Case file · Healthcare

Silvertree Clinics

A Cape Town clinic network is losing nearly a third of its nurses a year, and a pay rise has already failed to stop them.

Source: Simulated data Fictional organization Intermediate Updated 3 November 2026

The decision

How should Silvertree keep its nurses, now that a pay rise has not worked?

Thirty nurses left Silvertree's six clinics in 2025, and every vacancy was covered by agency nurses who cost more and do not know the patients. Agency costs rose by more than half, waiting times lengthened, and patients rated their care lower at the clinics that lost most staff. A pay rise in January made more nurses feel fairly paid, but turnover rose anyway. The new head of people has evidence on why nurses leave and five costed options, and the cheapest one on paper does nothing about the cause.

Organization
Silvertree Clinics
Sector
Private primary health care (family medicine clinics)
Location
Cape Town, South Africa
Size
Six clinics, 210 employees, of whom 96 are nurses
Legal form
Private company, owned by its two founding doctors and an investor
Figures in
ZAR (R), millions of rand (R m), and rand for costs per nurse or shift
Functions
Human resource management, Finance and accounts
For
IB DP SL, IB DP HL, Undergraduate
Key concepts
Ethics, Sustainability
Status
Fictional case. An invented organization. Every figure is simulated for teaching and checked for consistency.

Section 01: The story so far

Two doctors, Pieter van Wyk and Aisha Patel, opened the first Silvertree clinic in Observatory in 2012, offering family medicine at prices that working families could afford. There are now six Silvertree clinics across Cape Town, from Sea Point to Mitchells Plain, with 210 employees. In 2019 the founders sold a share of the company to an investor, Atlantic Health Partners, to fund the last three clinics. Patients pay for each visit or through their medical insurance.

Nurses are the business. They run the triage, the chronic medicine reviews, the vaccinations and most of the follow-up care, and patients come back to the nurses they know. In 2025, 30 of Silvertree's 96 nurses left (Exhibit 3). Each vacancy was covered by agency nurses until it was filled, and agency spending rose from R6.30m to R10.08m (Exhibit 1). At the clinics that lost most nurses, patients waited longest and rated their care lowest (Exhibit 6).

The owners had seen the problem coming. In January 2025 they gave every nurse a 6% pay rise, the largest in Silvertree's history. The staff survey a few months later showed that far more nurses now felt fairly paid; but turnover rose and fewer nurses said they intended to stay (Exhibit 4).

Thandiwe Mokoena joined as head of people in September. Her first act was to read the exit interviews (Exhibit 5). Her second was to visit Observatory, the one clinic where nurses stay. Its manager, Grace Adams, lets the nurses plan the rota together and swap shifts among themselves, and sends one nurse a year on a course of their choosing (Exhibit 8).

Thandiwe has costed five options, from another pay rise to a single contracted agency (Exhibit 7). The investor wants the profit margin back above 10% (Exhibit 9); the founders want clinics where nurses stay and patients see the same faces. The board meets next month.

Section 02: The industry

How the industry works and what is changing in it, in general terms. The figures in this case are the business's own, and simulated.

Primary care clinics are the first stop for most patients: consultations, chronic medicines, vaccinations and minor procedures. In South Africa, private clinics serve patients who pay for each visit or are covered by medical insurance, alongside a large public health system.

Nurses are central to the work and in demand far beyond any one city, so experienced nurses can move between employers, between public and private health care, and between countries. Clinics that cannot keep nurses fill the gaps with agency staff, who cost more and do not know the clinic's patients or systems.

Clinic work runs on rosters of early, late and weekend shifts that must cover the opening hours. For many nurses, how rotas are set, how much say they have in them, and whether there is a path to more skilled work matter as much as pay.

Section 03: The key challenge

Silvertree is losing nurses faster than it can replace them, and the cost appears three times over: in agency fees, in recruitment, and in patients who wait longer to see staff who do not know them. The obvious remedy, more pay, has been tried. The board must choose how to keep its nurses on the evidence of why they leave, at a cost the business can sustain, and without mistaking a cheaper way of covering vacancies for a way of preventing them.

Section 04: Financial information

Revenue grew by 4.0% in 2025, but profit before interest and tax fell from R15.60m to R14.76m, and the profit margin from 10.4% to 9.5%, mainly because agency staff cost R3.78m more. Each nurse who leaves costs Silvertree about R173,000: R45,000 to recruit and induct a replacement, and 80 agency shifts at R1,600 more than an employed nurse's shift while the post is empty. Thirty leavers cost about R5.19m in 2025.

Exhibit 1

Summary of the operating statement (R m)

Source: Simulated data
Item 2024 2025
Revenue150.00156.00
Employed staff81.6082.80
Agency staff6.3010.08
Medical supplies21.0021.84
Premises and other costs25.5026.52
Profit before interest and tax15.6014.76

Agency staff were 1,500 shifts in 2024 and 2,400 in 2025, at R4,200 a shift. Employed staff costs include the 6% pay rise for nurses from January 2025, offset by the pay saved on empty posts.

Source Simulated teaching data, from Silvertree's management accounts.
Exhibit 2

What a nurse's departure costs

Source: Simulated data
Recruitment and induction, per nurse replaced
R45,000
Agency shifts to cover each vacancy
80
An agency nurse's shift
R4,200
An employed nurse's shift, with on-costs
R2,600
Average nurse salary
R420,000 a year

Each vacancy takes about four months to fill, covered meanwhile by agency nurses. The head of people believes Silvertree's pay is in line with other private clinics in the city.

Source Simulated teaching data, from the people team's records.

Section 05: The rest of the evidence

7 exhibits. Each is labelled with what kind of evidence it is.

Exhibit 3

Nurses by clinic, 2025

Source: Simulated data
Clinic Average number of nurses Nurses who left Labour turnover (%) Vacancies at the year end Agency shifts
Observatory18316.71140
Bellville16743.83610
Mitchells Plain17635.32520
Wynberg15533.32430
Durbanville14428.61300
Sea Point16531.32400
All six clinics963031.3112,400

Labour turnover is the number who left divided by the average number employed, multiplied by 100. Each clinic's manager is a senior nurse who manages all of the clinic's nurses and six administrative staff directly.

Source Simulated teaching data, from the personnel records.
Exhibit 4

Nurses agreeing with each statement in the staff survey (%)

Source: Simulated data
Statement 2024 2025
My pay is fair for the work I do3152
My shift pattern lets me manage my life outside work3834
I have opportunities to develop my skills2927
My manager recognizes good work4139
I intend to be working here in a year5855

81 nurses answered in 2024 and 74 in 2025. The 2025 survey was run in May, four months after the pay rise.

Source Simulated teaching data.
Exhibit 5

Why nurses left in 2025 (exit interviews with 26 of the 30)

Source: Simulated data
Shift patterns and rotas
9
Workload
6
No path to develop or progress
5
Pay
3
The clinic manager
2
Moving away
1

Each leaver gave one main reason.

Source Simulated teaching data, from exit interview notes.
Exhibit 6

Patients by clinic, 2025

Source: Simulated data
Clinic Average wait to be seen (minutes) Patients rating their care good or very good (%)
Observatory2491
Bellville5172
Mitchells Plain4478
Wynberg3981
Durbanville3186
Sea Point3782
Source Simulated teaching data, from the booking system and the patient feedback cards.
Exhibit 7

Five ways to keep nurses, with the head of people's estimates

Source: Simulated data
Option Yearly cost (R m) Forecast labour turnover (%) Nurses leaving a year Yearly cost of turnover (R m) Net yearly effect (R m)
Pay rise of 8%3.2328.026.94.65−2.69
Self-rostering and flexible shifts0.6022.021.13.650.94
Clinical career ladder2.4020.019.23.320.67
Team leaders in every clinic1.5025.024.04.15−0.46
One contracted agency0.0031.330.04.230.96

Turnover in 2025 cost R5.19m. The net yearly effect is that cost less the option's cost of turnover, less the option's own cost, plus any new revenue; a negative figure leaves Silvertree worse off. Turnover forecasts are the head of people's estimates.

  • Pay rise of 8%: a second rise for all 96 nurses.
  • Self-rostering and flexible shifts: nurses plan each clinic's rota together, with rostering software and an hour a week of a manager's time, as at Observatory.
  • Clinical career ladder: senior nurse posts, mentoring, and training towards nurse-led clinics for minor illness, which would bring in about R1.2m a year of new revenue. The effect on turnover is expected from the second year.
  • Team leaders in every clinic: a team leader for every six or so nurses, to narrow each manager's span of control.
  • One contracted agency: a single agency at R3,800 a shift in place of R4,200. Turnover is unchanged.
Source Simulated teaching data, prepared by the head of people.
Exhibit 8

How Observatory does it

Source: Simulated data

I don't set the rota. The nurses sit down once a month and build it together, and they swap among themselves when life happens. My job is to check that every shift is covered and that nobody always gets the worst ones. And every year one of them goes on a course they choose. It costs me an afternoon a month and one course fee.

Grace Adams, clinic manager, Silvertree Observatory
Source Fictional interview, written for this case.
Exhibit 9

The investor's view

Source: Simulated data

We backed Silvertree because it runs good clinics at a fair price and earns a margin above 10%. Agency costs have taken that margin away. We will support any plan that brings it back, but not another pay rise without evidence that it will keep people.

Lindiwe Dube, partner, Atlantic Health Partners
Source Fictional email, written for this case.

Section 06: Constraints

  • The nurses' pay was raised by 6% in January 2025. The investor will not support another rise without evidence that it would reduce turnover.
  • Every shift must be covered by a registered nurse, so a vacancy must be filled by an agency nurse until it is filled permanently.
  • A vacancy takes about four months to fill.
  • The board wants a plan it can start within three months, and results it can measure within a year.

Section 07: The people with a stake

Stakeholder Interest Influence Stake Concern
Dr Pieter van Wyk and Dr Aisha Patel, founders and shareholders Good clinics at a fair price, where patients see the same faces. High High A business that runs on agency staff and loses the continuity of care it was built on.
Atlantic Health Partners, investor A margin above 10% and a return on its investment. High Medium Rising costs, and spending that does not change anything.
Thandiwe Mokoena, head of people A plan that deals with why nurses leave. Medium High Being asked for a quick saving rather than a lasting fix.
Nurses Workable rotas, a manageable workload, development and fair pay. Medium High Rotas that leave no room for life outside work, and no way to progress.
Clinic managers Fully staffed clinics they have time to run. Medium High Giving up control of the rota, or adding work to an already wide span of control.
Patients Short waits and staff who know them. Low High Longer waits and a different nurse at every visit.
Nursing agencies Selling shifts. Low Medium Losing business if Silvertree keeps its nurses.

Section 08: Strategic alternatives

A further pay rise of 8%

Raise every nurse's pay again, by 8%.

Requires
R3.23m a year, and the investor's agreement.
Upside
A clear signal that nurses are valued; simple to do at once.
Risks
The survey shows that pay is no longer the main complaint, and only 3 of 26 leavers named it; the forecast effect is small for the cost.

Evidence: Exhibit 4, Exhibit 5, Exhibit 7

Self-rostering and flexible shifts

Let each clinic's nurses plan the rota together and swap shifts among themselves, as Observatory does.

Requires
Rostering software, an hour a week of each manager's time, and rules that keep the rota fair.
Upside
The cheapest option that acts on the main reason nurses give for leaving, with evidence from Silvertree's own best clinic.
Risks
Rotas could become unfair to nurses with less say; managers must accept giving up control; it does nothing for development.

Evidence: Exhibit 3, Exhibit 5, Exhibit 7, Exhibit 8

A clinical career ladder

Create senior nurse posts, mentoring and training towards nurse-led clinics for minor illness.

Requires
R2.4m a year, training places, and doctors willing to support nurse-led clinics.
Upside
Acts on development, which nurses rate lowest, and adds about R1.2m a year of revenue from nurse-led clinics.
Risks
Slow, with the effect on turnover expected from the second year; better-trained nurses are also more attractive to other employers.

Evidence: Exhibit 4, Exhibit 5, Exhibit 7

Team leaders in every clinic

Appoint team leaders so that each manager oversees fewer people directly.

Requires
R1.5m a year in allowances, and nurses ready to lead.
Upside
Narrows a span of control of more than twenty, giving nurses someone with time to support them.
Risks
The smallest forecast effect after the pay rise, and it leaves rotas as they are.

Evidence: Exhibit 3, Exhibit 7

One contracted agency

Buy all agency shifts from one agency at a discounted rate of R3,800 a shift.

Requires
A contract with one agency.
Upside
Saves about R0.96m a year at once, the largest saving on paper.
Risks
Does nothing to keep nurses; turnover, waiting times and the loss of familiar faces continue.

Evidence: Exhibit 6, Exhibit 7

Section 09: Questions for analysis

Original practice questions written for this case, not IB examination questions. The marks are each question's own allocation, set to the size of the task. Answer first, then open the guidance.

Source: Original practice question
Show content for

Showing everything. HL-only material is marked HL.

  1. Define the term non-financial rewards.

    Define AO1 2.4 Motivation and demotivation

    Guidance for a strong answer
    Source: Assessment explanation The platform's guidance, not an official markscheme.

    One mark for rewards that are not paid in money, and one for an example or a fuller statement of what they include, such as job enrichment, empowerment or teamwork. At Silvertree, a say in the rota and a course each year are non-financial rewards.

    [2 marks]

  2. Using Exhibit 3, calculate the labour turnover in 2025 at Observatory, at Bellville and across all six clinics.

    Calculate AO4 Paper 2 style 2.4 Motivation and demotivation Exhibit 3 HL

    Guidance for a strong answer
    Source: Assessment explanation The platform's guidance, not an official markscheme.

    Observatory: 3 ÷ 18 × 100 = 16.7%. Bellville: 7 ÷ 16 × 100 = 43.8%. All six clinics: 30 ÷ 96 × 100 = 31.3%.

    One mark for the method and one for each correct answer, with no more than four in all. Divide by the average number employed, not the number at the end of the year.

    [4 marks]

  3. Using Exhibits 2 and 3, calculate the cost to Silvertree of the nurses who left in 2025.

    Calculate AO4 Paper 2 style 3.3 Costs and revenues; 2.4 Motivation and demotivation Exhibit 2, Exhibit 3

    Guidance for a strong answer
    Source: Assessment explanation The platform's guidance, not an official markscheme.

    Agency premium per shift = R4,200 − R2,600 = R1,600. Cost per leaver = R45,000 + 80 × R1,600 = R173,000. Cost of 30 leavers = 30 × R173,000 = R5,190,000, or R5.19m.

    One mark for the premium, one for the cost per leaver, one for multiplying by the leavers and one for the answer. The premium, not the whole agency rate, is the extra cost: Silvertree would have paid an employed nurse for the shift anyway.

    [4 marks]

  4. Using Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theory, explain why the 2025 pay rise did not reduce nurse turnover.

    Explain AO2 2.4 Motivation and demotivation Exhibit 4, Exhibit 5

    Guidance for a strong answer
    Source: Assessment explanation The platform's guidance, not an official markscheme.

    Two marks for the theory: hygiene factors, such as pay and working conditions, cause dissatisfaction when they are poor but do not motivate when they are good; motivators, such as achievement, recognition and growth, do. Two marks for applying it with the evidence: the share who felt fairly paid rose from 31% to 52%, yet intention to stay fell from 58% to 55%; the leavers named rotas and development far more often than pay.

    [4 marks]

  5. Using Exhibit 3, explain how the clinic managers' span of control might contribute to nurses leaving.

    Explain AO2 2.2 Organizational structure Exhibit 3

    Guidance for a strong answer
    Source: Assessment explanation The platform's guidance, not an official markscheme.

    Each manager directly manages all of a clinic's nurses (between fourteen and eighteen) and six administrative staff, a span of control of more than twenty. Two marks for explaining what a wide span means; two for the effect in the case: little time for each nurse, little recognition or coaching, and rotas set from above, all of which appear in the survey and the exit interviews.

    [4 marks]

  6. Explain how Deci and Ryan's self-determination theory supports the self-rostering option.

    Explain AO2 2.4 Motivation and demotivation Exhibit 8 HL

    Guidance for a strong answer
    Source: Assessment explanation The platform's guidance, not an official markscheme.

    Two marks for the theory: people are motivated from within when three needs are met, autonomy, competence and relatedness. Two marks for applying it: building the rota together gives nurses autonomy over their working lives; swapping among themselves builds relatedness; and Observatory's yearly course supports competence. Answers that name the three needs without the case earn two marks at most.

    [4 marks]

  7. Evaluate self-rostering and the clinical career ladder as ways for Silvertree to reduce nurse turnover.

    Evaluate AO3 2.4 Motivation and demotivation; 2.1 Introduction to human resource management Exhibit 4, Exhibit 5, Exhibit 7, Exhibit 8

    Guidance for a strong answer
    Source: Assessment explanation The platform's guidance, not an official markscheme.

    A strong answer does four things.

    • It uses the evidence on why nurses leave: rotas (9 of 26), workload (6), development (5) and pay (3).
    • It weighs self-rostering: cheap, at R0.60m a year, quick, tested at Observatory and aimed at the main reason; but dependent on managers giving up control, and silent on development.
    • It weighs the career ladder: aimed at development, with new revenue, but slow, dearer and at risk of training nurses for other employers.
    • It reaches a judgement, such as using both in sequence, and says how Silvertree would know within a year whether it had worked.

    Answers that treat the estimates in Exhibit 7 as certain, or that ignore the cause of turnover, stay in the middle of the range.

    [10 marks]

HL-only questions are hidden in the SL view. Choose HL above to see them.

Section 10: The decision exercise

Decide before you read the debrief. The exercise is the platform's own; it is not an IB task.

Your role

You are Thandiwe Mokoena, Silvertree's head of people.

The board meets next month: the two founders and the investor's partner, Lindiwe Dube. The investor will not fund another pay rise without evidence; the founders want clinics where nurses stay. You have the exit interviews, two years of surveys, the clinic figures and your estimates of five options.

The task
Recommend one option, or a sequence led by one, and show why it will keep nurses.
What to produce
A recommendation to the board of about 250 words, with the evidence for it, its yearly cost and effect, and how you will measure it.
Time
35 minutes

Choose one of the strategic alternatives and write down your reasons before you open the debrief below. With JavaScript on, this page keeps your decision on this device and shows how the evidence judges the alternative you chose.

Make your decision

Which alternative do you choose?
The alternative you choose, the evidence for it, its main risk, and what would change your mind, at the length the task asks for. 0 words

Section 11: The debrief

The worked analysis, then every alternative judged against the evidence. One defensible reading, not the only one: try your own first.

Read the debrief
Source: Arjun Agrawal framework

Silvertree's problem is not pay. The pay rise moved the measure it was meant to move, and turnover rose anyway. The evidence from the exit interviews, the survey and Observatory points to the rota, the workload and the lack of a future. The strongest answers follow that evidence, and notice that the cheapest option on paper, a contracted agency, is a way of paying less for the problem rather than solving it.

The worked analysis

DataWhat the exhibits say

  • 30 of 96 nurses left in 2025, a labour turnover of 31.3%, from 16.7% at Observatory to 43.8% at Bellville (Exhibit 3).
  • Turnover cost about R5.19m, R173,000 for each leaver, and agency spending rose from R6.30m to R10.08m (Exhibits 1 and 2).
  • After the pay rise, nurses agreeing that their pay is fair rose from 31% to 52%, but those intending to stay fell from 58% to 55%; agreement fell on rotas (34%) and development (27%) (Exhibit 4).
  • Rotas were the main reason for 9 of 26 leavers, workload for 6, development for 5 and pay for 3 (Exhibit 5).

InsightWhat it means

  • In Herzberg's terms, pay was a hygiene factor. Raising it removed a source of dissatisfaction, but it did not make nurses want to stay, because what drives them out is the rota and the lack of a future.
  • Observatory shows what works at Silvertree itself. Nurses who control their rota and can develop stay, and its patients wait least and rate their care highest.
  • The contracted agency and self-rostering save almost the same on paper, R0.96m and R0.94m a year, but only one of them reduces the number of nurses who leave.

OptionsWhat each choice does

  • A further pay rise costs R3.23m a year and leaves Silvertree R2.69m worse off on the head of people's estimates.
  • Self-rostering is the cheapest real fix, at R0.60m a year, and acts on the main reason for leaving.
  • The career ladder acts on development and brings in new revenue, but slowly.
  • Team leaders narrow the span of control at a net cost of R0.46m a year.
  • The contracted agency saves money and changes nothing else.

RecommendationOne defensible answer

One defensible recommendation: introduce self-rostering in every clinic now, using Observatory's method, with rules that keep weekend and late shifts fair and Grace Adams to help the other managers. Start the career ladder in the two clinics with the highest turnover, Bellville and Mitchells Plain, and extend it if turnover there falls. Negotiate a single-agency rate as well, because vacancies will continue for a while and it saves money on cover without pretending to solve the problem. Measure each clinic's turnover, agency shifts and waiting times every quarter.

CaveatWhen it would change

The estimates of turnover are judgements, not results, and Observatory may be different in ways that do not transfer: a manager with Grace Adams's skills, or nurses who live nearby. If self-rostering does not reduce turnover at the first clinics within six months, the explanation is probably workload or management rather than the rota, and the board should look again at team leaders and staffing levels.

Every alternative, judged

  1. A further pay rise of 8%

    Weakly supported by the evidence

    Pay is no longer the main complaint: the share who feel fairly paid rose from 31% to 52% after the last rise, and only 3 of 26 leavers named it. A further rise of 8% costs R3.23m a year and, on the head of people's estimate, leaves Silvertree R2.69m worse off. It treats a hygiene factor that is already largely fixed.

  2. Self-rostering and flexible shifts

    Best supported by the evidence

    The cheapest real fix, at R0.60m a year, with a net gain of R0.94m on the estimates. It acts on the most common reason for leaving, gives nurses autonomy, and has worked at Silvertree's own best clinic, where turnover is 16.7%. Its risks are fairness between nurses and managers who resist giving up control, which clear rules and Grace Adams's example can address.

  3. A clinical career ladder

    Defensible if its conditions hold

    It acts on development, which nurses rate lowest, and adds about R1.2m a year of revenue, for a net gain of R0.67m from the second year. But it is slow, and it makes nurses more employable elsewhere. Strong as a second step, after the rota, in the clinics that lose most nurses.

  4. Team leaders in every clinic

    Defensible if its conditions hold

    A span of control of more than twenty is a real problem, and team leaders would give nurses support. But the forecast effect is modest, the net cost is R0.46m a year, and it leaves the rota as it is. Worth doing if self-rostering shows that management, not the rota, is the cause.

  5. One contracted agency

    Weakly supported by the evidence

    The largest saving on paper, R0.96m a year, and no effect at all on why nurses leave. Turnover stays at 31.3%, the agency shifts continue, and patients keep meeting staff who do not know them. A sensible purchase alongside a real fix, not instead of one.

The trade-offs

  • Cost of cover against cost of causes. A cheaper agency lowers the cost of each vacancy; only the other options reduce the number of vacancies.
  • Speed against depth. Self-rostering can start in weeks; the career ladder builds a future but takes two years.
  • Control against autonomy. Self-rostering asks managers to give up a source of control to keep their teams.
  • Money against meaning. Pay addresses a hygiene factor; development and autonomy address motivators.

The evidence that matters most

  • The pay rise that worked on the survey and not on turnover (Exhibit 4).
  • The exit interviews, led by rotas and workload (Exhibit 5).
  • Observatory, with the lowest turnover, the shortest waits and the best ratings (Exhibits 3, 6 and 8).
  • The cost of a leaver, which is mostly agency premium (Exhibit 2).

What would change the recommendation

  • Self-rostering at the first clinics does not reduce turnover within six months. Look at workload and management instead.
  • Observatory's results turn out to depend on Grace Adams rather than on the method. Invest in the managers.
  • Other employers raise nurses' pay sharply. Pay could become a reason for leaving again.

Common errors

  • Recommending more pay because pay usually motivates, without reading the survey and the exit interviews.
  • Treating the contracted agency's saving as a solution.
  • Calculating labour turnover with the number of nurses at the end of the year rather than the average.
  • Using Herzberg to label factors without showing which ones the evidence points to.

Section 12: Theories and frameworks

The theories and tools this case calls for, each with how it applies here and where the platform teaches it.

HL-only frameworks are hidden in the SL view.

Section 13: For seminar discussion

Prompts for undergraduate and MBA seminars. They go beyond the IB course and are labelled as enrichment.

Source: Enrichment
  1. Silvertree's investor sees turnover as a cost problem; its founders see it as a problem of care. How should a board weigh a saving that leaves patients meeting unfamiliar staff against a fix whose financial effect is uncertain?
  2. The career ladder makes nurses more valuable to other employers. Is investing in people who may leave a mistake, or the price of being an employer they want to stay with?
  3. Observatory may work because of Grace Adams rather than her method. How would you design the roll-out so that the board learns which it is?