Case file · FMCG (fast-moving consumer goods)

Tausi Beverages

A Nairobi drinks and foods maker has four products in four positions, and money to back only part of its portfolio.

Source: Simulated data Fictional organization Foundation Updated 3 November 2026

The decision

Where should Tausi spend its KSh 120m marketing and development reserve for 2026?

Tausi's original mango nectar still earns most of its money but has started to lose share. Its porridge flour leads a fast-growing segment and has run out of capacity, its ginger drink grows quickly but loses money, and its cheap cola is fading in a shrinking segment. The board has set aside KSh 120m for 2026, and the marketing manager has four plans that each spend all of it. The plans that promise most over three years are the least certain, and the research behind them may not describe Tausi's own customers.

Organization
Tausi Beverages
Sector
Packaged drinks and foods (fast-moving consumer goods)
Location
Nairobi, Kenya
Size
One factory and a distribution depot, 310 employees
Legal form
Private limited company, owned by the Kamau family
Figures in
KES (KSh), millions of Kenyan shillings (KSh m)
Functions
Marketing, Finance and accounts
For
IB DP SL, IB DP HL, Undergraduate
Key concepts
Creativity, Change
Status
Fictional case. An invented organization. Every figure is simulated for teaching and checked for consistency.

Section 01: The story so far

Joseph Kamau started Tausi Beverages in 2009 with a second-hand filling machine and a mango nectar made from fruit bought at a market outside Nairobi. Sixteen years later Tausi employs 310 people at a factory in Nairobi's Industrial Area, and its four products are sold in supermarkets, petrol station shops and thousands of small neighbourhood shops across Nairobi and central Kenya. Joseph's daughter, Wanjiru Kamau, became managing director in 2021; Joseph still chairs the board.

The four products have very different stories. Mango Nectar, the original, is still the best-selling juice in the shops that Tausi's research agency audits, but its share has started to slip. Uji Power, a fortified millet porridge flour launched in 2018, leads a segment that is growing fast. Ginger Zing, a sharp ginger and lemon drink in a can, launched in 2023, is growing quickly from a small base in the fastest-growing segment of all. Tausi Cola, launched in 2015 to compete on price with the global brands, is losing ground in a shrinking segment (Exhibits 3 and 4).

The business is still profitable, but less so each year. Revenue has grown, while profit before interest and tax fell from KSh 170m in 2023 to KSh 148m in 2025 (Exhibit 2). Mango Nectar earns most of the money; Ginger Zing loses money once its marketing is paid for, and Tausi Cola earns little (Exhibit 1).

For 2026 the board has set aside KSh 120m of retained profit for marketing and development, on top of the normal budgets. Brian Otieno, the marketing manager, has worked up four plans, each costing the full amount (Exhibit 7). Hassan Abdi, the head of sales, wants the money behind Ginger Zing, which he believes could be the company's next Mango Nectar. Faith Njeri, the finance manager, points out that the plan with the best two-year return protects the products Tausi already has. And Joseph does not want to drop a product the distributors have stocked for ten years.

Brian has two more pieces of evidence: a price test of Ginger Zing in 120 shops (Exhibit 5) and a survey of shoppers (Exhibit 6). He is not sure how far to trust either. Wanjiru wants his recommendation for the board in January.

Section 02: The industry

How the industry works and what is changing in it, in general terms. The figures in this case are the business's own, and simulated.

Packaged drinks and foods are fast-moving consumer goods: bought often, at low prices and in large volumes, with a small margin on each unit. Profit comes from volume and from the brand. A brand that customers ask for earns shelf space, a better price and loyalty, and it costs money to build and to keep.

In much of East Africa, a large part of these sales goes through small neighbourhood shops supplied by distributors, alongside supermarkets and petrol station shops. Reaching the small shops takes a distribution network, credit for shopkeepers and support at the point of sale, such as branded coolers. Global drinks brands compete in the same shops with far larger budgets for advertising and promotion.

Tastes change. Concern about sugar is growing among parents and schools, drinks sold for energy, digestion or other benefits are a growing category, and busy households buy more convenient foods. Each product therefore has its own life cycle, and a company with several products has to decide which to build, which to milk for cash and which to let go.

Section 03: The key challenge

Tausi has four products in four different positions, and money to back only part of its portfolio. The product that earns the most is mature and starting to lose share; the fastest-growing one loses money; the most promising one already leads a growing segment but cannot make any more; and the oldest challenger is losing in a shrinking segment. The board has to decide where the reserve will do most for the company over the next three years, on estimates that are least certain for the plans that promise most, and on research that may not reach the shops where most of Tausi's sales are made.

Section 04: Financial information

Revenue grew from KSh 1,980m in 2023 to KSh 2,240m in 2025, but profit before interest and tax fell from KSh 170m to KSh 148m, and the profit margin from 8.6% to 6.6% (Exhibit 2). Exhibit 1 shows where the profit comes from. Mango Nectar earns KSh 462m of contribution after its marketing, more than two thirds of the total; Uji Power earns KSh 198m; Tausi Cola KSh 33m; and Ginger Zing loses KSh 15m, because its marketing costs more than its contribution.

Exhibit 1

Contribution by product, 2025 (KSh m)

Source: Simulated data
Item Mango Nectar Ginger Zing Uji Power Tausi Cola Total
Revenue1,3201006002202,240
Variable costs792653721651,394
Contribution5283522855846
Marketing66503022168
Contribution after marketing462−1519833678

Variable costs are ingredients, packaging, filling and delivery, and rise with the volume sold. Marketing is each product's own advertising and promotion. Fixed overheads of KSh 530m (the factory, the distribution depot and administration) are not shared between products: contribution after marketing of KSh 678m less fixed overheads gives a profit before interest and tax of KSh 148m.

Source Simulated teaching data, from Tausi's management accounts.
Exhibit 2

The company, 2023 to 2025

Source: Simulated data
Year Revenue (KSh m) Profit before interest and tax (KSh m) Profit margin (%)
20231,9801708.6
20242,1201607.5
20252,2401486.6
Source Simulated teaching data, from Tausi's annual accounts.

Section 05: The rest of the evidence

5 exhibits. Each is labelled with what kind of evidence it is.

Exhibit 3

The retail audit, sales in the panel shops (KSh m at shelf prices)

Source: Simulated data
Segment Segment sales 2024 Segment sales 2025 Tausi's brand 2024 Tausi's brand 2025 Largest rival 2025
Juices and nectars4,8004,9441,4401,4581,020
Ginger and functional drinks9001,1705482410
Fortified porridge flours1,2501,500400510300
Colas6,0005,8802402063,700

The audit records the sales of 1,600 shops of every kind in Nairobi and central Kenya, chosen by a research agency to represent the area. Shares calculated from it are shares of sales in these shops, at shelf prices, not shares of the whole market. Tausi's brand in each segment: Mango Nectar in juices and nectars, Ginger Zing in ginger and functional drinks, Uji Power in fortified porridge flours, and Tausi Cola in colas. The largest rival is the biggest brand in the segment other than Tausi's.

Source Simulated teaching data, from a fictional retail audit agency.
Exhibit 4

The four products

Source: Simulated data
Product Launched Pack and shelf price Who buys it Notes
Mango Nectar2009500 ml bottle, KSh 90; 1 litre, KSh 160Families; sold almost everywhereReal fruit, but sweeter than some schools now want in lunchboxes.
Ginger Zing2023330 ml can, KSh 80Young adults; mainly supermarkets and petrol station shopsFew small shops stock it, and fewer have a cooler for it.
Uji Power20181 kg pack, KSh 210ParentsMillet and sorghum flour with added vitamins and minerals. Its packing line runs at full capacity.
Tausi Cola2015500 ml bottle, KSh 60Price-conscious buyersCheaper than the global colas. Its bottling line could also fill Ginger Zing in bottles.
Source Simulated teaching data, from the marketing department.
Exhibit 5

The Ginger Zing price test

Source: Simulated data
Measure Before the test During the test
Shelf price (KSh a can)80.0070.00
Cans sold per shop per week40.0052.00
Tausi's revenue per can (KSh)48.0042.00
Variable cost per can (KSh)31.2031.20
Contribution per can (KSh)16.8010.80
Contribution per shop per week (KSh)672.00561.60

In 120 panel shops the shelf price was cut from KSh 80 to KSh 70 for eight weeks; the first column is the same shops in the eight weeks before. Tausi receives 60% of the shelf price; the rest goes to the distributor and the shop. Tausi's variable cost is KSh 31.20 a can at either price.

Source Simulated teaching data, from the research agency's test.
Exhibit 6

The shopper survey

Source: Simulated data
Shoppers interviewed
300 Outside two Nairobi supermarkets, on two Saturdays
Aged 18 to 35
71%
Would buy Ginger Zing again (of those who had tried it)
62%
Find Mango Nectar too sweet
41%
Would try a ready-to-drink porridge
55%

Interviewers stopped shoppers who were willing to answer. Most of Tausi's sales are made in small neighbourhood shops, where nobody was asked.

Source Simulated teaching data, from a survey run by the marketing department.
Exhibit 7

Four plans for the KSh 120m reserve (KSh m)

Source: Simulated data
Plan Spending in 2026 Extra in 2026 Extra in 2027 Extra in 2028 Three-year total Total less spending
A. Back the challenger1202090150260140
B. Protect the core120608590235115
C. Prune and focus1203595130260140
D. Launch a new product12056014020585

Extra is the change in contribution after marketing compared with carrying on as now, before the plan's own spending. The estimates are the marketing manager's; those for 2028 are the least certain.

  • A. Back the challenger: KSh 90m behind Ginger Zing (advertising, sampling at colleges and events, and 400 branded coolers in shops) and KSh 30m for a 250 ml pack of Mango Nectar. Assumes Ginger Zing reaches 15% of its segment by the end of 2027.
  • B. Protect the core: KSh 70m to extend Mango Nectar's life (a reduced-sugar recipe, the 250 ml pack and new labels) and KSh 50m for a second Uji Power packing line. Assumes Mango Nectar holds its share and Uji Power's segment keeps growing.
  • C. Prune and focus: drop Tausi Cola, losing its KSh 33m a year of contribution after marketing; KSh 60m for the second Uji Power line and KSh 60m behind Ginger Zing, filled in bottles on the cola line as well as in cans.
  • D. Launch a new product: KSh 110m to develop and launch Uji Power To Go, a ready-to-drink porridge in bottles, from September 2026, and KSh 10m for new Mango Nectar labels.
Source Simulated teaching data, prepared by the marketing manager.

Section 06: Constraints

  • The reserve for 2026 is KSh 120m, on top of the normal budgets, and the board will not borrow for marketing.
  • Uji Power's packing line runs at full capacity. More Uji Power needs a second line, which takes about four months to install.
  • Distributors expect a full range. Dropping a product means telling them, and some may ask for better terms on the rest.
  • A new food product needs certification before it can be sold, which Tausi expects to take about four months.

Section 07: The people with a stake

Stakeholder Interest Influence Stake Concern
Wanjiru Kamau, managing director Profitable growth, and a portfolio with a future. High High Spending the reserve on the wrong product.
Joseph Kamau, founder and chair The brand, and the relationships he built with distributors. High High Dropping a product the distributors have stocked for ten years.
Brian Otieno, marketing manager A plan that builds the brands. Medium High Estimates he cannot defend if they turn out wrong.
Hassan Abdi, head of sales Products his team can sell into shops. Medium Medium Losing the cola, which gets the sales team into price-conscious shops.
Faith Njeri, finance manager A return on the reserve. Medium Medium A plan that earns back less than it spends for two years.
Distributors A full range that sells, on good terms. High Medium Fewer products to sell, or new ones that do not move.
Small shopkeepers Products that sell fast, credit, and coolers. Medium Medium Stock that ties up their money.
Customers Taste, price and, increasingly, health. Medium Medium The sugar in drinks, and rising prices.
Employees on the cola line Their jobs. Low High Being moved or laid off if the cola is dropped.

Section 08: Strategic alternatives

A. Back the challenger

Put KSh 90m behind Ginger Zing, in advertising, sampling and branded coolers, and KSh 30m into a smaller Mango Nectar pack.

Requires
Ginger Zing reaching 15% of its segment by the end of 2027, and shops willing to give it cooler space.
Upside
Joint best over three years, at KSh 260m, in the fastest-growing segment Tausi is in.
Risks
Depends on more than doubling Ginger Zing's share against a rival five times its size; leaves Uji Power's line full and the cola fading.

Evidence: Exhibit 3, Exhibit 5, Exhibit 7

B. Protect the core

Extend Mango Nectar's life with a reduced-sugar recipe, a smaller pack and new labels, and add a second Uji Power packing line.

Requires
Mango Nectar holding its share, and the Uji Power segment continuing to grow.
Upside
The best two-year return and the lowest risk.
Risks
Spends most on a mature product in a slow-growing segment, and postpones every decision about Ginger Zing and the cola.

Evidence: Exhibit 1, Exhibit 3, Exhibit 7

C. Prune and focus

Drop Tausi Cola, and use its line and the reserve for a second Uji Power line and a push behind Ginger Zing.

Requires
Distributors who accept the loss of the cola, and a new job on the line for its employees.
Upside
Joint best over three years, at KSh 260m, with the money behind the two products in growing segments.
Risks
Distributors and price-conscious shops may react badly to losing the cola; Ginger Zing still has to grow.

Evidence: Exhibit 1, Exhibit 3, Exhibit 4, Exhibit 7

D. Launch a new product

Develop and launch Uji Power To Go, a ready-to-drink porridge in bottles, from September 2026.

Requires
Certification in time, and customers who will buy porridge as a drink.
Upside
A new product that uses the strength of the Uji Power brand, with the largest promise for 2028.
Risks
The lowest three-year return, the most uncertainty, and demand evidence from a survey of supermarket shoppers only.

Evidence: Exhibit 6, Exhibit 7

Section 09: Questions for analysis

Original practice questions written for this case, not IB examination questions. The marks are each question's own allocation, set to the size of the task. Answer first, then open the guidance.

Source: Original practice question
Show content for

Showing everything. HL-only material is marked HL.

  1. Define the term product portfolio.

    Define AO1 4.5 The seven Ps of the marketing mix

    Guidance for a strong answer
    Source: Assessment explanation The platform's guidance, not an official markscheme.

    One mark for the range of products a business sells, and one for the idea that they are managed together, so that the business can balance products at different stages of their life cycles. Tausi's portfolio is its four products.

    [2 marks]

  2. Using Exhibit 3, calculate (i) Ginger Zing's market share in the panel shops in 2025 and (ii) the growth of the ginger and functional drinks segment from 2024 to 2025.

    Calculate AO4 Paper 2 style 4.1 Introduction to marketing Exhibit 3

    Guidance for a strong answer
    Source: Assessment explanation The platform's guidance, not an official markscheme.

    (i) Market share = 82 ÷ 1,170 × 100 = 7.0%. (ii) Market growth = (1,170 − 900) ÷ 900 × 100 = 30.0%.

    Two marks for each: one for the method and one for the answer. Say what the share describes: sales in the panel shops, at shelf prices, not the whole market.

    [4 marks]

  3. Using Exhibits 1 and 3, analyse Tausi's product portfolio with the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) matrix.

    Analyse AO2 4.5 The seven Ps of the marketing mix; 4.1 Introduction to marketing Exhibit 1, Exhibit 3

    Guidance for a strong answer
    Source: Assessment explanation The platform's guidance, not an official markscheme.

    A strong answer places each product with figures, then draws the implication.

    • Uji Power: a star, with 34.0% of a segment growing at 20.0%, selling 1.7 times its largest rival.
    • Mango Nectar: a cash cow, the leader of a segment growing at 3.0%, earning KSh 462m after marketing.
    • Ginger Zing: a question mark, with 7.0% of a segment growing at 30.0%, a fifth of its largest rival's sales, and a loss after marketing.
    • Tausi Cola: a dog, with 3.5% of a segment shrinking by 2.0%, a small fraction of its rival's sales.

    The implication earns the higher marks: the cash cow's cash should build the star and decide the question mark, and the dog's future should be questioned. Placing products without figures earns half the marks at most.

    [6 marks]

  4. Explain one extension strategy Tausi could use for Mango Nectar.

    Explain AO2 4.5 The seven Ps of the marketing mix Exhibit 4, Exhibit 6

    Guidance for a strong answer
    Source: Assessment explanation The platform's guidance, not an official markscheme.

    Two marks for a relevant extension strategy and two for explaining how it would lengthen the product's life in Tausi's situation. Strong examples from the case: a reduced-sugar recipe, which answers the 41% of surveyed shoppers who find it too sweet and the schools' concern; a 250 ml pack for lunchboxes, which opens a new use; or new labels to refresh a long-established product.

    [4 marks]

  5. Explain two limitations of the shopper survey in Exhibit 6 as evidence for Tausi's decision.

    Explain AO2 4.4 Market research Exhibit 6

    Guidance for a strong answer
    Source: Assessment explanation The platform's guidance, not an official markscheme.

    Two limitations, each explained and tied to the case, for two marks each. The sample is a convenience sample of willing supermarket shoppers on two Saturdays, so it is unlikely to represent the people who buy in small neighbourhood shops, where most of Tausi's sales are made; 71% were aged 18 to 35, so parents, who buy Uji Power, are under-represented; and saying you would try a product is not the same as buying it again.

    [4 marks]

  6. Using Exhibit 5, calculate the price elasticity of demand for Ginger Zing.

    Calculate AO4 Paper 2 style 4.5 The seven Ps of the marketing mix Exhibit 5 HL

    Guidance for a strong answer
    Source: Assessment explanation The platform's guidance, not an official markscheme.

    Percentage change in quantity = (52 − 40) ÷ 40 × 100 = 30%. Percentage change in price = (70 − 80) ÷ 80 × 100 = −12.5%. Price elasticity of demand = 30 ÷ −12.5 = −2.4.

    One mark for the two percentage changes and one for the answer. The guide does not list this formula on its formula sheet; the standard form divides the percentage change in quantity demanded by the percentage change in price. Demand is price elastic, because the answer is greater than 1 if the sign is ignored.

    [2 marks]

  7. Using Exhibit 5, explain why the price cut raised the shops' revenue from Ginger Zing but reduced Tausi's contribution.

    Explain AO2 4.5 The seven Ps of the marketing mix Exhibit 5 HL

    Guidance for a strong answer
    Source: Assessment explanation The platform's guidance, not an official markscheme.

    Demand is elastic, so the percentage rise in cans sold (30%) is larger than the percentage fall in price (12.5%), and revenue per shop rises from KSh 3,200 to KSh 3,640 a week. But Tausi's variable cost per can does not fall with the price, so its contribution per can falls from KSh 16.80 to KSh 10.80, and the extra cans do not make up for it: contribution per shop falls from KSh 672 to KSh 561.60 a week. Two marks for the revenue effect and two for the contribution effect, each with figures.

    [4 marks]

  8. Discuss which of the four plans Tausi should choose for its KSh 120m reserve.

    Discuss AO3 4.5 The seven Ps of the marketing mix; 4.1 Introduction to marketing Exhibit 1, Exhibit 3, Exhibit 5, Exhibit 6, Exhibit 7

    Guidance for a strong answer
    Source: Assessment explanation The platform's guidance, not an official markscheme.

    A strong answer does four things.

    • It uses the portfolio: each product's share, growth and contribution, and what the BCG matrix suggests.
    • It compares the plans over two and three years, and notices that the plans that promise most are the least certain.
    • It questions the evidence: the panel's coverage, the convenience sample, and what the price test says about promotion.
    • It reaches a judgement, with a condition or milestone that would show whether it is working.

    Answers that describe all four plans without weighing them stay in the middle of the range.

    [10 marks]

HL-only questions are hidden in the SL view. Choose HL above to see them.

Section 10: The decision exercise

Decide before you read the debrief. The exercise is the platform's own; it is not an IB task.

Your role

You are Brian Otieno, Tausi's marketing manager.

Wanjiru wants your recommendation for the January board meeting. Hassan will argue for Ginger Zing, Faith for the plan with the best two-year return, and Joseph against dropping any product. You have the audit, the product accounts, the price test and the survey, and you know which of them you trust least.

The task
Choose one plan and defend it with the portfolio, the figures and the limits of the evidence.
What to produce
A recommendation of about 250 words, giving the plan, the portfolio reasoning, one milestone that would show it is working, and its main risk.
Time
30 minutes

Choose one of the strategic alternatives and write down your reasons before you open the debrief below. With JavaScript on, this page keeps your decision on this device and shows how the evidence judges the alternative you chose.

Make your decision

Which alternative do you choose?
The alternative you choose, the evidence for it, its main risk, and what would change your mind, at the length the task asks for. 0 words

Section 11: The debrief

The worked analysis, then every alternative judged against the evidence. One defensible reading, not the only one: try your own first.

Read the debrief
Source: Arjun Agrawal framework

Tausi's four products sit in the four boxes of the BCG matrix, and the plans differ in which box they feed. The strongest answers use the matrix as a starting point rather than a verdict: they check it against contribution, capacity and the evidence on how Ginger Zing can grow, and they set a milestone that turns a three-year hope into a decision that can be reviewed.

The worked analysis

DataWhat the exhibits say

  • In the panel shops, Uji Power has 34.0% of a segment growing at 20.0% a year and sells 1.7 times as much as its largest rival; Ginger Zing has 7.0% of a segment growing at 30.0%, a fifth of its largest rival's sales; Mango Nectar leads a segment growing at 3.0%, its share down from 30.0% to 29.5%; and Tausi Cola has 3.5% of a shrinking segment (Exhibit 3).
  • Mango Nectar earns KSh 462m of the KSh 678m of contribution after marketing, while Ginger Zing loses KSh 15m (Exhibit 1).
  • The price test shows elastic demand for Ginger Zing. A 12.5% price cut raised sales by 30%, a price elasticity of −2.4, yet Tausi's contribution per shop fell by 16.4% (Exhibit 5).
  • Over three years Plans A and C are forecast to add KSh 260m each, Plan B KSh 235m and Plan D KSh 205m; over two years Plan B leads (Exhibit 7).

InsightWhat it means

  • On the BCG matrix, Uji Power is a star, Mango Nectar a cash cow, Ginger Zing a question mark and Tausi Cola a dog. The portfolio's logic is to use the cash cow's cash to build the star and settle the question mark, not to spend most of it on the cash cow.
  • Ginger Zing's growth will not come from cutting its price. Demand is elastic, so a lower price sells more cans but earns less. Its route is distribution and promotion, which Plans A and C pay for.
  • The plans that promise most are the least certain, and the evidence behind Plan D, a survey of supermarket shoppers, does not reach the small shops where most of Tausi's sales are made.

OptionsWhat each choice does

  • Plan A backs the question mark hardest and leaves the star short of capacity and the dog in place.
  • Plan B earns most in two years and leaves the portfolio as it is for another year.
  • Plan C reshapes the portfolio, dropping the dog and backing both products in growing segments.
  • Plan D adds a new question mark before the existing one has been settled.

RecommendationOne defensible answer

One defensible recommendation is Plan C. Drop Tausi Cola, whose small share of a shrinking segment earns KSh 33m a year after marketing, and use its line and budget for the products with a future: the second Uji Power line, which lifts the capacity limit on the company's star, and a push behind Ginger Zing through distribution rather than price. Set Ginger Zing a milestone, such as 10% of its segment by the end of 2026, and stop the extra spending if it misses. Keep Mango Nectar's normal budget and test a reduced-sugar recipe within it, because a cash cow needs care, not a large new investment.

CaveatWhen it would change

This rests on two judgements: that Ginger Zing can grow through distribution without price cuts, and that dropping the cola does not cost Tausi shelf space in the shops that bought it with the rest of the range. If the distributors made the cola a condition of stocking the other products, Plan B, which protects what Tausi has, would be the safer choice.

Every alternative, judged

  1. A. Back the challenger

    Defensible if its conditions hold

    It puts most of the money behind the question mark in the fastest-growing segment, which portfolio logic allows, and ties with Plan C over three years at KSh 260m. But it depends on Ginger Zing more than doubling its share, from 7.0% to 15%, against a rival five times its size, and it leaves the cola fading and Uji Power's line full. Defensible with a milestone; risky as a single bet.

  2. B. Protect the core

    Defensible if its conditions hold

    The best two-year return, KSh 145m against spending of KSh 120m, and the lowest risk. But it spends most on the cash cow, in a segment growing at 3.0%, and leaves the questions of Ginger Zing and the cola for another year. A sound short-term choice that postpones the portfolio decision.

  3. C. Prune and focus

    Best supported by the evidence

    The plan that follows the portfolio: it drops the dog, lifts the capacity limit on the star and backs the question mark, funded by the cash cow. It ties with Plan A over three years at KSh 260m, with less resting on a single forecast. Its risks are the distributors' reaction to losing the cola and the people on its line, which the plan answers by filling Ginger Zing there.

  4. D. Launch a new product

    Weakly supported by the evidence

    The most exciting plan and the least supported: the lowest three-year return, KSh 205m, a launch in September with certification still to come, and demand evidence from a convenience sample of supermarket shoppers, 55% of whom said they would try it. Better tested on a small scale once the portfolio is in order.

The trade-offs

  • Two years against three. Plan B leads over two years; Plans A and C over three.
  • Building against milking. Portfolio logic uses the cash cow's cash rather than spending it on the cash cow.
  • Focus against range. Dropping the cola sharpens the portfolio but may cost goodwill with distributors.
  • Volume against margin. Elastic demand rewards a price cut with volume and punishes it in contribution.

The evidence that matters most

  • Each product's share and its segment's growth (Exhibit 3).
  • Where the contribution comes from, and where it is lost (Exhibit 1).
  • The price test, which shows that price cuts are the wrong way to grow Ginger Zing (Exhibit 5).
  • The limits of the survey, which never reached a small shop (Exhibit 6).

What would change the recommendation

  • Distributors make the cola a condition of taking the range. Plan B becomes the safer choice.
  • Ginger Zing's share rises without extra spending. Back it less and Uji Power more.
  • A proper test of Uji Power To Go in small shops shows strong repeat buying. Plan D deserves a second look.

Common errors

  • Placing products on the BCG matrix without figures. Use share against the largest rival and the segment's growth.
  • Treating the 55% who would try a product as forecast sales.
  • Assuming that a price cut which raises revenue also raises profit.
  • Reading the panel's shares as shares of a whole national market.

Section 12: Theories and frameworks

The theories and tools this case calls for, each with how it applies here and where the platform teaches it.

HL-only frameworks are hidden in the SL view.

Section 13: For seminar discussion

Prompts for undergraduate and MBA seminars. They go beyond the IB course and are labelled as enrichment.

Source: Enrichment
  1. The BCG matrix treats market share as a sign of cost advantage and market growth as a sign of cash needs. How well do those signs fit a regional drinks maker competing with global brands in small shops?
  2. Tausi's market data come from an audit of 1,600 shops. What would you ask about the panel before trusting a share calculated to one decimal place, and how would the answers change the decision?
  3. Should a drinks company reformulate a popular, sugary product before customers or regulators insist on it? Weigh the cost of moving first against the risk to the brand of moving late.