommendation is withheld.
This briefing has two editions. The Student edition comes first: the case and the questions. The Analysis edition follows it, closed, so that you can decide before you read the recommendation.
The edition switch could not start. Both editions are on the page: the Analysis edition follows the Student edition.
The Student edition
Section 01: Executive summary
The decision in brief. In this edition the summary stops short of a recommendation.
The situation
At three in the morning on a Monday, ransomware encrypted the systems that run Velantra Cold Chain's three warehouses and its delivery routes. The cold stores are still cold, but nobody can see what is in them or plan a delivery. Forty-six hospital deliveries, mostly temperature-sensitive medicines, are due in the next 72 hours.
The decision
How the chief executive should lead the company through the crisis: rebuild the systems safely from offline backups while running a manual service for the most urgent customers, restore quickly from the latest backup and accept the risk of reinfection, pay the criminals for a key, or hand the deliveries to competitors until the systems are rebuilt.
What is at stake
Patients waiting for medicines, supermarket shelves, the jobs of 1,100 people and the trust of every customer are at stake. What the chief executive does and says in the first hours will shape how all of them judge the company long after the systems are back.
Section 02: Business background
Velantra Cold Chain stores and delivers food and medicines that must be kept cold: chilled and frozen food for two supermarket chains, medicines for independent pharmacies, and vaccines and other temperature-sensitive medicines for four hospital systems in Ohio. It runs three warehouses and 140 refrigerated trucks and employs 1,100 people. In 2025 it earned revenue of US$214.0m and an operating profit of US$12.8m (Exhibit 3).
Dana Okafor became chief executive in 2023, after the company was bought by a private equity firm, which owns 70%; the managers own the rest. Under her the company tested its contingency plan every quarter: offline backups of its systems were kept apart from the network and restored in practice, and a crisis team was named. The plan did not say how to deliver without the warehouse system.
The attack came in the early hours of a Monday (Exhibit 1). By the time Dana convened the crisis team, the IT director had cut the network off from the internet, the temperature loggers in the cold stores, which run on their own, showed every store at the right temperature, and the attackers had demanded US$4.5m for a key to unlock the systems.
- Company
- Velantra Cold Chain
- Business
- Temperature-controlled distribution of food and medicines
- Based in
- Columbus, Ohio, United States
- Size
- Three warehouses, 140 refrigerated trucks, 1,100 employees and revenue of US$214.0m in 2025
- Ownership
- Privately held company, 70% owned by a private equity firm and 30% by its managers
- Figures in
- USD, in thousands (US$000)
- Status
- A fictional company. Every figure is simulated for teaching and checked for consistency.
Section 03: Strategic context
The industry and the forces on the decision, in general terms. The only figures in this briefing are the company's own.
Cold-chain distribution sits between producers and the shops, pharmacies and hospitals that depend on it. Its customers plan on deliveries arriving on time and at the right temperature, and many hold only a few days of stock. When a distributor stops, the effects spread quickly, and for medicines they can reach patients.
Ransomware attacks encrypt an organization's systems and demand payment for the key. Attackers increasingly copy data before they encrypt it, and threaten to publish it. Paying does not guarantee that the key works, that the data is destroyed or that the attackers will not return, and the authorities in many countries advise organizations not to pay.
In a crisis, the first hours matter most. Customers, employees, regulators and the media all want to know what has happened and what the organization is doing about it. Silence is filled by rumour, and a statement that later proves wrong is hard to take back.
Section 04: Relevant evidence
The company's own evidence (simulated), established research (cited, and stated only as its central idea) and how the market works.
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The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data
A business that can afford any response
Velantra ended 2025 with US$9,600k in cash and an undrawn credit facility of US$15,000k (Exhibit 3). Even the costliest outcome in the incident team's estimates, US$9,280k if a fast restore is reinfected, would not exhaust that. The choice is not about whether the company can pay, but about what it should do.
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The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data
Who is waiting
In the next 72 hours Velantra is due to make 46 deliveries to hospitals, 1,280 to pharmacies and 410 to supermarket stores (Exhibit 2). Hospitals bring 18% of revenue and supermarkets 58%, but the hospitals' medicines are the deliveries that cannot wait.
See Exhibit 2
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The company’s own evidence Source: Simulated data
Four responses, costed
The incident team has estimated the cost of each response, with probabilities where the outcome is uncertain (Exhibit 4). Rebuilding from offline backups takes seven days and costs about US$3,920k. Restoring from last night's backup takes two days if it works, but the team puts the chance of reinfection at 35%.
See Exhibit 4
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Established research Cited research
The response should match the responsibility
Situational crisis communication theory holds that an organization's response should fit how much responsibility the public attributes to it. When it is seen as a victim, information and support for those affected come first; when it is seen as at fault, it needs to accept responsibility and make amends.
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How the market works General context
What customers need to hear
In any supply crisis, customers need to know three things quickly: whether their orders will arrive, when they will hear more, and whom to call. Telling them early, even with incomplete information, usually does less damage than telling them late.
The exhibits
The first six hours
Source: Simulated data- Hour 1 Every screen in the three warehouses shows a ransom note. The warehouse system, route planning and the customer portal stop.
- Hour 2 The night manager calls the IT director, who disconnects the network from the internet to stop the attack spreading.
- Hour 3 Dana Okafor convenes the crisis team by phone. The temperature loggers in the cold stores, which run on their own, show every store in range.
- Hour 4 The IT director confirms that the offline backups were not touched. The forensic firm on the insurer's panel is called in.
- Hour 5 The first trucks should be loading. Drivers arrive and are asked to wait.
- Hour 6 The attackers' note demands US$4.5m in cryptocurrency within 72 hours, and claims they have copied customer data.
Deliveries due in the next 72 hours
Source: Simulated data| Customers | Deliveries due | What they carry |
|---|---|---|
| Hospitals (four systems) | 46 | Vaccines, insulin and other temperature-sensitive medicines |
| Independent pharmacies | 1,280 | Medicines, some refrigerated |
| Supermarket stores (two chains) | 410 | Chilled and frozen food |
Section 05: Financial information
Exhibit 3 gives Velantra's results and liquidity at the end of 2025, with its revenue by kind of customer. Exhibit 4 sets out the incident team's estimates for each response: the days of reduced service, the loss for each of those days, the cost of the incident response, stock that would spoil, and the ransom or a lost contract where they apply. Where an outcome is uncertain, the response has two branches, each with its probability.
Velantra Cold Chain in 2025 (US$000)
Source: Simulated data| Item | 2025 |
|---|---|
| Revenue | 214,000 |
| from supermarkets (58%) | 124,120 |
| from pharmacies (24%) | 51,360 |
| from hospitals (18%) | 38,520 |
| Operating profit | 12,840 |
| Operating profit margin (%) | 6 |
| Cash at the year end | 9,600 |
| Undrawn credit facility | 15,000 |
A cyber insurance policy covers incident response costs up to US$5,000k after the first US$500k, but not lost business or a ransom.
The incident team's estimates for each response (US$000)
Source: Simulated data| Response and outcome | Days of reduced service | Loss a day | Incident response | Spoiled stock | Ransom or lost contract | Probability | Total cost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A. Rebuild from offline backups, with a manual service for urgent customers | 7 | 260 | 1,200 | 900 | 0 | 1.00 | 3,920 |
| B. Restore fast from last night's backup: it works | 2 | 420 | 1,200 | 500 | 0 | 0.65 | 2,540 |
| B. Restore fast from last night's backup: reinfected | 14 | 420 | 1,800 | 1,600 | 0 | 0.35 | 9,280 |
| C. Pay the ransom: the key works | 2 | 420 | 1,200 | 500 | 4,500 | 0.60 | 7,040 |
| C. Pay the ransom: the key fails | 7 | 260 | 1,200 | 900 | 4,500 | 0.40 | 8,420 |
| D. Hand deliveries to competitors for three weeks: customers stay | 21 | 150 | 1,200 | 300 | 0 | 0.70 | 4,650 |
| D. Hand deliveries to competitors for three weeks: a supermarket leaves | 21 | 150 | 1,200 | 300 | 4,000 | 0.30 | 8,650 |
A full day without service loses US$420k of contribution and penalties; a day of manual service for urgent customers loses US$260k. Under D, the loss a day is the premium paid to the competitors. If a supermarket moves its contract, the contribution lost over the following year is US$4,000k. The probabilities are the incident team's judgement.
Section 06: Stakeholder implications
Who has a stake in the decision, how much they care and how much they can affect it, what they want, and what the decision would mean for them.
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Hospitals and their patients
- What they want
- Their medicines on time and at the right temperature, and honest warning if they will not be.
- What the decision means for them
- Forty-six deliveries are due in 72 hours. A manual service that puts them first protects patients; a response that fails halfway would leave the hospitals finding other suppliers at the last moment.
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Pharmacies and supermarkets
- What they want
- Their orders, or enough notice to buy elsewhere; the supermarkets can move their contracts.
- What the decision means for them
- Most of Velantra's revenue comes from them. They will forgive a delay they are told about more readily than one they discover, and they will remember who supplied them in the meantime.
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Employees
- What they want
- To know what is happening, to be paid, and to be able to help.
- What the decision means for them
- A manual service depends on drivers and warehouse staff working from paper lists and phone calls, often for long hours; their goodwill is part of the response.
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The owners and the board
- What they want
- A recovery that protects the value of the business and its reputation.
- What the decision means for them
- The private equity firm will want the cost contained; the board must also weigh what the company would become if it paid criminals.
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Regulators and the authorities
- What they want
- Prompt notice of the attack and of any data taken, and no payments to criminals.
- What the decision means for them
- If customer data was copied, Velantra must notify those affected. Paying a ransom could break the law if the attackers are on a sanctions list.
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The insurer
- What they want
- A recovery that follows its panel firms' advice and keeps the claim down.
- What the decision means for them
- Covers incident response costs up to US$5,000k after the first US$500k, but not lost business or a ransom.
Section 07: The strategic options
The courses of action open to the board. Each is set out on its own terms; the Analysis edition judges them.
Section 08: Evaluation criteria
How the board has said it will judge the options, and how much each criterion counts. The weights add up to 100.
| Criterion | How it is judged | Weight |
|---|---|---|
| Patients and customers | Whether the most urgent deliveries arrive safely, and how well every customer is served and informed. | 30% |
| Expected cost | The expected cost of the response, from the incident team's estimates and probabilities. | 20% |
| Time to recover | How quickly full service would return. | 15% |
| Law and ethics | Whether the response is lawful, and whether the company could defend it to its customers, staff and the public. | 20% |
| Trust and reputation | How customers, staff and regulators would judge the company once the crisis is over. | 15% |
Section 09: Discussion questions
Answer them before you open the Analysis edition, which has notes on each.
In the style of the IB course
The platform's own questions, written for this briefing; they are not IB examination questions. The marks are each question's own allocation.
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Using Exhibit 4, calculate the expected cost of option B and of option C.
[4 marks]
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Distinguish between crisis management and contingency planning, using Velantra Cold Chain as an example.
[4 marks]
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Explain two barriers to communication that Velantra's chief executive faces in the first day of the crisis.
[4 marks]
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Discuss which leadership style Velantra's chief executive should use in the first 72 hours of the crisis.
[10 marks]
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Evaluate the chief executive's options for responding to the attack.
[10 marks]
HL-only questions are hidden in the SL view. Choose HL above to see them.
For seminars, beyond the course
For undergraduate, MBA and professional readers. These questions go beyond the IB course and are labelled as enrichment.
- How much responsibility will customers attribute to Velantra for an attack by criminals? What does that imply for the tone of its first statement?
- Should a company ever pay a ransom? Consider who gains and who loses if it does.
- What should a board have in place before an attack, and what can only be decided during one?
The Analysis edition The worked discussion: the evidence, the assumptions, every option judged and the recommendation. Open it when you have decided. About 7 minutes to read.
The Analysis edition
From here, the page gives the platform's reading of the case: its interpretation of the evidence, its judgement and its recommendation. It adds no new facts, and the same evidence can support other conclusions if they are argued well.
Section A1: Executive summary
Recommended Option A: Contain, rebuild and serve the urgent customers by hand
Contain and rebuild, and serve the most urgent customers by hand (option A). It has the lowest expected cost of the four responses (US$3,920k, against US$4,899k for a fast restore, US$5,850k for handing deliveries to competitors and US$7,592k for paying the ransom), it protects the hospitals' medicines first, and it pays nothing to criminals. Its success depends less on the systems than on leadership: decisive priorities from the chief executive, honest and regular communication with every customer and employee, and the staff's willingness to work by hand for a week.
Section A2: What the evidence shows
The exhibits worked through. Every figure here is recomputed from the exhibits on every build.
- On the incident team's estimates, A is both the cheapest response and the only certain one: US$3,920k against expected costs of US$4,899k for B, US$7,592k for C and US$5,850k for D (Exhibit A1).
- The fast restore looks cheap only if it works: US$2,540k. With a 35% chance of reinfection costing US$9,280k, it is the riskiest option, and a second outage would destroy the customers' confidence that A protects.
- Paying the ransom is the most expensive response even when the key works, US$7,040k, and the copied data may be published anyway. Its legal and ethical risks are not in the numbers at all.
- The company can afford any response: cash and undrawn credit of US$24,600k cover the worst outcome in Exhibit 4 more than twice over. The decision is about safety, trust and conduct, not survival.
Expected cost of each response (US$000)
Source: Simulated data| Response | Best outcome | Worst outcome | Expected cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| A. Contain, rebuild and serve the urgent customers by hand | 3,920 | 3,920 | 3,920 |
| B. Restore fast from last night's backup | 2,540 | 9,280 | 4,899 |
| C. Pay the ransom for a key | 7,040 | 8,420 | 7,592 |
| D. Hand the deliveries to competitors | 4,650 | 8,650 | 5,850 |
The expected cost weights each outcome by the incident team's probability, as in a decision tree. It does not count the legal and ethical risks of paying a ransom, or the damage a second outage would do to customers' trust.
Section A3: The assumptions
What the analysis takes as given, and how a manager would test it before relying on it.
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The offline backups are clean and can be restored in seven days.
How to test it They were tested every quarter, and the IT director confirmed they were untouched. The forensic firm should confirm it before restoring.
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Staff can run a manual service for urgent customers.
How to test it Ask the warehouse supervisors and drivers in the first hours, and start with the 46 hospital deliveries, which are few enough to plan by hand.
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The incident team's probabilities are right.
How to test it They are judgements made in hours. Exhibit A1 shows that B would still cost more than A even with a much lower chance of reinfection.
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Customers will accept a week of reduced service if they are told honestly.
How to test it Ask the largest customers directly on the first day what they most need, and agree priorities with them.
Section A4: The trade-offs
What the board gives up to get what it wants. No option avoids all of them.
Speed, or control
A fast restore or a ransom promises speed; containing and rebuilding keeps control. The guide's factors in effective crisis management include both, and here control has to come first, because a second outage would cost more than a slow first recovery.
Transparency, or certainty
The chief executive will not know for days whether data was copied or when service will return. Speaking early with what is known, and saying what is not, earns more trust than waiting for certainty.
The urgent, or the important
Supermarkets bring most of the revenue; hospitals bring the deliveries that cannot wait. A manual service cannot do everything, and the chief executive has to say openly who comes first.
Section A5: The alternatives, judged
Every option judged against the evidence, then scored against the board's criteria.
The options scored against the board's criteria
Each option is scored from 1 (poor) to 5 (strong) on each criterion. The weighted score is the sum of each weight times its score, divided by 100. The scores are the analysis's judgement; a scoring matrix organizes judgement, it does not replace it.
| Criterion | Weight | Option A | Option B | Option C | Option D |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Patients and customers | 30% | 5 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Expected cost | 20% | 5 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| Time to recover | 15% | 2 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Law and ethics | 20% | 5 | 3 | 1 | 5 |
| Trust and reputation | 15% | 5 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Weighted score | 100% | 4.55 (the highest) | 2.70 | 2.05 | 3.70 |
Section A6: The recommended course of action
Option A: Contain, rebuild and serve the urgent customers by hand
Keep the systems shut until the forensic firm clears them and rebuild from the offline backups. Run a manual service from the first morning: hospital deliveries first, then pharmacies' refrigerated medicines, then the rest. Tell every customer, employee and regulator within 24 hours what has happened, what will and will not arrive, and when they will hear more, and update them every 12 hours. Do not pay the ransom.
Why
- It has the lowest expected cost and the only certain outcome.
- It puts the medicines patients need ahead of everything else.
- It is lawful and defensible, and it pays nothing to criminals.
- Honest, regular communication turns a week of disruption into evidence that the company can be trusted in a crisis.
On these conditions
If the manual service cannot reach the hospitals, the chief executive should arrange for a competitor to carry those deliveries at once, taking that part of option D, rather than let a single patient go without.
Section A7: Implementation
What happens, in what order, and who answers for it.
- Hours 1 to 6 Name a single crisis lead for each stream (systems, deliveries, communications, legal); confirm the backups are untouched; bring in the forensic firm; inform the authorities. Chief executive
- Hours 6 to 24 Rebuild the delivery schedule from customers' emails and paper records; run the 46 hospital deliveries by hand; speak to every hospital and the largest customers directly. Operations director with the warehouse supervisors
- Hours 12 to 24 Issue the first statement to customers, employees and regulators, saying what is known, what is not, and when the next update will come; brief staff before the public. Chief executive and head of communications
- Days 2 to 7 Restore systems from the offline backups once cleared; extend the manual service to pharmacies, then supermarkets; update everyone every 12 hours; notify anyone whose data was copied. IT director and operations director
- Weeks 2 to 6 Review what happened, close the gap in the contingency plan by adding a tested manual delivery procedure, and report openly to customers on what has changed. The board
Section A8: Evaluation: how to tell if it is working
The evaluation criteria, applied after the decision: what to measure, what counts as working, and when to look.
| Measure | Target | Reviewed |
|---|---|---|
| Urgent deliveries | Every one of the 46 hospital deliveries made on time and at the right temperature. | Every few hours in the first week |
| Recovery | Full service restored within the seven days of the plan, with no reinfection. | Every day |
| Communication | Every customer and employee told within 24 hours, with an update every 12 hours until service is restored. | Every day |
| Customers kept | No contract lost as a result of the attack, six months on. | After six months |
Section A9: Limitations
What the analysis cannot see, and what would change its recommendation.
The limits of the analysis
- The probabilities and costs in Exhibit 4 are judgements made in the first hours of a crisis, and could prove badly wrong.
- The analysis cannot know whether customer data was copied, which would add costs and obligations to every option.
- The expected costs compare averages; a board may rightly care more about the worst outcome than about the average.
What would change the recommendation
- If the offline backups proved damaged, the case for option A would weaken, and handing more deliveries to competitors (D) would grow.
- If patients' safety could be protected in no other way, the case against handing deliveries to rivals would fall away entirely.
- If the authorities confirmed that the attackers' key works and that no data was taken, the economics of paying would change, though its ethics would not.
Section A10: Notes on the discussion questions
What a strong answer to each discussion question does. Guidance, not a markscheme.
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Question 1 [4 marks]HL
Expected value = the sum of each outcome times its probability. B: 0.65 × 2,540 + 0.35 × 9,280 = 1,651 + 3,248 = US$4,899k. C: 0.60 × 7,040 + 0.40 × 8,420 = 4,224 + 3,368 = US$7,592k. Both are higher than A's certain US$3,920k. Two marks for each, with the working.
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Question 2 [4 marks]HL
Contingency planning is done before a crisis: Velantra's offline backups, tested every quarter, and its named crisis team. Crisis management is the response once it happens: the decisions Dana Okafor's team takes in the first hours. The case also shows a gap in the plan: no way to deliver without the warehouse system.
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Question 3 [4 marks]
The company's own systems, including the customer portal, are down; many audiences need different messages at once; the facts are uncertain, so early statements may have to change; rumour fills any silence. Each barrier explained with its effect in the case.
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Question 4 [10 marks]
Strong answers argue that a crisis calls for fast, clear decisions (an autocratic element), while the crisis team's expertise and the staff's goodwill call for consultation (democratic and situational elements). Many conclude that a situational style, decisive on the priorities and open in how they are carried out, fits best.
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Question 5 [10 marks]HL
Good answers use the expected costs (A US$3,920k, B US$4,899k, C US$7,592k, D US$5,850k) but go beyond them: the hospitals' medicines, the legal and ethical case against paying, the risk to customers' trust under B and D, and the factors in effective crisis management (transparency, communication, speed and control).
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Seminar question 1 Enrichment
Customers may see Velantra as a victim of the attack, but as responsible for its preparedness and its response. Good answers suggest a statement that is informative and supportive, and accepts responsibility for putting things right without speculating about the cause.
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Seminar question 2 Enrichment
Arguments for: lives or essential services at risk, no other way to recover. Against: no guarantee, legal risk, funding crime and encouraging more attacks on others. Good answers separate the company's interest from society's.
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Seminar question 3 Enrichment
Before: tested offline backups, a named crisis team, a manual way to serve the most critical customers, prepared statements and agreed authority to spend. During: the judgement calls, such as how long to wait for forensic clearance, which only the facts of the attack can settle.
Notes on HL-only questions are hidden in the SL view.
The course and beyond
Where this briefing meets the IB course, and, kept apart and labelled, the ideas it draws on from beyond it.
Subtopics
- 5.7 Crisis management and contingency planning HL Crisis management against contingency planning, and the factors in effective crisis management: transparency, communication, speed and control.
- 5.9 Management information systems HL Cybersecurity and cybercrime, and the risks of depending on management information systems.
- 2.3 Leadership and management Which leadership style suits the first hours of a crisis.
- 2.6 Communication Formal communication with many audiences when the usual channels are down, and the barriers to it.
- 1.4 Stakeholders Stakeholders whose needs conflict in a crisis: patients, customers, staff, owners and regulators.
- 3.7 Cash flow Liquidity: whether the business has the cash and credit to see the crisis through.
Frameworks in the course
- Decision trees IB toolkit Weigh the four responses by their expected costs, with the incident team's probabilities on the uncertain branches.
- Leadership styles IB syllabus Choose the style for each phase of the crisis, from the first hours to the review.
Course terms
Ideas beyond the course
- Situational crisis communication Situational crisis communication theory asks first how much responsibility the public will attribute to the organization, and chooses the response to fit: information and care for those affected when it is seen as a victim, apology and amends when it is seen as at fault. A cyberattack sits between the two: the attack is not Velantra's fault, but its preparation and its response are its own. Source: W. Timothy Coombs (2007), Protecting organization reputations during a crisis: the development and application of situational crisis communication theory
Frameworks beyond the course
- Mendelow's matrix Enrichment Decide whom to tell first and how closely to manage each stakeholder through the week.
- The RACI matrix Enrichment Make clear who is responsible, accountable, consulted and informed for each stream of the response.
Go further: Advanced Management
- Strategy execution, change and crisis Beyond the IB course Advanced strategy: the module behind this decision, with real organizations, models and a decision exercise.
- Leadership under uncertainty and executive decision-making Beyond the IB course Leadership and organizational behaviour: the module behind this decision, with real organizations, models and a decision exercise.
Work it through
The platform's tools that apply the briefing's ideas to its figures, or to your own.
- Strategy Studio Decision tree builder Build the decision tree for the four responses and test the probabilities.
- Strategy Studio Stakeholder map Map the stakeholders and plan the communication with each.
- IB toolkit guide Decision trees The toolkit guide to decision trees and expected values.
- Financial Laboratory Current ratio Check Velantra's liquidity before and during the crisis.
Sources and method
- Method How the Boardroom Briefings and their figures were made, Arjun Agrawal | The Business Brief (2026). The platform’s own method.
- Research Protecting organization reputations during a crisis: the development and application of situational crisis communication theory, W. Timothy Coombs, Corporate Reputation Review 10(3) (2007). Cited as a reference; not opened for this release.
Arjun Agrawal | The Business Brief, https://the-business-brief-dun.vercel.app/boardroom-briefings/leading-through-a-crisis/. Original teaching material, not an IB publication. The organizations in the teaching cases are fictional unless a case says otherwise.