Entrepreneurship and innovation · Module 3

Funding strategy and venture capital

Which money fits which venture, how venture capital terms divide the value a start-up creates, and what fund economics demand of the companies they back.

Beyond the IB course UndergraduateMBAProfessional About 25 minutes · 2,788 words · checked 16 November 2026

From the IB course to this module

The IB course covers types of business entity (1.2), capital and revenue expenditure (3.1) and the sources of finance, including share capital, loans, venture capital, business angels and crowdfunding (3.2). The Lab briefing Funding a start-up compares those sources and works through pre-money and post-money valuation and dilution in a single round. This module adds why ventures are funded in stages, the economics of term sheets (option pools, liquidation preferences, anti-dilution and convertible instruments), the economics of venture funds and the power law, the evidence on venture returns and on whether investors add value, and the trade-off founders face between wealth and control.

Section 01: Conceptual foundation

Funding strategy matches the type of money to the risk, size and timing of a venture's needs. Debt needs predictable cash flows or assets to secure it; equity shares both the upside and the risk; customers, suppliers and grants can fund some ventures without either.

Venture capital is a specialized product. A fund buys minority stakes in a small number of young companies, most of which will fail, in the hope that a few become very large. Its contracts, its pace and its appetite for growth follow from that portfolio logic. Most new businesses are unsuited to it, and taking it changes what the business must try to become.

Money also comes with rights. Investors negotiate not only a price but also preferences on exit, protection against later down rounds, board seats and vetoes. Two offers at the same valuation can leave founders with very different outcomes, so terms matter as much as price.

Section 02: Advanced explanation

Why ventures are funded in stages

Founders know more about their venture than investors do, and once funded they may act in ways investors would not choose. Myers and Majluf (1984) showed that such information asymmetry makes outside equity costly, so firms prefer internal funds, then debt, then equity. A start-up has no internal funds and little to pledge as collateral, so it must sell equity to investors equipped to cope with the asymmetry.

Staging is their main tool. Gompers (1995) found that venture capitalists invest in rounds, monitor between them and keep the right, but not the obligation, to continue. Rounds were shorter where agency problems were worse, as in firms rich in intangible assets and research. Each round is a real option: if the venture misses its milestones, investors can stop.

This shapes how founders should raise. A round should fund the venture to a milestone that removes a major risk, such as proof of demand, a working product at scale or regulatory approval, and that raises its value enough to justify the next round at a higher price. Raising too little forces a new round before the milestone; raising too much at a high price creates expectations the next round must exceed, and a down round at a lower price triggers protections that fall hardest on founders and employees.

Term sheet economics: dilution, preferences and control

Pre-money valuation plus new money gives post-money valuation, and the investor's stake is its money divided by post-money. Two details change the founders' outcome. If investors require a new option pool for employees to be created before the round, the dilution falls entirely on existing shareholders, so the effective pre-money valuation of the founders' shares is lower than the headline.

A liquidation preference gives investors their money back before ordinary shareholders on a sale. Under a 1× non-participating preference, each investor takes the larger of its money back or its share of the proceeds; a participating preference takes its money back and then a share of the remainder as well. Seniority decides who is paid first. In a modest sale, preferences can move millions from founders to investors, and in a poor one they can leave ordinary shareholders with nothing.

Anti-dilution clauses compensate investors if a later round is priced lower: a full ratchet resets their price to the new one, while a broad-based weighted average adjusts it partly. Convertible notes and simple agreements for future equity defer the price to the next round, converting at a discount or a capped valuation; the cap works as a hidden valuation.

Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) found that venture contracts separate cash flow rights, voting rights, board rights and liquidation rights, and make them contingent on performance: investors gain control if the venture does badly, and founders regain it if it does well.

Fund economics and the power law

A venture fund is usually a limited partnership with a life of about ten years. Limited partners commit capital; the general partners commonly charge an annual management fee of around 2% of commitments and take around 20% of profits as carried interest (Metrick and Yasuda, 2010). Consider a £200 million fund. Ten years of fees cost about £40 million, leaving £160 million to invest. For limited partners to receive three times their money (£600 million) after carry, the portfolio must return about £700 million, 4.4 times the capital invested.

Returns follow a power law: a few investments produce most of the money. If the fund invests £8 million in a company, that company must return 25 times to repay the whole fund. Investors therefore need companies with a path to very large exits, push for growth over early profit, and may be nearly indifferent between a modest success and a failure, which a founder is not.

The evidence on returns is mixed. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) found that the performance of a firm's successive funds persists strongly, unlike that of mutual funds. Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan (2014) found that venture funds beat public markets strongly for 1990s vintages but not for most raised in the early 2000s. Whether investors add value or just pick well is debated: Sørensen (2007) estimated that much of the better performance of companies backed by experienced investors reflects sorting rather than influence.

Other money, and the price of control

Many ventures should not take venture capital. Bootstrapping and customer prepayments keep control and force discipline. Grants suit research with public benefit. Angels invest smaller sums earlier, often with mentoring. Crowdfunding comes as rewards (pre-selling a product, which also tests demand) or as equity, regulated to protect small investors. Revenue-based finance and venture debt extend runway without dilution but claim cash every month. Corporate venture capital brings strategic partners whose interests may differ from financial investors'. Capital-intensive ventures may use project finance secured on contracted revenues.

Each source buys money with some mixture of control, risk and obligation. Hellmann and Puri (2002) found that venture-backed firms professionalized faster, adopting stock options, formal human resource policies and outside chief executives; founders were more likely to be replaced. Wasserman (2008) described the resulting choice as rich or king: founders who give up control to attract capital and talent tend to own a smaller share of a more valuable company, while those who keep control tend to own more of a less valuable one. Neither choice is wrong; the error is not knowing which one is being made.

Section 03: Models and frameworks

Where each comes from, how to use it, and where it stops being useful.

Gompers (1995)

Staged financing as a real option

Investors fund ventures in rounds tied to milestones, monitor between rounds and keep the option to stop. Shorter stages are used where information problems are greatest.

How to use it

Plan each round to reach a milestone that resolves a major risk; size it with a buffer for delay; and judge offers by how well they fund the path to that milestone.

Where it fails

Frequent rounds absorb management time, and short-termism can push founders to hit visible milestones rather than build lasting value. In hot markets, investors may skip discipline altogether.

Paul A. Gompers (1995). Optimal investment, monitoring, and the staging of venture capital. Journal of Finance.

Myers and Majluf (1984)

The pecking order of finance

Because insiders know more than outside investors, firms prefer internal funds, then debt, then outside equity, which is the most expensive source when information is asymmetric.

How to use it

Ask what a funding choice signals, and reduce the information gap by sharing evidence; it explains why specialized investors who can monitor are needed for young ventures.

Where it fails

Start-ups with no profits or collateral cannot follow the order, and in buoyant markets equity may be cheap and plentiful whatever the theory predicts.

Stewart C. Myers and Nicholas S. Majluf (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13(2).

Kaplan and Strömberg (2003)

Venture contracts and contingent control

Venture contracts allocate cash flow, voting, board and liquidation rights separately and make them depend on performance, shifting control to investors when results disappoint.

How to use it

Read a term sheet as a map of who controls what in which state of the world, and model proceeds for each party at several exit values rather than at the headline valuation.

Where it fails

The evidence comes from US contracts of the 1990s; terms vary with market conditions and jurisdiction, and founders with strong bargaining power can avoid many of them.

Steven N. Kaplan and Per Strömberg (2003). Financial contracting theory meets the real world: an empirical analysis of venture capital contracts. Review of Economic Studies. Andrew Metrick and Ayako Yasuda (2010). Venture Capital and the Finance of Innovation (second edition). John Wiley & Sons.

Wasserman (2008)

Rich versus king

Founders face a trade-off between maximizing the value of their stake (by giving up control to attract resources) and keeping control of their company (at the cost of a smaller, less valuable business).

How to use it

Decide explicitly which matters more before raising, and choose investors, board composition and voting arrangements consistent with that choice.

Where it fails

The trade-off is a tendency, not a law: some founders keep control of very valuable companies, and dual-class shares and founder-friendly markets can soften it.

Noam Wasserman (2008). The founder's dilemma. Harvard Business Review. Noam Wasserman (2012). The Founder's Dilemmas: Anticipating and Avoiding the Pitfalls That Can Sink a Startup. Princeton University Press.

Section 04: Real business applications

Real organizations appear only with dated, cited facts; illustrative examples are labelled.

Real organization, 2025-12

Databricks: a late-stage private round

In December 2025 Databricks announced that it was raising more than $4 billion in a Series L round valuing the company at $134 billion. It reported a revenue run-rate above $4.8 billion, growth of more than 55% a year, positive free cash flow over the previous twelve months and a net retention rate above 140%. The round was led by Insight Partners, Fidelity Management & Research and J.P. Morgan Asset Management, with investors including Andreessen Horowitz, BlackRock, Blackstone, Coatue, GIC, NEA, Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan, Temasek and Thrive Capital. The company said the money would fund product development and research, provide liquidity for employees and support future acquisitions.

Interpretation. The letter L shows how many rounds a company can now raise privately before any listing. The valuation is about 28 times the revenue run-rate, and the new money is about 3% of it, so the round serves price discovery, employee liquidity and acquisition firepower as much as cash need. Liquidity for employees is a substitute for the listing that once provided it.

Real organization, 2019-06

Crowdfunding rules: the FCA's 10% limit

In March 2014 the UK's Financial Conduct Authority set rules for securities-based crowdfunding that allowed anyone to invest up to 10% of their available assets, with more permitted for investors who took advice or had relevant knowledge and experience. It reported, citing Nesta, that £28 million had been raised through securities-based crowdfunding in 2013, an increase of around 600% on 2012, and that £480 million had been lent through loan-based platforms. In June 2019 it confirmed a 10% limit on peer-to-peer investment for retail customers new to the sector unless advised, an assessment of investors' knowledge and experience, and stronger wind-down plans for platforms, in force from 9 December 2019.

Interpretation. Crowdfunding lets a founder test demand and raise money at once, but small investors cannot monitor a company as a venture fund can, so regulation caps their exposure. The cap limits the money available and makes the platform a gatekeeper.

Real organization, 2024-01

Northvolt: financing a capital-intensive venture

By August 2023 the Swedish battery maker Northvolt had raised a $2.3 billion convertible note round (a $1.1 billion note in July 2022 extended by $1.2 billion), from investors including pension funds, asset managers and Volkswagen Group, and said it had secured over $9 billion of equity and debt to deliver over $55 billion of orders. In January 2024 it signed a $5 billion non-recourse project financing for its Skellefteå gigafactory, which it called the largest green loan raised in Europe, from 23 commercial banks, the European Investment Bank and the Nordic Investment Bank, with guarantees from export credit agencies and the Swedish National Debt Office. It was raised on the back of long-term supply contracts with customers including BMW, Scania, Volvo Cars and Volkswagen, and took total equity and debt to over $13 billion.

Interpretation. A gigafactory is too large for venture funds alone, so financing was layered: convertibles, then project debt secured on contracted revenue and backed by public agencies. Contracts secure demand, not output; the module on scaling and failure follows what happened when production lagged.

Section 05: Case studies

Fictional case, simulated figures

Ferrous Labs: who gets what?

Ferrous Labs (fictional) develops software for steel recyclers. Its two founders held 10,000,000 shares before raising three rounds. The seed investors required a new option pool equal to 10% of the post-money shares, created before their round. Each investor series has a 1× non-participating liquidation preference, Series B ranking first. A trade buyer now offers £120 million for the company.

Ferrous Labs, ownership on a fully diluted basis after each round
Holder or measure After seed After Series A After Series B
Founders70.0%52.5%42.0%
Seed investors20.0%15.0%12.0%
Employee option pool10.0%7.5%6.0%
Series A investors0%25.0%20.0%
Series B investors0%0%20.0%
Amount raised (£m)21230
Pre-money valuation (£m)836120
Post-money valuation (£m)1048150
Price per share (£)0.702.526.30

The seed round's £8 million pre-money valuation included the new option pool. Simulated data.

Questions

  1. The founders sold 20% of the company in the seed round but own 70% after it. Explain why, and calculate the founders' effective pre-money valuation.
  2. Assuming the option pool has been fully granted and exercised, calculate each holder's proceeds from the £120 million sale, and compare the founders' share with a simple pro rata split.
  3. Recalculate the proceeds if Series B's preference were participating.
  4. Above what sale price would Series B prefer to convert, and what do these terms do to the founders' incentives when offered a modest sale?

Section 06: Critical evaluation

What the evidence supports, where the debate is, and what the models leave out.

Some findings are robust. Venture investors stage their funding and write contracts that shift control with performance, as Gompers and Kaplan and Strömberg documented; terms such as liquidation preferences divide outcomes very differently from headline ownership; and venture returns are highly skewed, with a few investments producing most of the money.

The returns to venture capital as an asset class are less settled. Measured performance depends on the period, the benchmark and the data source; strong 1990s vintages lift long-run averages, and many funds have not beaten public markets after fees. Data are reported by funds, and failed funds and companies drop out, so survivorship bias pushes estimates upwards.

Whether venture capital causes success or selects it is the deepest debate. Venture-backed companies grow faster and professionalize sooner, but investors choose promising companies, and studies that separate sorting from influence, such as Sørensen's, find that selection explains much of the difference. Gompers, Gornall, Kaplan and Strebulaev (2020) found that venture capitalists themselves rank the founding team as the most important factor in their decisions, which is consistent with both views.

For founders, the interpretive question is fit. The power law pushes funded companies towards maximum growth, which suits a few and harms many that could have been good, smaller businesses. The Northvolt and Databricks applications show two ends of the spectrum: capital that could not overcome an operational problem, and capital raised from strength to provide liquidity. Founder stories in the press are a biased sample of the successes, so they are poor guides to the typical outcome of taking venture money.

Section 07: Decision exercise

A fictional situation. Decide before you read the guidance.

Which money for Thermapod?

Thermapod (fictional) has developed a compact heat pump for small shops and offices, with 40 installed units and orders for 300 more. It needs £15 million to build an assembly line and fund working capital for two years. The founders own 85% of the company; angels own the rest.

  1. A. Venture capital

    A Series A of £15 million at a £35 million pre-money valuation (30% dilution), with a 1× participating preference, two board seats and a veto over future financing and any sale.

  2. B. Strategic investor plus debt

    £6 million from a large boiler distributor for 15%, with distribution rights in the UK, plus a £9 million asset-backed loan and a government grant towards the line. Less dilution, but the distributor could block sales through rivals, and the loan must be serviced from month 12.

  3. C. Stage it

    Raise £4 million now from existing angels and new ones, lease equipment and use a contract manufacturer for two years, then raise on stronger evidence. Least dilution, but a higher unit cost, slower growth and the risk of missing the market window.

Judge the options on

  • Cost of capital and dilution, including the effect of terms
  • Control and strategic freedom
  • Risk of insolvency
  • Speed to market and capacity to deliver orders
  • Fit between the money and the milestones it must fund
Read the guidance

Compare the offers by their outcomes, not their headline prices. Option A gives the most money and the fastest path to scale, but a participating preference and a veto over any sale give the investor a large claim in modest outcomes and control over the exit. It suits Thermapod only if the founders aim for a very large company and accept losing some control: rich rather than king.

Option B looks cheaper, but distribution rights can shut Thermapod out of rival channels, which may cost more than dilution, and debt repayments from month 12 add insolvency risk to an unproven manufacturing ramp-up. It suits a firm confident of steady early cash flows.

Option C keeps control and treats the next two years as a stage that resolves the main risks, unit cost and reliability at volume, before larger money is raised. Its danger is that competitors scale first. Many boards would choose C if the market window is not urgent, or negotiate A towards a non-participating preference and narrower vetoes if it is. The weakest answer compares valuations without modelling terms.

Section 08: Further reading

  • Paul A. Gompers (1995). Optimal investment, monitoring, and the staging of venture capital. Journal of Finance.

    The evidence that staging and monitoring are how venture investors manage information problems.

  • Steven N. Kaplan and Per Strömberg (2003). Financial contracting theory meets the real world: an empirical analysis of venture capital contracts. Review of Economic Studies.

    How real venture contracts allocate cash flow and control rights, contingent on performance.

  • Robert S. Harris, Tim Jenkinson and Steven N. Kaplan (2014). Private equity performance: what do we know?. Journal of Finance.

    A careful review of the evidence on private equity and venture returns relative to public markets.

  • Thomas Hellmann and Manju Puri (2002). Venture capital and the professionalization of start-up firms: empirical evidence. Journal of Finance.

    Evidence that venture capital professionalizes start-ups, including founder replacement.

  • Noam Wasserman (2012). The Founder's Dilemmas: Anticipating and Avoiding the Pitfalls That Can Sink a Startup. Princeton University Press.

    The founder's dilemmas, including the trade-off between wealth and control, from a large dataset of start-ups.

  • Andrew Metrick and Ayako Yasuda (2010). Venture Capital and the Finance of Innovation (second edition). John Wiley & Sons.

    The economics of venture funds, term sheets and valuation, at MBA level.

Every work cited here is listed in the platform's sources register. Real organizations appear only with facts from the sources shown; everything else is labelled illustrative or fictional.